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Cover
The tall ship Lynx, a replica of a War
of 1812–era privateer, under sail near
Nantucket Island, Massachusetts. In this
issue, author Christopher J. McMahon
discusses the history of maritime trade
warfare and the prospects that it would
be practiced in a future conflict. Lynx
(“America’s privateer”) hails from Nantucket and is owned and operated by the
Lynx Educational Foundation of Newmarket, New Hampshire. The nonprofit
foundation, led by President Donald E.
Peacock, teaches “the history of America’s
struggle to preserve its independence,”
concentrating on the 1812 era.
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FROM THE EDITORS
In this era of globalization, it often is taken as axiomatic that maritime trade
warfare is obsolete. Yet serious analysis of this issue is conspicuous for the most
part by its absence. In “Maritime Trade Warfare: A Strategy for the Twenty-First
Century?,” Christopher J. McMahon sets out to rectify this situation. After an
extensive survey of the role of antitrade warfare—guerre de course—in modern
times, he develops and assesses systematically the arguments both for and against
the likely utility or threat of such warfare today. He notes that most observers
in the years of “globalization” prior to 1914 were similarly convinced that the
economic interests of the great powers would preclude its use in future wars—a
prediction that both world wars showed to be completely unfounded. He also
points out that the United States today, with its far-flung global maritime presence and relatively limited inventory of lift and sustainment shipping, should
be giving more attention to this potential threat than it appears to have done in
recent years. Christopher J. McMahon is the Maritime Administration Emory S.
Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs at the Naval War College (NWC).
There has been much discussion over the last few years of what has come
to be called “gray-zone conflict.” According to some, this kind of conflict—
exemplified in Russia’s relatively bloodless takeover of Crimea—is a fundamentally novel phenomenon. Van Jackson, in “Tactics of Strategic Competition:
Gray Zones, Redlines, and Conflicts before War,” takes issue with this view. He
argues that three interrelated tactics making up gray-zone conflict—avoidance of
“redlines,” the use of intermediaries, and the use of faits accomplis—in fact have
a venerable history, yet stand in need of more-thorough conceptualization. Van
Jackson is a senior lecturer at Victoria University of Wellington.
The present moment is a propitious and critical one for reexamining fundamental aspects of the Navy’s fleet architecture, emerging maritime technologies,
and acquisition challenges. In his timely “Impacts of the Robotics Age on Naval
Force Design, Effectiveness, and Acquisition,” Jeffrey E. Kline makes a compelling case for a new “high-low” force mix that effectively reverses the prevalent
concept centered on large-platform capital ships. Instead, he proposes a forwarddeployed “offensive” force using new, smaller platforms capable of dispersed and
highly autonomous operations and equipped with continuously evolved missile
and sensor systems, while the legacy fleet would become primarily a “defensive”
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13
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or sea-control force dedicated to protection of sea lines of communication. This
argument is very much in line with the Navy’s emerging concept of “distributed
lethality,” while drawing out some of its potentially radical implications. Jeffrey
Kline is a professor of practice in the Operations Research Department of the
Naval Postgraduate School.
In “Organization and Innovation: Integrating Carrier-Launched UAVs,” Greg
Smith also is concerned with the role of unmanned systems in the Navy of the
future, but his focus is on the development of unmanned aerial strike vehicles
and their integration into aircraft carrier operations. Drawing on the literature
on military innovation, he explores in depth the organizational and cultural
challenges involved in realizing the full potential of this revolutionary capability.
Commander Greg Smith, USN, currently is assigned to the staff of the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy.
We turn, finally, to a less familiar—but not, for that reason, less important—
mission of this journal and the institution it serves. The late Vice Admiral James
Stockdale remains a revered figure throughout the U.S. Navy for his exemplary
conduct as a North Vietnamese prisoner of war. As President of the Naval War College, Admiral Stockdale championed the centrality of moral virtue or character in
the development of military leaders, and personally taught a course on the subject.
The Stockdale legacy remains very much alive—as does the “Stockdale Course”—
in the College of today. Over the last half decade, NWC has been at the forefront of
a Navy-wide effort to systematize and strengthen the formation of naval leaders at
every level, with particular emphasis on the development of character.
Questions of ethics and character lead us inevitably to the domain of philosophy. Stockdale himself was influenced deeply by the philosophy of the ancient
Stoics, which he encountered by chance as a graduate student at Stanford. It
takes nothing away from Stockdale to suggest, however, that there are alternatives. Mark N. Jensen, in “Epictetus vs. Aristotle: What Is the Best Way to Frame
the Military Virtues?,” argues that the fourth-century BCE Greek philosopher
Aristotle, because he frames ethical behavior more firmly in its social and political context, may be a better fit for today’s soldiers and sailors. Mark Jensen is a
professor of philosophy at the U.S. Air Force Academy.
Returning to Stockdale, we conclude with two pieces that shed interesting light
on the personality and character of this remarkable officer. Thomas J. Gibbons,
in “Foundations of Moral Obligation: After Forty Years,” provides an account of
the genesis and evolution of the Stockdale Course since its inception, drawing
on unpublished materials in the NWC archives. Finally, also from our archives,
comes a sample of the mind of the man himself, with a brief introduction by
former Stockdale Professor of Ethics at the College Martin L. Cook: “Remarks of
wing commander James B. Stockdale to the pilots of Carrier Air Wing 16 aboard
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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USS Oriskany, at sea en route to the Gulf of Tonkin, on April 29, 1965, one week
before they entered combat.”
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 309).
For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-841-2236).
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President
of the U.S. Naval War College. The College is responsible for educating future leaders, developing their
strategic perspective and critical thinking, and enhancing their capability to advise senior leaders and
policy makers.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer
whose sea-duty assignments have included command
of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 9, and
Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet / Expeditionary
Strike Group 7 / Task Force 76. During his command
of Milius, the ship participated in combat operations
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and his crew
won the Battle Efficiency Award and the Marjorie
Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall combat
readiness.
Admiral Harley attended the University of Minnesota, graduating with a bachelor of arts in political
science, and received master of arts degrees from the
Naval War College and the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Additionally, he
served as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York City.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

On Futurization

as Naval War College (NWC)
President last July, I have identified four broad elements of a
vision under which the institution will Operationalize, Navalize, Futurize, and
Internationalize its education and research efforts, with an overall goal of contributing to the professionalism and capabilities of the nation’s future leaders.
Previously I addressed aspects of the vision’s operationalization component in
the Naval War College Review’s Winter 2017 issue and navalization in the Spring
2017 issue. In this issue I will outline the actions we are taking on futurization.
SINCE ASSUMING MY POSITION

Core Course Modifications
NWC efforts at futurization include an ongoing reassessment of how to prepare
students for the strategic environment that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
articulated in his January 2016 “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,”
with its emphasis on contestation of the maritime system, the rising influence of
the global information system, and the increasing rate of technological change.
Our goal is to produce graduates able to succeed in the dynamic and dangerous
strategic environment of today and tomorrow.
With regard to the information domain, the College has greatly expanded
the cyber content in its curriculum. It also has coordinated with the Naval Postgraduate School on a core cyber curriculum, with overlap in four content areas:
cyber concepts; international cyber law, ethics, and standards; military cyber operations; and cyber policy and strategy. To augment the NWC joint professional
military education curriculum, a series of classified and unclassified sessions on
cyber and emerging technologies offered at the commencement of each academic
year will prepare students better for engaging with the challenges of cyber and
emerging technologies during their research and studies.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13
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Certificate in Ethics and Emerging Military Technology
The College’s new certificate in ethics and emerging military technology (EEMT)
seeks to deepen our students’ understanding of the ethical complexities that new
technology imposes. The certificate option was launched in the fall of 2016 as a
specialized version of our popular electives program. We anticipate that the first
six certificates will be awarded in June 2017.
EEMT students enroll in a trio of relevant ethics and technology courses; complete one additional course (beyond the normal three-course electives sequence);
and write an original, comprehensive, faculty-mentored research paper. They
earn four additional graduate credits and recognition as certificate recipients in
studies highly relevant to the Navy and the nation. Participation in this first-ever
NWC certificate program is voluntary, goes beyond the level of effort required for
the master of arts degree, and is limited to a small number of highly motivated
students.
Certificate candidates will examine the ethical and military relevance of
emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, genetic manipulation,
neuro-enhancements, cyber, cryptology, nano-engineering, 3D printing, robotics, and unmanned systems (air, surface, and maritime). They will apply ethical
reasoning to the challenges and consequences of rapid technological change in
the modern security environment. The courses and research they complete will
help them formulate original perspectives on many potential technologies and
their ethical implications for the profession of arms.
Center for Naval Warfare Studies Initiatives
Our Center for Naval Warfare Studies is directly supporting the Assessment
Division of the CNO staff as they consider different variations of future fleet architectures following work done by the Navy Staff, the MITRE Corporation, and
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Several faculty members are
continuing to support the CNO staff in studying other future fleet architecture
work, looking at the 2030 and 2045 time frames. The center’s talented researchers
also continue to support future thinking and analysis through work with the College’s Center for Cyber Conflict Studies (known as C3S) and the Stockton Center
for the Study of International Law’s work in the area of cyber conflict.
In March 2017, the College sponsored a workshop entitled “Military Innovation and the New Presidential Administration: Lessons from the Past, Solutions
for the Future.” This event focused on the notion that, regardless of what national
security strategy the Trump administration ultimately pursues, maintaining the
U.S. military’s qualitative edge will give his administration and those of his successors greater degrees of freedom in responding to long-term security challenges
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and short-term crises. Given the range of American security responsibilities and
the dictates of geography, the belief is that the United States must out-innovate
its rivals or it will be unable to accomplish American security objectives in the
long term. The workshop also examined the successes and failures of the Defense
Department’s widely reported “Third Offset Strategy” to help chart a proposed
course for the new administration. It focused on practical, policy-oriented issues useful for planning how to maintain the technological advantages of the
U.S. military far into the future. The moderators, panelists, and postworkshop
analysts emphasized implications for USN future strategy, policy, operations,
concepts, and technologies.
Institute for Future Warfare Studies
In February 2017, we opened the Institute for Future Warfare Studies (IFWS) as a
new research and study department aimed at understanding how armed conflict
may evolve in the future and how the U.S. Navy can prepare for it better. The
mission of the new institute is to serve as a cross functional focal point for the
College as we carry out the mission of helping to define the future Navy and its
associated roles and missions.
Anticipating future security challenges is critical to national security, and
navies are expensive and take many years to build. That’s why we have to look
out a long way to figure out what platforms, weapons, and capabilities the Navy
is likely to need in the decades ahead. IFWS will be taking a long-range look at
the warfare needs of the country. This longer time horizon is what differentiates
our new institute from other external organizations that are looking at these issues; while many other forward-looking groups tend to view the next three to
five years as the future, IFWS will be looking out thirty years or more from today.
The institute’s location within the College allows the impressive academic
horsepower housed in Newport to assist IFWS in carrying out its mission. We
believe that this institute will become yet another vital service we provide to Navy
decision makers and stakeholders. We are excited about the research findings that
this group—working with partners in government, academia, and industry—will
provide to NWC, the Office of the CNO, and the fleet.
Future Forces Gallery
For the past eight years, the faculty moderators of the Unmanned Systems and
Conflict in the 21st Century elective have sponsored multiple “futurization”
events each academic year, focusing on emerging technology related to unmanned and robotic systems. These occasional events have brought manufacturers, designers, and government scientists and engineers to campus to provide
informational displays and demonstrations on cutting-edge technologies.
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Such events now are being presented in the College’s newly opened Learning
Commons. To maintain a more persistent “future focus” throughout the year, we
recently established a permanent “Future Forces Gallery” that features graphics,
models, and large, flat-screen monitors to display new systems and concepts as
they are designed, tested, and deployed throughout the services. A trio of “Future
Navy” images by award-winning science-fiction artist John Berkey are featured
prominently in the gallery, and rotating exhibits will ensure that future platforms,
weapons systems, and exotic hardware are kept at the forefront of the minds of
our students, faculty members, and visitors.
Some wise sage once said, “The future is closer than you think.” I agree, and we
want to ensure that our students and our fleet customers not only learn from the
lessons of history but consider them in the context of many possible futures.

JEFFREY A. HARLEY

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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Christopher J. McMahon holds the Maritime Administration Emory S. Land Chair of Merchant Marine
Affairs at the Naval War College. He is a graduate of
the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point,
New York, and holds master’s degrees from American University, Long Island University, and Starr
King School. He holds an unlimited master mariner
license and is a commissioned rear admiral in the
U.S. Maritime Service. He has held several Senior
Executive Service positions with the Department of
Transportation and the Maritime Administration.
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MARITIME TR ADE WARFARE
A Strategy for the Twenty-First Century?
Christopher J. McMahon

The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the
U-Boat peril.

M

WINSTON CHURCHILL

aritime trade warfare, also called commerce warfare, is a naval/military
strategy that has been followed since ancient times.1 The idea of maritime
trade warfare is to attack or neutralize the commercial shipping of one’s enemy
in an effort to disrupt the enemy’s economy, make it more difficult for the enemy
to continue waging war by disrupting the enemy’s military supply chain that uses
the sea, or both.
Maritime trade warfare can take different forms. Until the twentieth century,
close blockades of an enemy’s ports were most common, conducted to prevent
the movement of an enemy’s commercial shipping. In the twentieth century,
with the introduction of new technologies such as the torpedo, submarine, and
airplane, distant blockades (farther from the enemy coast) became standard practice. Mining of ports also was practiced.2 In addition, maritime exclusion zones
(MEZs) sometimes were established to prevent shipping from entering a designated area. Maritime trade warfare also has included attacking or seizing enemy
shipping in general, or outright destroying an enemy’s commercial shipping in
particular. In the twentieth century, destruction of an enemy’s port infrastructure
to prevent the loading or off-loading of commercial vessels also became a type of
maritime trade warfare.3
The use of maritime trade warfare in World War II and, to some extent, World
War I is commonly understood. In the latter part of World War I, for example, the
Germans’ indiscriminate sinking of neutral vessels incensed the United States,
eventually driving the country into the war on the side of the Allies.4 German
employment of submarines (U-boats), particularly in World War II, played a
large role in disrupting the flow of supplies from North America and the British
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Empire that was supporting the Allied war effort.5 Similarly, the United States
waged a very successful campaign of maritime trade warfare against the Empire
of Japan in World War II.6
The present question is: Is maritime trade warfare still a viable strategy and
tactic to be employed by warring powers today, or is it an anachronistic practice
that has no place in twenty-first-century maritime conflicts? There seem to be
two very different views on this question. On the one hand, there are military
scholars and experts who not only promote the use of maritime trade warfare
but also emphasize that modern navies should plan and exercise for it, from
both offensive and defensive perspectives. On the other hand, there are military
scholars and experts who argue that commerce warfare is a tactic of the past that
is no longer viable, with no valid bearing on today’s world. Reasons for the latter
viewpoint, among others that will be discussed below, include the interconnec
tedness of the global economy and the nature of modern commercial shipping.
The purpose of this article is to consider both viewpoints and analyze their
theories and supporting arguments. In the final analysis, the answer to the question whether maritime trade warfare belongs in the twenty-first century is complex. There are many obstacles to employing maritime trade warfare in a manner
that would strangle an enemy’s economy effectively or prevent the movement of
military supplies. However, history shows that, given just the right circumstances
and time, maritime trade warfare can work. In any case, it is in the interest of
military strategists and planners to plan for and exercise offensive and defensive
maritime trade warfare in many potential conflict scenarios.
HISTORY OF MARITIME TRADE WARFARE
Maritime trade warfare is certainly not a new military strategy. It has been employed for thousands of years in various forms.
Early to Modern History
Maritime trade warfare was employed commonly throughout ancient Greek
history. In his writings on the Greek Peloponnesian War, the ancient historian
Thucydides (ca. 460 BCE–400 BCE) described nearly thirty years of war between
Athens and Sparta. In these writings he referred to what was essentially maritime
trade warfare.7
For much of history, commerce warfare largely was performed by privateers,
who received letters of marque from their governments. This instrument provided state authorization for their actions in seizing enemy shipping. In truth,
however, there was often a fine line between privateers and pirates, since they
operated in very similar manners. In theory, a privateer acted at least partly in the
interest of his nation, whereas a pirate acted solely in his own interest.8
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Essentially, privateers operating under letters of marque were nonmilitary
persons given permission by their sovereigns or other governments to raid enemy
shipping. This activity often was referred to as guerre de course. The intention was
to enable a weaker naval power to attack a stronger power—and to seize booty in
the process.9 Acting as privateers with a letter of marque, a captain and crew were
protected from being brought up on charges of piracy if captured. When successful in capturing an enemy merchant vessel, privateers turned over the vessel and
cargo to the privateers’ government in exchange for prize money. Rewards for
privateers often were substantial.10
From a government’s perspective, the major potential advantages of using
privateers were the revenue generated and the damage inflicted on an enemy’s
economy. And the efforts of privateers could be had with little or no cost to a
belligerent’s treasury, because privateers often were completely self-funded. They
might receive a small stipend from their host governments; Queen Elizabeth I of
England, for example, partly funded the privateering efforts of Sir John Hawkins
and Sir Francis Drake—Drake being, perhaps, the most successful privateer in
history.11 Probably because of their low cost to governments combined with their
successes, privateers continued to be used to wage warfare on enemy commerce
until the dawn of the twentieth century.12
Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, maritime trade warfare
in Europe played a role in the almost continuous conflicts among the British,
French, Spanish, Dutch, and others. In the second half of the seventeenth century,
Louis XIV of France, “the Sun King” (1638–1715), engaged his country in three
major wars: the Franco-Dutch War, the War of the League of Augsburg, and the
War of the Spanish Succession. In all three wars, maritime trade warfare played
an important role in damaging enemy economies and preventing the movement of military supplies.13 Because France was primarily a continental power, it
needed to fund and support large land forces. This left it with only a limited ability to build or sustain a substantial navy with which to attack enemy shipping or
fleets directly (i.e., guerre d’escadre, or war of fleets). As an alternative, in the last
decade of the seventeenth century the French began to practice guerre de course
to contest their enemies’ complete command and control of the sea.14
The French enjoyed such great success with maritime trade warfare during
this period that the noted late nineteenth-century naval theorist Rear Admiral
Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, suggested that “at no time has war against commerce
been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results than during this period,
. . . [which was] a large factor in bringing the sea nations to wish for peace.”15
Guerre de course or maritime trade warfare has been called a tactic of the
weak because it often has been practiced by nations with weaker navies.16 The
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American colonies employed commerce warfare from the late 1600s onward. For
example, during times of conflict in the period 1739 to 1748, American colonial
privateers sailed on some 466 privateering voyages and captured at least 829 foreign vessels.17 During the War of 1812, American privateers profited handsomely
from attacks on British shipping.18
In the Mediterranean, commerce warfare—perhaps legitimately called piracy
by some—occurred from Roman times into the nineteenth century. The Knights
of Malta preyed on Ottoman shipping sailing between North African and Spanish
ports. During the Crusades, Ottoman pirates profited frequently from attacks on
European shipping. So too the famed “Barbary pirates” attacked ships from countries unwilling to pay a tribute to the local beys (rulers). This included attacks
in the late eighteenth century on merchant ships flagged by the new American
republic, which prompted the U.S. Congress and president to establish a navy.19
Following the Crimean War in the mid-nineteenth century, the great powers
of Europe negotiated the Declaration of Paris in 1856. Signing nations agreed to
end guerre de course. The declaration pledged as follows: “Neutral goods, with
the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy’s
flag.”20 Not surprisingly, other countries did not sign the declaration. One such
was the United States; because its Navy was small, guerre de course offered one of
the few options by which it could attack a more-powerful naval power.21 Indeed,
during the American Civil War, the Confederates employed guerre de course
against Union merchant ships, albeit with only a modest degree of success.22
The twentieth century brought an entirely new approach to maritime trade
warfare with the introduction of several new maritime and naval technologies.
At first, in the very early part of the twentieth century, it appeared to some that
maritime trade warfare actually might cease to be a tactic because of these technological advances and treaties such as the Declaration of Paris.
In fact, in 1911 the noted British naval theorist Sir Julian Corbett declared,
“Modern developments and changes in shipping and naval material have indeed
so profoundly modified the whole conditions of commerce protection, that there
is no part of the strategy where historical deduction is more difficult or more
liable to error.”23 Corbett believed it would be difficult to provide sufficient coaling stations for modern steam-powered warships to cruise extensively to attack
enemy shipping. He also believed (as though it were a requirement) that it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to embark a prize crew on a captured vessel. As to
merely sinking enemy vessels, Corbett famously stated, “No Power will incur the
odium of sinking a prize with all hands, and their removal to the captor’s ship
takes time.”24 He also theorized that since commercial steam vessels had great
maneuverability, they could avoid potentially dangerous routes on which enemy
warships might be lying in wait.25
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Needless to say, World Wars I and II clearly demonstrated the potential and
effects of maritime trade warfare. At the beginning of World War I, German
reliance on maritime trade for both imports and exports was substantial, and
the British navy believed it had the potential to destroy the German economy
through blockade.26 Ultimately, with the largest and most powerful navy in the
world, Great Britain successfully blockaded Germany and prevented merchant
vessels, German or otherwise, from trading at German ports.
According to Naval War
Whether today’s Navy leadership believes
College professor and naval
that protecting shipping in a maritime trade
theorist Dr. Milan Vego, “a
warfare situation is a Navy mission is a moot blo ckaded countr y often
point. . . . [T]he U.S. Navy has no doctrine
resorts to commercial counand no current practices regarding protecting terblockade.”27 As an imperial
maritime commerce from attack, and precious power with the most far-flung
few resources with which to do so in any case. empire in history, Britain was
dependent on the sea for trade
with its colonies and with nations providing matériel for the war effort. Not
surprisingly, as the war progressed Germany increasingly countered the British
blockade with commerce warfare, using the submarine.28
By the end of World War I, the Germans had managed to sink 11,153,000 tons
of Allied merchant shipping, comprising 2,990 commercial ships and 578 fishing
vessels. To accomplish this, the Germans used some 390 submarines, of which
Allied forces sank 178.29
Although Germany was not as dependent on seaborne commerce at the
beginning of World War II as it had been in 1914, its maritime trade was still
important. As in World War I, the British early in World War II established a
blockade of German ports. The Germans responded with commerce warfare in
the form of air and submarine attacks on British, and later Allied, maritime trade
and on British port infrastructure. In total, during this war the Germans sank
5,150 Allied merchant ships displacing 21.57 million tons.30 The German attacks
on maritime trade not only destroyed ships; they greatly disrupted the entire
military supply chain by requiring the use of large, slow convoys and by causing
substantial rerouting of ships, which increased voyage times. They also caused
negative second-order effects by slowing the production of military equipment
and supplies.31
The cost to the Germans of their submarine warfare campaign was the loss of
785 submarines and their crews.32 However, looking at the big picture, the Allied
cost in dollars and additional resources for protecting vessels with convoys and
other measures and for merchant vessels lost nonetheless was substantially higher
than the cost to the Germans of building and operating their submarine fleet.33 In
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other words, although the Germans were not ultimately successful in curtailing
Allied maritime trade, they might have been if circumstances had been somewhat
different. In any case, the U-boats greatly disrupted the entire Allied war effort
and caused the Allies to expend substantial resources to protect their sea-lanes.34
German maritime trade warfare was at least partly successful.
In World War II, the United States prosecuted a very successful maritime
trade warfare campaign against Japan, destroying 8.1 million tons of merchant
shipping. The United States employed 288 submarines in the Pacific, which were
responsible for sinking about 4.9 million tons of that total; aircraft, surface ships,
and mines accomplished the remainder. This crippled the Japanese merchant marine, which prevented the importation of critical supplies, starving the Japanese
military, economy, and people.35 The Japanese did not employ any significant
maritime trade warfare against the United States during World War II, because it
simply was not a part of Japanese naval doctrine, nor did it seem to conform to
the Japanese Bushido (warrior) code. Further, the Japanese offered no effective
defenses against the U.S. maritime trade warfare campaign.36
Maritime Trade Warfare in the Latter Half of the Twentieth Century
As noted earlier, the 1856 Declaration of Paris banned attacks on commercial
shipping by privateers—at least, those of the European nations that signed the
treaty. This was followed by significant maritime technological advances in the
construction of naval vessels, including submarines, and the torpedo, which
caused at least some naval theorists—such as the respected Sir Julian Corbett
quoted earlier—to believe that commerce warfare in the modern age was farfetched and very unlikely. Obviously, the events of World Wars I and II proved
otherwise.37
In the dozens of conflicts that have broken out around the globe since World
War II, maritime trade warfare has been relatively rare. During the U.S. interventions in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, it was and has been limited or
nonexistent. As a result of the lack of maritime trade warfare in recent times, and
in a manner similar to the propositions of naval theorists a century ago, there
are those who believe that commerce warfare has been relegated to the history
books. As Professor Douglas Peifer of the University of North Carolina notes in
an article, “‘Maritime commerce warfare’ has a distinctly dated whiff.”38 Still, as in
the days of Corbett, this contention can be called into question.
Indeed, maritime trade warfare did occur in the second half of the twentieth
century, albeit infrequently. During the period of the Yom Kippur or Ramadan
War of 1973, for example, the Egyptians attempted to blockade commercial shipping traffic to prevent oil tankers from reaching Israel from Iran. To accomplish
this, the Egyptians mined Israeli ports and declared a naval blockade in the Red
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Sea. Had the war lasted longer, the Egyptians’ maritime trade warfare might have
been successful, because Israel had no other method of obtaining the necessary
oil supplies.39
The Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) provides another very clear example of maritime
trade warfare in relatively recent times. The so-called tanker war began in early
1981, when the Iraqis announced that all shipping headed to and from Iran was
subject to attack. In 1982, Iraq attacked the Iranian oil terminal and commercial
shipping at Khārk (Kharg) Island.40 In every respect, this was maritime trade
warfare.
Initially, Iran had little ability to attack commercial shipping bound for Iraq,
but this eventually changed; by 1987, Iran was targeting tankers bound for Iraq
effectively. In 1986, to protect its shipping interests, Kuwait requested assistance
from the international community, including the United States. In 1987, several
Kuwaiti tankers were reflagged to the United States, in theory protecting them
from Iraqi or Iranian attack, since the United States was a neutral nation.41 In any
case, it was conjectured that the U.S. Navy would protect these ships through a
convoy system, which is what eventually occurred.
In total, the marine insurance company Lloyd’s of London reported that 546
commercial ships were damaged during the Iran-Iraq War, killing 430 merchant
mariners.42 Of the ships attacked, very few actually were sunk. Sixty-one percent
of the vessels attacked (239 ships) were tankers. Fifty-five of these tankers were
declared “constructive total losses.” Thirty-nine percent of the bulk carriers attacked and 32 percent of the freighters attacked also were declared constructive
total losses.43
The Use of Mines in Maritime Trade Warfare
Although the American David Bushnell is credited with developing the first naval mine in 1776 and mines were used to a limited extent in nineteenth-century
wars, it was during World War I that the mine became a major weapon against
navies and merchant ships.44 Mines historically have been used to restrict access
to a sea area and to blockade commercial vessels from port areas—a form of
maritime trade warfare. Certainly World Wars I and II offer many examples of
this type of warfare. In World War II alone some seven hundred thousand mines
were sown. These accounted for the loss of 650 Allied ships and 1,100 Axis ships,
with another eight hundred damaged between them. In fact, mines damaged or
sank more vessels than any other weapon.45 Perhaps the best example of the use
of mines in maritime trade warfare was Operation STARVATION in the summer
of 1945, for which the U.S. Navy and Army Air Corps sowed eleven thousand
mines off the coasts and ports of Japan, sinking 605 Japanese merchant ships and
sixty-five warships.46
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From May 1972 through January 1973, the United States mined Haiphong
Harbor in North Vietnam and two other, smaller North Vietnamese ports. This
effectively closed these ports to commercial shipping, forcing North Vietnam
to use inland roads and railroads from Chinese ports for imports and exports.47
During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, Iran made extensive use of mines in an
effort to blockade Kuwaiti ports. The mines damaged numerous merchant ships
from many countries, although these efforts did not curtail merchant shipping
in the Persian Gulf.48
ARGUMENTS FOR THE USE OF MARITIME TRADE WARFARE IN
THE FUTURE
Some theorists believe that maritime trade warfare will continue to be used in any
lengthy war conducted at least partly at sea.49 Supporters of maritime trade warfare acknowledge that, for it to be an effective instrument for crippling an enemy’s
economy in general and preventing military supplies in particular from getting
through, the time factor is essential. In other words, it takes time for maritime
trade warfare to have the desired economic and military effects.
Geography also plays an important role in maritime trade warfare. An island
nation, a coastal nation isolated by geographical features that are a barrier to
land trade, or a nation with hostile neighbors is more vulnerable to maritime
trade warfare.50 Regarding the notion that because of the integration of the global
economy commerce warfare is unlikely in future conflicts, proponents note that
before 1914 many Europeans believed that a large-scale European war never
would happen because it would lead to a European economic collapse that would
harm all participating nations. Proponents argue that in many ways the global
economy was intertwined prior to World War I in ways similar to today, yet both
sides used maritime trade warfare as a tactic during the war.51
Prospects for Blockading
Given the past successes of maritime trade warfare, some experts contend that
commerce warfare not only is likely to be practiced but should be incorporated into many conflict scenarios as an essential component of military strategy
and tactics. In a Yale Law Journal article written in the 1990s, author Michael
Fraunces notes:
In the future, blockade may become even more important as the need of a blockading state to stop every merchant ship grows vital. The recent willingness of ostensibly
neutral states to supply not simply technical know-how and materials for weapons of
mass destruction, but also ready-for-use missiles and other decisive weapons, to the
highest bidder portends such a future. As the negative consequences of allowing even
one ship to pass uninspected grow more severe, blockading states will become more
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willing to use the new blockade forms (long-range blockade and blockade zones) at
the expense of neutral interests.52

To be sure, discussion in military circles today regarding maritime trade warfare is very limited, if it occurs at all. There currently is no U.S. military doctrine
that even raises the issues of offensive or defensive maritime trade warfare. This
situation is reminiscent of the interwar years: despite the extensive use of maritime trade warfare during World War I, requiring the United States to protect its
convoys, during the 1920s and ’30s the Navy essentially forgot the lessons it had
learned. When the United States entered World War II, German submarines had
a field day sinking American shipping, often in plain sight of the American mainland, because merchant shipping was given no protection at all.53 The then Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King, believed the Navy
had no obligation to protect
commercial shipping, in light
[O]pponents of modern commerce warfare
contend that it simply is not possible to isolate of the many other demands
the service faced at the time.54
a powerful nation through maritime trade
warfare without devastating the entire global Whether today’s Navy leadership believes that protecting
economy.
shipping in a maritime trade
warfare situation is a Navy mission is a moot point. Aside from fighting piracy in
East Africa, which could be regarded as protecting shipping, the U.S. Navy has no
doctrine and no current practices regarding protecting maritime commerce from
attack, and precious few resources with which to do so in any case.
Some military experts contend that maritime trade warfare not only is likely in
future conflicts, but that it can and should be a strategy the United States directs
its military to employ. The services therefore should plan for and practice this
employment, in the form of military exercises conducted from both offensive
and defensive perspectives. Given the growing power, including naval power,
of several nations around the world, some military experts have weighed the
potential for maritime trade warfare being employed in a conflict and believe it
is a worthy strategy.
The possibility of conducting maritime trade warfare against China is one example. In a paper entitled “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely
Conflict,” retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel T. X. Hammes contends that in a
protracted conflict with China the United States could employ a strategy of “offshore control” to interdict China’s energy, raw material, and industrial imports
and exports to strangle the country’s economy. According to Hammes, this could
be achieved through the use of Navy ships, Army and Navy boarding teams, and
contracted shipping and helicopters.55
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Essentially, Colonel Hammes believes that blockading shipments to China
through the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda and controlling the north–
south routes to and from Australia could block 80 percent of China’s oil imports.
Further, blockading exports from China would rob China of its source of economic power. This would force the Chinese to the bargaining table, which very
likely would end the conflict.56
Colonel Hammes states:
Clearly the U.S. Navy has insufficient ships to control the almost 1,500 very large
commercial ships projected to be in use by 2015. However, these numbers can be
controlled by U.S. amphibious shipping projecting Army and Marine boarding parties that will travel with the ships to ensure they do not enter the maritime exclusion zone. Commercial shipping and helicopters could be contracted to support the
distant efforts, thus reducing the stress on the amphibious fleet.57

In their article “No Oil for the Lamps of China,” authors Gabriel Collins and
William Murray further explain how the U.S. Navy could block the key straits on
Chinese trade routes effectively:
It appears then that at least ten surface warships and two replenishment vessels would
be required to establish an effective and protected distant blockade at the Straits of
Malacca. This number would increase proportionally if the Lombok Strait, Sunda
Strait, and the route around Australia also had to be patrolled. The authors estimate
that three surface warships and accompanying replenishment vessels per additional
strait would be necessary to provide reasonable assurance that all passing tankers
could be boarded, inspected, and if necessary escorted to a quarantine anchorage.
This gives a minimum total of sixteen surface warships and four replenishment
vessels.58

In a well-researched article in the Journal of Strategic Studies, author Sean
Mirski argues as follows: “A blockade strategy [against China] is viable, but it
would be limited to a narrow context: the United States would have to be engaged in a protracted conflict over vital interests, and it would need the support
of key regional powers. The United States would also need to implement a mix
between a close and distant blockade in order to avoid imperiling the conflict’s
strategic context. If enacted, a blockade could exact a ruinous cost on the Chinese
economy and state.”59 Mirski comments that the existing literature on commerce
warfare is “remarkably sparse, circumscribed, and inconclusive,” in large part because commercial links between China and the United States are so intertwined
that maritime trade warfare is considered unlikely because it would be too mutually destructive.60
Yet Naval War College professor Dr. Milan Vego believes that maritime trade
warfare remains a possibility in the future. He notes that another large-scale
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global war may never occur; however, history suggests that the improbable often
becomes reality. He uses World War I as an example; as noted earlier, theorists in
the early twentieth century did not believe a large European war would occur—
yet it did. Similarly, some naval theorists in the early part of the twentieth century
suggested that the days of commerce warfare were over—yet in both world wars,
maritime trade warfare was definitely a reality.61 Accordingly, Vego believes that
in a large, long-term conflict, maritime trade warfare is probable. He also believes
that attacks on maritime trade might take the form of attacks on infrastructure
and ports and, perhaps, some forms of cyber warfare, but that “attacks on ships
at sea and in port would also be essential.”62
Prospects for Use of Mines
Historically, mines have been used effectively to blockade merchant shipping
from entering a belligerent’s ports. In numerous conflicts, mines have proved
themselves to be quite deadly. It is noteworthy that since World War II, fourteen
USN ships have been sunk or damaged by mines, compared with only two that
have been damaged by missile or air attack.63 Mines are relatively inexpensive,
and nations throughout the world keep tens of thousands in their inventories.64
Available current literature on the use of mines to blockade as a form of commerce warfare is quite sparse. However, given the low cost and deadly effectiveness of mines in past conflicts, it seems reasonable to some experts that mines
could play an important role in modern maritime trade warfare by effectively
blockading the ports and harbors of an enemy.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE LIKELIHOOD OF MARITIME TRADE
WARFARE IN THE FUTURE
While acknowledging the historical successes of maritime trade warfare, there
are those who contend that this type of warfare is essentially a strategy and tactic
of the past. Numerous factors support this position.
The Nature of the Global Economy
In a manner similar to the arguments offered prior to World War I, the integrated
nature of the global economy today and the difficulty of interdicting maritime
commerce often are cited as reasons there will be no maritime trade warfare in
the future. In 1897, Germany’s Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz—given the
situation at the time—projected as follows: “Commerce raiding and transatlantic
war against England is so hopeless, because of the shortage of bases on our side
and the superfluity on England’s side, that we must ignore this type of war against
England in our plans for the constitution of our fleet.”65 Obviously, Admiral
Tirpitz’s prediction of how developments would unfold was significantly off the
mark.
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Regarding the integrated global economy of today, opponents of modern commerce warfare contend that it simply is not possible to isolate a powerful nation
through maritime trade warfare without devastating the entire global economy.
Yes, the global economy was integrated to some extent prior to World War I, but
not to the degree and scope that it is today. The technological developments in
communications and transportation and more-positive international government policy environments established around the world in the last half-century
have expanded trade greatly in both size and scope.66 At the beginning of the
nineteenth century, global trade was estimated to be U.S.$1.5 billion; by 1850
this had risen to $4 billion; and by 1900 to $24 billion.67 In 2014, global trade was
reported to be $18.5 trillion.68 Worldwide, in manufacturing exports alone there
was a 3,500 percent increase just from 1950 to 1998.69
World Wars I and II devastated the global economy. The reasoning follows
that, with the economic destruction they inflicted so obvious, and with the global
economy even more integrated today than it was prior to those wars, another
conflict involving maritime trade warfare is as unthinkable as it is unlikely.
The Nature of Global Merchant Shipping
The complexity of the global commercial maritime business also is put forward
as a reason maritime trade warfare is unlikely in the future. Until the late 1940s,
commercial ships typically were financed, owned, built, and crewed in the flag
state of their registry. This changed dramatically in the decades after World War
II, with the proliferation of “flag-of-convenience registries.”70 Today, more than
half the world’s merchant ships are registered in flag-of-convenience countries.71
In many cases, the actual ownership of a vessel is difficult to ascertain.
Complicating this is the very nature of modern commercial shipping. Ownership of bulk cargoes such as oil, grain, and iron ore, as well as the destinations of
those cargoes, can change, sometimes repeatedly, as cargoes are sold and resold
throughout the course of a voyage. With general cargo and container vessels,
ownership and cargo destinations also can be complex. A single ship can contain
multiple cargoes—sometimes thousands—destined for dozens of countries, often
located far beyond the port of discharge.72 The basic problem is that boarding,
search, and seizure of vessels and cargoes on the high seas is complicated because
it can be difficult to identify the ownership of a ship and cargo and because a vessel’s cargoes often are destined for many countries. When a nation seizes or sinks
a vessel apparently bound for a belligerent nation, its cargo, or at least a portion
thereof, may be the property of a neutral nation, or even an ally.
Another factor of the modern global merchant marine is simply its size.
In 1939, prior to World War II, the combined size of the entire global merchant marine was about fifty-seven million deadweight tons.73 This included
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approximately twelve thousand vessels in deep-sea trade. Today, the size of the
global merchant marine is about 1.75 billion deadweight tons, with about ninety
thousand commercial vessels.74 In other words, there are tens of thousands more
vessels in the world today than in the decades prior to World War II, and they are
larger as well. At the same time, the number of naval vessels available in the larger
navies of the world today—those warships capable of conducting maritime trade
warfare or interdiction in any form—is very small.
These factors clearly indicate that conducting maritime trade warfare effectively would be exceedingly difficult in most scenarios today. Identifying vessels
and cargoes belonging to a belligerent is much more complex today than it was in
those historical situations in which maritime trade warfare proved a productive
strategy and tactic. In any case, the number of naval vessels or auxiliaries needed
to implement successfully an effective maritime trade warfare campaign would
be very substantial—far more, in most scenarios, than the number of vessels
needed during World War II. Compounding this is the fact that even the large
navies of the world today are much smaller than in the era of the world wars.
Use of Alternative Intermodal Transportation
There are other reasons to argue that maritime trade warfare in the twenty-first
century would require massive resources yet would be ineffective. As maritime
transportation technologies have made great strides with the development of
containerization and container shipping, so too have land port infrastructure
and intermodal transportation. The majority of the world is linked as never before, not just by ports but by highly efficient ports, ports that are linked to vast
networks of roads, railroads, and airports. This means that, in many cases, trade
by sea can be bypassed by using other modes of transportation. Doing so might
raise transportation costs significantly, but it nonetheless could render maritime
trade warfare ineffective.
It must be noted, for example, that even during World War II German maritime trade warfare in the Atlantic was not effective in blocking the majority of
economic and military supplies from reaching the Soviet Union from North
America. In fact, of the supplies sent that reached the Soviet Union, 23 percent
did so through Iran and another 46 percent reached Pacific coast ports of the Soviet Union—passing near Japan, which had a nonaggression pact with the Soviet
Union until 1945. Today, in an era of much more sophisticated railroad, pipeline,
and aviation intermodal links, maritime trade warfare alone, in many cases,
would not isolate a country—particularly one with friendly or neutral countries
on its borders. In a conflict with China, for example, it would be highly unlikely
that land intermodal shipments of oil and other cargoes to and from one or more
of China’s many neighbors could be blocked.75

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 27

32

4/21/17 8:35 AM

28

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue

In November 2014, for example, China initiated a new train service from
China west to Spain, a route covering a distance of some 6,200 miles and requiring approximately twenty-one days’ travel.76 In January 2017, the first freight
train from China arrived in London after a 7,500-mile journey, having reached
its destination in eighteen days—half the time required for a sea voyage.77 In addition, China has the ability to link to Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway and other
rail lines across Asia. Further, according to Global Risk Insights, during the past
few years Russia and China have forged new energy deals that will open energy
pipeline links from Russia to China.78 The Chinese also are funding both rail
and pipeline links from China to Myanmar ports so as to bypass the Straits of
Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda.79
In other words, although the Chinese do rely on ocean transportation for the
majority of their energy, raw materials, and exports, they have several neighbors
and connections to numerous intermodal links to the Middle East and Europe
that could ease their dependence on marine transportation during a military
conflict. Most coastal nations, especially large nations, have the same ability.
Use of Reserves and Rationing
For any military conflict or other national emergency in which vital imports
such as energy supplies are required, many nations around the world have plans
and infrastructure in place to conduct rationing. In addition, many countries,
including the United States, have established substantial petroleum reserves,
which would provide energy supplies for an extended period during a national
emergency.80
If targeted states brought in resources via intermodal links other than the sea,
then rationed them carefully, the results desired from maritime trade warfare
might be minimal.
The Naval Resources Question
The question of the naval resources needed to conduct maritime trade warfare in
the form of imposing an effective blockade is a very significant one. With regard
to a country such as China—or any other country in East Asia, for that matter—
the supporters of maritime trade warfare cited in this article focus on blockades
of the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda as the method for restricting energy supply lines or otherwise curtailing economic activity, particularly exports.
These studies indicate that a relatively small number of naval ships could blockade the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda successfully, effectively isolating
the energy and economic supply lines to and from China.81
However, the imposition of a blockade in these straits would be illegal under
international law, as represented by the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations notes:
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Belligerent forces transiting through international straits overlapped by neutral
waters must proceed without delay, must refrain from the threat or use of force
against the neutral nation, and must otherwise refrain from acts of hostility and other
activities not incident to their transit. . . . Belligerent forces may not use neutral straits
as a place of sanctuary or as a base of operations and belligerent warships may not
exercise the belligerent right of visit and search in those waters.82

It could, perhaps, be argued that blockading naval vessels could operate in
waters sufficiently far away from international straits to remain compliant with
international law. However, this would increase significantly the number of naval
resources required to implement an effective blockade. In any case, 2014 data
indicate that in that year alone there were some 79,000 transits through the Strait
of Malacca. These involved 25,071 containerships and 4,993 very large crude oil
carriers (VLCCs), in addition to tens of thousands of smaller cargo vessels and
tankers. This translates to about 217 ships a day passing through the Strait of
Malacca.83 Adding the vessels transiting the Sunda and Lombok Straits would increase significantly the daily and annual ship-transit totals. Simply put, the naval
resources needed to effect a legal blockade in areas near these straits—to board,
search, and inspect vessels and to provide escorts to quarantine anchorages for
suspect vessels—would be far more significant than is accounted for in any of the
sources cited in this article.
It further complicates this problem that there is a huge swath of the Pacific
Ocean that could be used for alternative routes to China and the rest of East
Asia—numerous Pacific Ocean trade routes to Asia are available that do not use
any strait. True, this would add to shipping and other transportation costs, owing
to the longer distances covered (west from the Panama Canal and northwest from
Cape Horn), but nevertheless these routes could be used.
For a VLCC traveling from Saudi Arabian oil terminals to Shanghai, China,
today, for example, the transportation cost of crude oil is thirteen to eighteen
cents per gallon for a transit of about eighteen days.84 Crude oil transportation
to China from Venezuela instead, via the Panama Canal in a tanker somewhat
smaller than a VLCC, would require twenty-six days. VLCC oil transportation
from Angola to China via Cape Horn would entail a voyage of about forty days.85
Clearly, the added distance in longer voyages would add to transportation
costs—possibly doubling them, or more—but this hardly would impose an insurmountable expense if the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda were being
blockaded. The Suez Canal has been closed five times since its opening in 1869,
including for the eight years between 1967 and 1975.86 Oil tankers and cargo vessels transiting from the Middle East to Europe and the Americas were required
to transit much longer distances around the Cape of Good Hope, and at greater
expense to shippers, but this did not impose an overbearing economic hardship
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on the countries of Europe or the Americas. Similarly, if the Straits of Malacca,
Lombok, and Sunda were blockaded, using Pacific Ocean shipping routes to East
Asia would create a hardship, but one that could be endured.
Any attempt to conduct maritime trade warfare (or interdiction) against all
the Pacific Ocean route approaches to Asia and the approaches to the Straits of
Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda would require a huge number of naval vessels, with
all the complicated logistics and resupply associated therewith. Further, for every
naval and resupply vessel used for maritime trade warfare and blockade, one
fewer vessel would be available for other naval missions—missions that probably
would be critically important in a time of military conflict.
The Targeting Problem
As noted earlier, there are some ninety thousand deep-sea commercial vessels
in the world. This does not include hundreds of thousands of fishing vessels,
coastwise vessels, and other special-purpose vessels. The waters in and around
East Asia teem with traffic—thousands of vessels within a relatively small area.
Identifying which vessels to board, search, and seize would be a daunting task
that would get harder the closer one approached the Asian mainland or a choke
point such as a strait.
It is true that commercial vessels now broadcast on an Automatic Identification System (AIS) frequency, by which they identify themselves, but AIS can be
switched off. During the recent piracy crisis off the coast of Somalia, for example,
many vessels simply turned off their AIS to avoid identification. In a maritime
trade warfare situation, many vessels, including neutral vessels, likely would not
broadcast their AIS signals, further complicating identification efforts.87
The Complexity Involved in Sinking Vessels
Some supporters of maritime trade warfare suggest the establishment of a maritime exclusion zone, with any commercial vessel entering the MEZ subject to
attack and sinking. The theory is that this would prevent merchant ships from
entering the zone.
However, the collateral consequences of sinking a modern commercial vessel would be huge. Sinking a vessel likely would result in the deaths of innocent
merchant mariners, probably from a large number of nations, including friendly
or neutral ones. Some might view this as a war crime.
In addition, the environmental impact of sinking a large ship, especially a petroleum tanker, would be immense. Sinking a VLCC, which can carry more than
165 million gallons of crude oil, would create an environmental disaster of epic
proportions. The destruction of fishing grounds and the pollution of thousands
of square miles of coastlines would be enormous.
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While the German and American navies had great success in sinking merchant vessels during World War II, the problem today is much more complex.
Simply put, merchant ships now are huge—much larger than those that sailed the
seas during the twentieth-century world wars. It likely would take a significant
amount of ordnance to sink a ship, or even to damage and disable it. Recall that
very few of the 546 ships attacked during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s were
declared constructive total losses, and almost none actually were sunk. No recent
studies are available that analyze the methods and weapon capabilities needed to
sink modern commercial vessels; the problem is likely much more complex than
many realize.
Adding to this problem is the scarce inventory of available weapons and ordnance. Just as the number of naval vessels available for maritime trade warfare is
extremely small, so too is the availability of ordnance needed to accomplish the
task. While production of naval ships, weapons, and ordnance in theory could
be ramped up, this would take a substantial amount of time. In fact, it would
take much more time than was needed after America entered World War II in
December of 1941. At that time shipbuilding and weapons-manufacturing companies already had increased their production substantially over a span of years,
yet it took years more for the United States to produce enough ships, weapons,
and ordnance to protect against German maritime trade warfare effectively and
to establish an offensive maritime trade warfare campaign against Japan.
Maritime Trade Warfare Does Not Curtail Shipping
Some believe that even the threat of maritime trade warfare would cause shipowners from nonbelligerent countries to keep their vessels out of hostile waters.
In individual instances this might be true, but history shows that generally it is
not so. During the age of sail, shipowners were quite willing to sail into harm’s
way because profit motives outweighed concern for the safety of their vessels.
The world wars of the twentieth century also offer no exception. During the
relatively recent tanker wars during the Iran-Iraq War, there was an initial 25
percent decrease in shipping traffic, but this soon changed as profits for shipowners soared. More ships became available to carry crude oil, despite the dangers
involved. To cover the cost of higher marine insurance premiums, Iran reduced
the price of its oil exports.88
The Question of Mines
Historically, mines have been used effectively in commerce warfare as a form
of blockade to close the ports and harbors of a belligerent. Given the massive
number of mines in the current inventories of some nations, it seems reasonable that mines might be used with great effectiveness, and in some cases this is
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probably true. For a relatively small island nation with a limited number of ports,
an enemy with substantial mining capabilities probably could blockade its ports
very effectively.
However, the scenarios under which this might occur are quite limited. With
regard to large countries having multiple ports and effective militaries, the challenges to effective mining are many. In a country such as the United States or
China, for example, it would be exceedingly difficult for an enemy’s submarines,
other vessels, or aircraft to sow mines in ports, harbors, or approach channels.
During the India-Pakistan War of 1971, for example, Pakistan attempted to sow
mines in Indian waters with a submarine, but was unsuccessful owing to Indian
navy intervention.89
A large country such as the
[I]f plans are not put in place and exercised to United States, India, or China
protect strategic sealift vessels, . . . protection
or an economic zone such
of warships is really a moot point. Without
as the European Union has
a reliable and capable supply chain of comdozens of ports. The resources
mercial and military logistics ships, warships
needed to blockade all these
cannot operate and fight far from American
ports effectively using mines
shores for any significant span of time.
would be quite substantial,
and such efforts similarly
would be vulnerable to intervention by local navies. Further, merchant ships
blockaded from one port could shift to ports in neighboring countries and load
and discharge their cargoes at intermodal facilities there, thereby limiting the
mine blockade’s effectiveness. As noted previously, the United States did manage
to close North Vietnamese ports with mines during the latter half of the Vietnam
War; however, North Vietnam at the time had only one large port and two smaller
ones, and no navy to challenge the U.S. Navy. Despite the resultant reduction in
transportation capabilities, North Vietnam was able to divert shipping to Chinese
ports and use road and rail into North Vietnam, although this was less efficient.
Finally, the mine ordnance necessary to effect a commercial blockade is significant and grows substantially as the number of ports, harbors, channels, and
coastal areas that require mining increases. And the United States, for example,
has only a very small inventory of mines.
A review of the sources cited in this article reveals general agreement that determining the likelihood of maritime trade warfare being practiced in the future is
a complex question. The proponents and opponents of maritime trade warfare
agree that, to be effective, maritime trade warfare generally needs to be executed
over a significant span of time. The American and German campaigns of World
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War II eventually had great effect, but required several years to reach that point.
The Egyptian campaign against Israel in 1967 was not effective because of its
short duration.
Proponents and opponents of maritime trade warfare also agree that any use
of this strategy and tactic would have devastating impacts on today’s global economy. An unanswered question is whether maritime trade warfare really would
bring a belligerent nation to the bargaining table, or simply escalate the conflict,
which might spiral out of control. The answer seems to be that it would depend
entirely on the situation; either result might occur. This certainly makes reliance
on maritime trade warfare a dangerous business.
Another concern is that in regional or limited wars with powerful nations
involved, commerce warfare is likely to create second-order effects that might
draw other nations into the conflict. In the colonial-era Seven Years’ War, for
example, British commerce raiding expanded beyond attacks on French vessels to
include attacks on neutral Dutch vessels, which strained relations with a friendly
country.90 In the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, Russia, fearing consequences
after numerous protests from the British and American governments, restricted
its maritime trade warfare.91 In the early part of World War II, Hitler specifically
forbade German submarines from attacking American vessels lest such attacks
bring the United States into the war on Britain’s side.92 Would similar problems
arise with modern use of maritime trade warfare? Would allied nations support
maritime trade warfare, or would they attempt to circumvent blockades? Again,
either outcome might occur.
Maritime trade warfare, however likely or unlikely it is to occur, could have
vast global, regional, and national consequences. Therefore policy makers and
military planners should consider the topic thoroughly from an offensive and—
equally important—a defensive standpoint. When the United States entered
World War II, the Navy was ill prepared for German maritime trade warfare and
largely remained so until 1943. The resulting commercial and military sealift
shipping losses were enormous, and thousands of merchant mariners lost their
lives.93 The United States today is equally unprepared to defend itself against
maritime trade warfare or to protect American commerce and strategic sealift
on the high seas.
To support its allies and national interests, the United States has taken on
worldwide missions, and therefore has the most expeditionary military in the
world. With the requirement to operate, in many cases, far forward from the
continental United States, the armed forces rely heavily on ocean transportation
for the majority of their lift capacity, in terms of tonnage. To support its worldwide ocean-transportation needs, the U.S. military depends on internal sealift
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capabilities through the Navy’s Military Sealift Command; for rapid deployment,
on the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Fleet of government-owned
vessels; and for sustainment, on the U.S. Merchant Marine (commercial vessels).
This triad of fleets offers substantial sealift capacity.
However, the potential for losses in this maritime capability through the offensive actions of enemy maritime trade warfare against the United States simply
is not factored adequately into the nation’s policies or plans. During a July 2014
congressional hearing on sealift force requirements, the deputy commander
of U.S. Transportation Command was asked about the potential for attacks on
strategic sealift vessels. In his response he admitted, “So in terms of protecting
ships as they go across [the ocean], we . . . don’t have a lot of attrition built into
our modeling. . . . [T]hat is not something that we really build in there.”94 In other
words, although the United States currently has a substantial military sealift capability, the losses resulting from even moderately successful attacks on U.S.-flag
shipping could have far-reaching consequences.
Further, the number of U.S.-flag merchant vessels engaged in international
trade and available for strategic sealift is very small—seventy-eight—compared
with the tens of thousands of merchant ships under other flags.95 Should losses
occur in the U.S. Merchant Marine as a result of an enemy maritime warfare
campaign, it is certainly questionable whether America could rely on foreign-flag
commercial vessels for economic or military sealift.96 Yet this topic receives little
attention.
Perhaps logically, USN planning efforts center on the protection of surface
combatants, particularly aircraft carriers. However, if plans are not put in place
and exercised to protect strategic sealift vessels, to include both governmentowned vessels and those of the U.S. Merchant Marine, protection of warships is
really a moot point. Without a reliable and capable supply chain of commercial
and military logistics ships, warships cannot operate and fight far from American
shores for any significant span of time.
The conduct of maritime trade warfare in the twenty-first century represents
a complex problem that in many conflict scenarios would not yield positive
results. However, history is full of examples of maritime trade warfare proving
an effective strategy against enemies—which sometimes was the United States.
Likewise, history is full of examples of “experts” and political leaders insisting
that maritime trade warfare would not work—only to be proved very wrong as
new conflicts and scenarios presented themselves.
Accordingly, it seems quite appropriate in the twenty-first century that historical lessons learned from maritime trade warfare campaigns of the past be
studied carefully, and that political leaders and military planners consider, plan,
and exercise scenarios involving maritime trade warfare from both offensive and
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defensive perspectives. Doing anything less risks repeating some of the greatest
mistakes of maritime history.
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TAC TICS OF STR ATEGIC COMPETITION
Gray Zones, Redlines, and Conflicts before War
Van Jackson

D

efense analysts and policy makers now refer routinely to the challenges of
operating in a “gray zone” of conflict, which coincides with recent scholarly
efforts to analyze more rigorously conflicts short of traditional coercion or war.1
Yet despite its frequent contemporary usage, the term gray zone does not seem to
describe anything new. However, it does highlight something that is underconceptualized: the use of tactics that challenge the status quo without resorting to
war. This article proposes that the gray zone is not a new concept, but that the
term conveniently describes a broad class of events involving nonwar yet conflictual interactions—what might be considered “normal” or “stable” strategic competition. Taking policy makers’ concerns seriously, I argue that at least three types
of interrelated tactics are historically common, if underconceptualized, ways of
pursuing competitive gains while deferring the decision for war: sidestepping
established defender “redline” commitments; employing intermediary actors as
aggressors; and presenting faits accomplis to defenders.
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revisionist tactics also undermines suggestions that the gray zone of conflict
represents a brave new world. What is more, recognizing when such tactics are
in play has payoffs for how we might expect conflict interactions to unfold—the
presence of each tactic plausibly biases the outcomes of strategic interactions in
favor of those who take the initiative, while also introducing the classic risks of
unintentional escalation.
The remainder of this article proceeds in three parts. The first part introduces
the modern usage of the term gray zone, its conceptual limitation, and three
interrelated tactics that simultaneously try to avoid inciting crisis or war while
pursuing revisionist aims—the essence of the gray-zone challenge, as explained
by its advocates. The second part makes a prima facie attempt to identify the ways
in which these revisionist tactics logically complicate competitive interactions in
international relations (i.e., how their employment plausibly affects the interplay
of conflict, on the basis of their presence in familiar historical examples as well as
the causal logics identified in the sparse but relevant literatures). The final part
surveys a diverse range of modern cases of international competition to illustrate
the centrality of these revisionist tactics to explaining those cases.
UNDERSTANDING THE GRAY ZONE . . . OR NOT
The term gray zone appears almost nowhere in scholarly literature. Among security practitioners, the broadest and most consistent use of the term seems to
describe what amounts to a realpolitik state of competition short of war.2 Deputy
Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work acknowledged that “agents, paramilitaries, deception, infiltration, and persistent denial” constitute “what some people
have called ‘the gray zone,’” arguing that it is the type of conflict for which U.S.
forces are least prepared.3 The former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics similarly eschewed the term itself but addressed
the crux of the problem by describing the category of conflict in a 2015 internal
memo as one “that occurs again and again. These conflicts are regional, may be
presented by an insurgency against a standing government, military and political activities within a sovereign nation conducted by a neighbor, disputes over
territory between neighboring nations, or terrorist or criminal activities within
ungoverned territories or within failing states.”4 The memo even explained why
these activities are a problem: “In these conflicts it has been very difficult to assess
the situation and to determine what U.S. interests are at stake, . . . determining
what actions should the U.S. take to protect those interests, who our allies and
adversaries are in the particular situation, and what end-state would be best to
protect our interests and result in the most favorable outcome.”5
But the gray zone is not a concern only for the U.S. government. In track 1.5
meetings with U.S. officials and analysts, South Korean and Japanese officials
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have expressed rising angst that gray-zone challenges may erode the credibility
of U.S. commitments.6 In particular, the government of Japan, which started using the term in 2010, has defined gray zones as “armed incidents that fall short
of a full-scale attack.”7 Examples that officials have offered to illustrate what
Japan means by the term gray zone range from Chinese special operations forces
infiltrating the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dressed as fishermen to drone
intrusions or cyber attacks aimed at compelling Japan to stand down in the event
of a remote confrontation in the East China Sea.8 Japan’s Defense of Japan 2014
annual white paper also articulates concerns that gray-zone situations will pre
sent the country with scenarios in which a military response might be necessary,
but only its coast guard or law-enforcement agencies would have the authority to
act.9 A number of scholars and pundits additionally have seized on the term to
describe contemporary cases of competition, ranging from recent North Korean
violence and Russia’s annexation of Crimea to China’s East China Sea policy and
its ongoing artificial island building in contested areas of the South China Sea.10
Although the term gray zone is not inherently problematic, it risks obscuring
the actual observed behaviors that are raising concerns among policy makers. If
focusing on the gray zone amounts to nothing more than identifying the numerous types of conflict short of war, there is little obvious benefit in aggregating
them into a master category labeled gray zone. The term can be a convenient
descriptive shorthand for referring to nonwar competition, but its use leaves
unresolved any adequate explanation for how and why the behaviors of contemporary international actors apparently vex security practitioners to the point of
leading many to reach for a new term.
But these public discussions of gray zones highlight a policy-relevant theoretical lacuna regarding revisionist tactics short of launching conventional war that
make it possible for revisionists to establish new status quo baselines, secure gains
at the expense of a competitor, and shape future bargaining contexts, all without
automatically requiring coercive diplomacy, crisis, or war. From scanning the
range of cases and definitions of gray zones that the practitioners and scholars
mentioned above have advanced, three interrelated ideal-type tactics emerge:
revisionism that avoids defender commitments; employment of intermediary
actors; and faits accomplis.
The most obvious way to pursue an advantage while avoiding war is to avoid
challenging any commitment a defender has defined as a casus belli. In other
words, this means engaging in only those revisionist actions that sidestep defender redlines, the latter term understood as a commitment threshold for punishment or reaction.11 During the early Cold War period, Henry Kissinger and others
wrote of the need to defend the “grey areas” of the globe, meaning those countries
the NATO umbrella did not cover (i.e., the places where U.S. commitments were
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sparse and of questionable credibility).12 Kissinger’s argument was a critique of
President Eisenhower’s massive retaliation doctrine, which Kissinger believed
basically prevented the United States from reacting to aggression in all situations
other than a large-scale Soviet invasion of Europe. Kissinger feared that Cold
War adversaries around the world would pursue political and military expansion
in areas where the U.S. willingness to wage war or incur risks of conflict had not
been established or was less than obvious. Much more recently, it has been argued
that competitive states historically have exploited—and have enduring incentives
to exploit—what Daniel Altman also calls “gray areas,” challenging a defender
not where its resolve is clearest but rather where its commitments or retaliation
thresholds have weaknesses, which come in several varieties.13
As I describe it here, though, the tactic of redline avoidance shares more in
common with Kissinger’s “grey areas” than Altman’s “gray areas.” The difference
is subtle but conceptually and practically meaningful. With the tactic of redline
avoidance, the revisionist is choosing a site of contestation involving issues or
geographies where it views a defender’s redline commitments as being absent.
The tactic does not constitute exploitation of a weak redline but rather exploitation of the absence of one. In 1962, the U.S. redline against Soviet invasion of
Europe was strong, while no redline existed against Soviet missiles in Cuba prior
to the Cuban missile crisis; in other words, there was not a weak redline against
Soviet missiles in Cuba, but rather no redline whatsoever. By contrast, Altman’s
redline typology and corresponding “gray areas” describe revisionism that exploits loopholes in perceived redlines. Such revisionism encroaches on a redline
without crossing it, rather than avoiding it.14 The conceptual difference can be
seen in the prelude to the Cuban missile crisis: Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev
is said to have thought that there was no U.S. commitment with regard to missiles in Cuba (redline avoidance), which is different from saying that he thought
he was exploiting a U.S. commitment (redline encroachment) that was weak or
not credible.15
For policy makers, these are two fundamentally different problems. The
former is about vulnerabilities where one allowed an absence of commitments,
while the latter is about vulnerabilities arising from flaws in established commitments. To be sure, exploiting weak redlines is one way to challenge the status quo
without resorting to war; that is a basic argument not only in this article but in the
recent research on redlines.16 However, as the historical example above illustrates,
challenging the status quo while avoiding redlines altogether is tactically different from encroaching on weak redlines; I treat the latter (encroaching on weak
redlines) as a subset of the discussion on faits accomplis, below.
One way that revisionists avoid a defender’s redlines—a method that also can
be used to encroach on a defender’s redlines without crossing them—is through
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the second revisionist tactic: employing intermediaries. From prisoners’ dilemmas to games of chicken, theories of competition in international relations often
employ a simplifying assumption of dyadic interaction.17 But many conflicts
short of conventional war involve an aggressor’s third-party agents, not conventional military forces.
Intermediaries in international competition are conceptualized in at least
three ways in the literature. First, in proxy wars, intermediaries are secondary
states or rebel groups whose war fighting benefits, or at least is consonant with,
the goals of a primary state. States resorting to proxy wars do so in part because
they find themselves in rivalry or strategic competition with another state, yet are
deterred by the prospective costs of fighting a war directly; this is also a prevailing
logic of covert war.18
Second, in the literature on third-party or “indirect” deterrence, intermediaries are those actors to whom pressure is applied so that they may in turn apply
pressure to still another actor.19 A common, if faulty, argument about how best to
pressure North Korea has been to pressure China, which has unique economic
leverage over North Korea and might succeed in coercing North Korea where the
United States and South Korea have not.20
A third conceptualization of intermediaries that more commonly fits the kind
found in the gray zone of conflict comes from the literature on state-sponsored
terrorism.21 Intermediaries in this context are the agents in a principal-agent
relationship and the state is the principal or patron, but the tie between them
is an ambiguous or tenuous one. Agents in this sense sometimes are described
colloquially as “little green men” or the “fifth column” to capture the deniable
manner in which a patron may employ them.22 They can be any agents of a state
that traditionally do not play a signaling role in executing the “high politics” of
international security, such as law-enforcement authorities or guerrillas, or moreautonomous actors that implicitly act on behalf of an aggressor, including terrorist groups, computer hackers, fishermen, and even members of social movements
or an ethnically bonded diaspora.
The distinction is meaningful because the use of militaries activates instrumental logics of either deterrence or battlefield efficiency between competitors.23
Intermediaries, by contrast, do not activate such logics as readily, which, as discussed below, is one of the reasons their presence both can “stack the deck” of
interaction in favor of defender restraint and can generate distinct risks of miscalculation or blowback.24 Thus, China’s coast guard or its maritime militia—the latter is affiliated with the central government but is not a war-making instrument
of the state—may engage in confrontational actions in the East or South China
Sea. Such actions force defenders to ponder the extent to which—especially
in contrast with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy under comparable
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 43

48

4/21/17 8:35 AM

44

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue

circumstances—they reflect a deliberately aggressive design by Beijing.25 The
military instrument brings with it certain kinds of expectations and implied risks
with regard to confrontation, while the actions of other agents of a state introduce
at least the possibility of doubt about the logic governing their behavior.
An aggressor that employs an intermediary obscures culpability by obscuring
identification of authority, assumptions of control, or intent. From the defender’s
perspective, the use of intermediaries in any competitive interaction raises logical questions about these same factors. If the defender cannot know the answers
to these questions with any great degree of confidence, then neither can it know
whom to influence or how to do so.
Intermediaries in conflicts short of war are not passive or trivial actors. Often,
they present defenders with a fait accompli, which is to say an “initiative that
forces the opponent to initiate” or to stand aside.26 Faits accomplis have a long
history in international politics, and in crisis bargaining in particular, but prior
to recent research by Ahmer Tarar and Daniel Altman they were entirely untheorized.27 This may be due in part to what faits accomplis are: unilateral acts that
come at the expense of a competitor’s preferences.28 They often present defenders with the choice of taking no direct action (i.e., backing down) or initiating a
coercive interaction; in other words, they can, but do not inherently, constitute
coercive actions themselves. Because faits accomplis often sidestep deterrence
and compellence and leave the decision to initiate such hostilities to the defender,
paradoxically—and sometimes intentionally—faits accomplis potentially transform a defender into a seeming aggressor.29
As illustrated in the figure, faits accomplis can be gradualist or decisive, and
coercive or noncoercive. In the coercive bargaining literature, some gradualist
fait accompli strategies are what Thomas C. Schelling famously called “salami
VARIATIONS OF THE FAIT ACCOMPLI
Decisive

Egypt’s nationalization of the
Suez Canal (1956)

Russian intervention in Crimea
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tactics”: deliberate erosion of a defender’s redline by consciously attempting to
stay below the perceived threshold for reaction.30 Salami slicing presents defenders with situations, “none of which in isolation amounts to a casus belli, but
which add up over time to a substantial change in the strategic picture.”31 While
“not quite invoking the commitment,” in other words, they manage to make “the
commitment appear porous and infirm.”32 Faits accomplis that take the form of
salami tactics are revisionist attempts to exploit a weak redline, providing specific
revisionist paths of least resistance (or windows of opportunity, if one prefers),
considering the nature of the redline’s weakness.33
But faits accomplis need be neither gradual nor coercive. They also can be
decisive; alternatively, they can involve no threat making or redline erosion
whatsoever. For example, a sudden military operation aimed at quickly seizing
and occupying a swath of territory presents a defender with a fait accompli that
is decisive, not gradual. One recent study found that territorial acquisition by fait
accompli (defined as a unilateral, noncoercive “landgrab”) is both more common
and more successful than attempts to acquire territory by coercion.34 Another
study, also focusing narrowly on military faits accomplis that pursue decisive
“landgrabs,” finds that they are often the consequence of a commitment problem
in which the revisionist believes the defender will undertake military preparations (regardless of promises to the contrary) that would nullify or raise the costs
of a fait accompli.35 Moreover, states may perform research and development on
advanced weaponry or deploy military assets in outer space as ways to shift the
military balance without intending to challenge or threaten an adversary; in such
instances, an adversary not only may not have thought to introduce a redline but
may not know whether such a situation warrants one.36
Even the convergence of these tactics—intermediaries and faits accomplis,
put to the service of exploiting ambiguities in defender commitments or avoiding defender commitments altogether—does not make gray zones a category of
conflict that stands independent of coercive diplomacy, hybrid conflict, or other
types of bounded conflict interactions short of conventional war. Such an understanding would conflate conflict tactics with conflict types. Instead, the gray
zone, should the term be used at all, reflects a convenient description of normal
strategic competition. The tactics we find in the gray zone are deployable in any
competitive setting.
REVISIONIST TACTICS AND CONFLICT DYNAMICS
As a starting point for understanding how these tactics matter, this section draws
on the applicable literature as well as classic historical examples to construct
plausible claims about their causal implications.
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How Avoiding Redlines Affects Conflict
There are several ways in which aggressors can challenge the status quo while
encouraging defender restraint. The most prominent way of doing so while
avoiding war is by steering clear of a defender’s clearest redlines entirely, pressing
only where one believes defender commitments do not exist. Deterrence theory
long has identified an inherent trade-off when it comes to threat making: when
a defender establishes clear redlines for the sake of credible deterrence, “there is
a good possibility of a gap emerging.”37 An adversary may interpret issues and
areas that go unmentioned as permissible arenas for actions that will be less likely
to trigger retaliatory commitments. When Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined the “defense perimeter” of U.S. commitments in Asia in January 1950, he
failed to mention Korea. This proved to be one of several reasons North Korea’s
Kim Il Sung and the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin thought North Korea could invade South Korea quickly; by leaving Korea out of the articulation of U.S. defense
commitments, Acheson inadvertently may have signaled that North Korea could
advance there without risking a larger war with the United States.38 This example
illustrates how an opportunistic aggressor may target issues and geographies
where defender commitments are absent, expecting that it can do so at less cost
and risk. Acheson’s announced defense perimeter and the outbreak of the Korean
War constitute merely one of the best-known examples in a twentieth century full
of them.39 Kissinger’s 1955 call to defend “grey areas” (that is, non-NATO areas
of U.S. interest) was an explicit recognition of this kind of possibility.40 The reactive temptation for defenders facing this exploitive tactic is simply to add new or
clarifying commitments to cover those ambiguities where an adversary may assert itself. But such a defender strategy involves high risk and brings diminishing
returns, because there comes a point at which the accumulation of commitments
to employ force logically outstrips the ability to maintain them credibly. Such an
aggressor tactic thus encourages the defender to be discerning, and somewhat
restrained, about adding new commitments or clarifying existing ones.
Before its eruption into the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev’s attempt to place
nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba can be seen as an initially noncoercive move intended to shift the military balance by taking action in an area other than Europe,
where commitments were more entrenched. The Soviet Union, in other words,
may have believed “that there was no tacit commitment on Kennedy’s part to
oppose such a deployment.”41 By shifting the military balance in its favor while
avoiding U.S. redlines, the Soviet Union was attempting to gain a geostrategic
advantage without engaging directly in a coercive contest.
But, as with North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, Khrushchev’s decision
to place Soviet missiles in Cuba illustrates the risk an aggressor incurs when
altering the status quo in places and on issues where defender commitments
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 46

51

4/21/17 8:35 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13

JA C K S O N

47

seem unclear, weak, or absent: underestimating the defender’s resolve. In neither
case did the aggressor seek to precipitate what became the Korean War and the
Cuban missile crisis, respectively, but in neither case was the United States willing simply to allow the aggressor’s actions to stand. Even though by using this
tactic—challenging the status quo in a manner that avoids a defender redline,
while targeting issues or areas high on uncertainty and low on precedent—
aggressors aim to achieve gains while avoiding conflict, doing so risks crisis or
conflict anyway. In cyberspace, for example, there are indications that U.S. strategic ambiguity about cyber attacks may reflect the uncertainty of U.S. officials
about the conditions that might lead to U.S. retaliatory attacks.42 If the United
States is unclear about its own retaliatory thresholds, then surely state-sponsored
hackers in China, North Korea, and elsewhere are as well.
How Faits Accomplis Affect Conflict
Regardless of whether a fait accompli is coercive or noncoercive, decisive or
gradual, it presents defenders with incentives either to back down or to take
coercive action themselves. The deliberate use of faits accomplis, as opposed to
some other type of aggressive action, involves an implicit wager that the action
taken will encourage restraint and not provoke defender retaliatory measures.43
It can do this in at least two different ways. The first is by moving too quickly
and completely for the defender to react because of material or capability constraints. North Korea’s 1950 invasion of South Korea was intended to do just this,
presenting the United States with a situation on the ground that was so far gone
it could not plausibly be reversed. In his memoir Khrushchev recalls that Stalin’s
decision to permit Kim Il Sung’s invasion of South Korea was premised on the
assumption “that if the war were fought swiftly . . . intervention by the USA could
be avoided.”44 The second way a fait accompli encourages defender paralysis is by
making the action such a small or gradual challenge to a defender’s redline that
the defender finds it difficult to justify mustering a retaliatory response. Such
gradualism can be seen in China’s repeated intrusions into the airspace surrounding the highly disputed (with Japan) Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China
Sea. Each such occurrence forces the Japan Self-Defense Forces to scramble fighter aircraft to intercept and turn back the intruders. Between 2006 and 2014, the
frequency of such high-friction encounters in the areas surrounding the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands has risen steadily, reaching a peak of 464 aerial intrusions in
2014.45 Each incident is too minor for Japan to base thereon a credible threat of
retaliation, but such incidents nevertheless repeatedly put Japan in the position
of either scrambling fighters to confront intruders or simply allowing Chinese
intrusions to go unchecked. The latter would establish a de facto precedent of
Chinese presence in Japan-administered territory against the latter country’s will.
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When deployed during noncrises and nonwar situations, faits accomplis thus
“stack the deck” of strategic interaction in favor of the aggressor at the expense of
the defender’s preferences by encouraging restraint in the latter. But, as with any
wager, there is a risk of being wrong. With faits accomplis, from the aggressor’s
perspective, the cost of being wrong takes the form of unintentionally triggering
coercion or retaliation from the defender. Inadvertent conflict and escalation
are possible if an aggressor attempting a fait accompli has misjudged where a
defender’s redline is (i.e., what its retaliatory commitments are) or its resolve (i.e.,
its willingness to retaliate when its redline proscription is violated).46 From the
defender’s perspective, the costs of inaction when presented with a fait accompli
must be weighed against the costs of initiating retaliation and the risk of escalating a conflict. Kim Il Sung’s gamble that the United States would not intervene to
reverse North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950 certainly ended up incurring a high cost. But miscalculation-based escalation also can result from faits accomplis that do not involve military invasions or “landgrabs.” For instance, when
Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser presented his famous fait accompli of
nationalizing the Suez Canal in 1956, he inadvertently catalyzed British, French,
and Israeli coordinated war plans, leading to Israeli ground forces’ seizure of the
Sinai Peninsula.47 Nasser’s unilateral yet noncoercive declaration proved to be a
gamble that did not pay off for Egypt.
Even if an aggressor has not misjudged an adversary’s likely reaction to a
proximate incident, there are broader risks from second-order or ancillary reactions. Between the United States and North Korea during the 1960s, for example,
North Korean salami tactics, in the form of small-scale violence, repeatedly were
met with either U.S. decision paralysis or conciliatory offers to resolve an incident
peacefully.48 While this might be framed as North Korea besting the United States
in a string of specific incidents, the larger history worked against North Korea.
The United States may have been “boxed in” to de facto acceptance of North
Korea’s violent provocations—because the incidents were too minor to warrant
retaliation—but it coped with that unsavory reality in ways anathema to North
Korean interests: by redoubling its commitment to ally South Korea, enhancing
the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula, providing greater financial
assistance to South Korean military modernization, and conducting grander
military exercises.49
How Intermediaries Affect Conflict
The presence of intermediaries in conflict interaction represents either some
degree of delegation of authority from a principal to an executing agent or the deceptive appearance of delegated authority. From a defender’s perspective, it may
be unclear what degree of autonomy an intermediary has, the degree to which
an intermediary is compliant with an aggressor’s prerogatives, and whether there
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even is a principal-agent relationship between the aggressor and the intermediary. Consequently, the presence of aggressor intermediaries structures strategic
interaction in several ways that are potentially favorable to the aggressor—but
with distinct risks.
One way, similar to the fait accompli approach, is to induce defender inaction
or decision paralysis by complicating the task of identifying retaliatory targets.
Attribution, a common problem with cyber attacks in particular, is essential
for mounting retaliation or countercoercion.50 And even if a defender can link
intermediaries and their patrons together accurately, ambiguities remain about
the extent to which an intermediary is a mindless agent of a patron as opposed to
a rogue actor.51 The United States quickly traced the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures
Studios to intermediaries acting on behalf of the North Korean regime, but it was
not immediately clear what exactly that meant.52 Were the perpetrators Chinese
hackers for hire? Were they government operatives executing orders received
from the regime in Pyongyang? Or were they autonomous actors launching attacks and making threats out of symbolic or identity solidarity with the North
Korean regime?
The use of intermediaries also can enhance the credibility of aggressor threat
making if it ties the hands of an aggressor, which can induce defender restraint
through successful coercion. Daniel L. Byman and Sarah E. Kreps claim this as a
major motivation of state-sponsored terrorism in the Middle East.53 Iran employs
Hezbollah and Palestinian terror groups as intermediaries against Israel in part
to credibly threaten retaliation for any and all grievances with Israel, whereas
the relatively poor state of Iran’s military does not allow it to make such blanket
retaliatory threats directly.54 Credible threats of retaliation come in the form of
support to intermediaries because direct interstate conflict per se would not favor
Iran, in contrast with terrorist groups that are openly at war with Israel and credibly can engage in continuous retaliation if called on to do so.
A third way intermediary agents benefit the aggressor state is by giving it
greater freedom of action through plausible deniability.55 An aggressor may seek
openly to associate itself with, and claim responsibility for, intermediary actions,
but only after they occur; plausible deniability allows it to take such a “wait and
see” approach. Conversely, an aggressor may seek to distance itself from the actions of autonomous intermediaries whose actions go too far, crossing a defender’s redlines, or with whose tactics they disagree. The aggressor thus may employ
intermediaries to give itself the latitude either to claim the benefits or to avoid the
costs of intermediary actions. The plausible deniability that intermediaries offer
also may allow for more aggressive salami tactics than a revisionist might pursue
using direct military force.
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Although intermediaries may skew interaction in the patron’s favor in multiple
ways, risks of backfire or negative feedback remain. Delegating a task inherently
involves some amount of risk (e.g., of the agent committing unintended errors
or taking undesirable independent actions).56 By relinquishing direct control to
a degree, an aggressor may have its hands undesirably tied. And when the linkage between an aggressor and its intermediary is grounded in a shared identity
or raison d’être, the aggressor may find it difficult to disassociate itself from the
intermediary, should it seek to do so. States that employ relatively autonomous
intermediaries run a risk of being “chain-ganged” into escalation of conflicts they
sought to avoid.
Use of intermediaries also risks engendering defender reactions of retaliation
or escalation. If an intermediary takes actions the defender finds unacceptable,
plausible deniability may not be enough to stifle a defender’s revenge-motivated
reaction. Decision makers are often willing to impose certainty on and form
beliefs about situations that are fundamentally uncertain.57 Politicians in a
defending state may feel public pressure to react quickly and forcefully and to
find a retaliatory scapegoat even if attribution is not immediately known—
sometimes uncertainty is no excuse for inaction. Even if an intermediary
complies perfectly and precisely with the intent of an aggressor, moreover, it
nevertheless may be the case that the aggressor misjudged either the defender’s
willingness to respond or its mode of response. Escalation logically could follow
either type of misjudgment.
DEGREES OF GRAY
As with all theoretical choices, analytic narratives constructed with a “revisionist tactics lens” foreground some elements over others to explain events. This is
not to trivialize other factors, nor to claim that contexts that exclude revisionist
tactics do not also bedevil policy makers. But there is a mismatch between the
academic literature’s lack of emphasis on redline avoidance, intermediaries, and
faits accomplis and policy makers’ growing concern about them.
Event Selection
The table compares several contemporary cases involving revisionism that avoids
or defers decisions for conventional war. These specific events with these specific
actors merit attention because they have been at the center of debates between
critics and advocates of the term gray zone. Demonstrating that the aforementioned revisionist tactics played a nontrivial role in the unfolding of events supports both aspects of my claim about the gray-zone debate.
First, the causal logics articulated in the prior section derived in part from
examining important historical cases in the security and strategic studies canon.
This demonstrates that they have explanatory power in contemporary cases,
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IDENTIFYING GRAY-ZONE TACTICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Intermediaries
Involved?

Defenders Faced a
Fait Accompli?

Aggressor Avoided
Defender Redlines?

North Korean
artillery attack
(2010)

No

No

Yes

Defender restraint,
but adoption of
“proactive
deterrence” doctrine

North Korean naval
attack (2010)

No

Yes

Yes

Defender restraint,
but international
investigation

North Korean hack
of Sony Pictures
(2014)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Defender restraint

China’s ADIZ
declaration for the
East China Sea
(2013)

No

Yes

Yes

Defender restraint,
but defiance of
Chinese claims

Chinese artificial
island building in
the South China Sea
(2013–present)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Defender restraint,
but increased U.S.
patrols and regional
security aid

Russian intervention
in Ukraine (2014–
present)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Defender restraint,
but renewed U.S.
emphasis on NATO;
military aid to
Ukraine

Event

Outcome

undermining notions that there is something new about the gray-zone security
challenges of the present.
Second, narratives of these cases would be incomplete without accounting for
revisionist tactics short of war, which repudiates claims that there is no explanatory value added in conceptualizing these tactics. Parsing any of these cases solely
with reference to logics of coercion, conventional war fighting, or game-theoretic
crisis bargaining not only would offer limited explanatory value but would sacrifice understanding of the similar role that redline avoidance, intermediaries, and
faits accomplis played across cases.
The range of cases reveals a common tendency (regardless of whether one
or all three revisionist tactics were employed): defender paralysis in response to
the immediate tactic, but inevitable second-order consequences in the form of
indirect responses.
North Korean Provocations
Twice in 2010, North Korea engaged in isolated acts of violence against South
Korea.58 The first was a torpedo attack that sank a South Korean naval ship in
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March of that year, killing all forty-six sailors on board. The second attack, eight
months later, was an artillery barrage against South Korean–administered islands
in a disputed maritime area near North Korea’s western coast, killing four South
Korean marines and critically injuring a mix of dozens of marines and civilians
on the island. North Korean conventional military forces conducted both attacks.
The torpedo attack, for which North Korea denied responsibility, was a covert
action in international waters, taking place far from the view of any onlookers.
The artillery attack, by contrast, was conducted close to the Korean Peninsula’s
coast and was filmed and broadcast in near real time on South Korean news stations. North Korea not only accepted responsibility for the latter attack; it claimed
the attack was a punitive measure in response to a South Korean military exercise
in the area, against which North Korea had issued warnings.
The torpedo attack effectively forced South Korea to choose between doing
nothing or retaliating despite North Korean denials of culpability. By comparison, the artillery attack is understood better as a coercive battlefield action, not a
fait accompli. Both were isolated, limited attacks that fell well short of triggering
a U.S. or South Korean invasion of North Korea, but did risk some retaliation.
Whereas the March torpedo attack generated political controversy within South
Korea about whether North Korea was actually responsible (a debate that prevented South Korean officials from being able to retaliate), the November artillery attack nearly led to South Korean punitive bombings of North Korea; these
were avoided narrowly, only because senior U.S. officials intervened with their
South Korean counterparts to prevent retaliation.59
Although in a crisis-bargaining sense North Korea came out of these interactions unscathed and succeeded in encouraging U.S. and South Korean restraint,
second-order consequences reified the hostility that gave rise to North Korean
violence in the first place. The March 2010 attack led directly to an international
investigation and the later imposition of punitive “5/24 sanctions” that cut off
North Korea from most sources of South Korean currency.60 The November 2010
attack, meanwhile, triggered the adoption of a South Korean “proactive deterrence” doctrine of preemption, acceleration of South Korean precision-strike
missile programs, and a discourse in support of South Korea developing an independent nuclear capability.61
Contrasting with these attacks was North Korea’s 2014 cyber attack against
Sony Pictures Studios in response to the latter’s insulting and subversive (from
North Korea’s perspective) movie The Interview, whose comedic plot centered
on two journalists who assassinate Kim Jong Un. This incident featured all three
gray-zone tactics. The hacker group, whose members called themselves the
“Guardians of Peace,” nominally was an independent entity, yet was acting in the
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interests of the North Korean regime.62 The group issued a number of threats—of
a digital and physical nature—aimed at preventing the public release of The Interview. Although the threats were to no avail and the movie eventually was released
without any violence, the hackers did disrupt Sony’s computer systems and stole
and released to the public proprietary internal company information, including
embarrassing e-mails from Sony executives.63 The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation eventually traced the Guardians of Peace back to North Korea, but slowly,
and never definitively.64 To this day, North Korea refuses to take responsibility
for the Sony hack, and some (a minority) in the technology sector in the United
States persist in doubting North Korean culpability.65
The surreptitious intrusion into Sony’s internal information network and
subsequent public revelation of stolen information was a coercive, decisive, and
nonviolent fait accompli. It presented not only Sony but the U.S. government with
multiple types of direct threats, and forced both into a position that favored not
attempting any meaningful retaliation.
China’s East China Sea ADIZ Declaration
China long has contested the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with Japan, which the latter administers. Every year since around 2006, China has increased the frequency
of its attempted air and naval intrusions into the area surrounding the disputed
islands, requiring Japan to increase the frequency with which it responds by
scrambling fighter aircraft to escort intruding Chinese assets out of the area.66
Some of these confrontations involve Chinese civil vessels and aircraft, but frequently they have involved Chinese military assets as well. Although most of
these confrontations have been resolved without incident, some have escalated
to militarized crises, leading to both sides issuing redline threats. Japan, for example, has threatened that any Chinese drone that unlawfully enters Senkaku
airspace will be shot down, while China has counterthreatened that any shootdown of a Chinese drone would be an “act of war.”67
Despite the highly contested nature of the East China Sea, in November 2013
China’s Ministry of National Defense declared an air defense identification zone
(ADIZ) over most of the area. Imposition of an ADIZ would require incoming
aircraft to identify themselves to Chinese authorities and, if military, to request
permission. As with all ADIZs, a Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea would
allow China to “identify, monitor, control, and react to aircraft entering this
zone.”68 China also claims the right to take “defensive emergency measures”
against noncompliant aircraft, although it has not done so—yet.69 Although
ADIZ declarations have been common since the United States established the
first zone in 1950, the United States and China’s neighbors view China’s ADIZ
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as a provocative fait accompli because it was declared unilaterally, without prior
consultation, over a maritime area that is heavily contested with Japan.70
As an act of defiance that constituted a fait accompli of its own, the United
States flew a nuclear-capable B-52 bomber through China’s “ADIZ” only two
days after its proclamation. The aircraft neither announced itself nor sought
permission.71 Notwithstanding the symbolism, the B-52 flight was an isolated
act of signaling that changed nothing with respect to China’s ADIZ declaration.
While the United States, Japan, and South Korea do not recognize the East China
Sea ADIZ, they have not attempted to compel China to roll it back—which preserves China’s de facto “right” to enforce the ADIZ at will. A U.S. Congressional
Research Service report assessed that China was “asserting a maximalist position,
then seeming to back down, while preserving some incremental gain.”72 Secretary
of State John F. Kerry accused Beijing of “an attempt to change the status quo
in the East China Sea.”73 The ADIZ declaration involved no intermediaries but,
from the perspective of the United States and Japan, was indeed a decisive fait
accompli that also avoided triggering any kind of retaliatory commitments from
either the United States or China’s neighbors.
Chinese Artificial Island Building in the South China Sea
Although not the first country to do so, China since 2013 has engaged in a rapid
process of “land reclamation”—the construction of artificial islands—in the disputed South China Sea. In less than two years, it developed more than 2,900 acres
of “land” in a space of overlapping exclusive economic zones between China and
other South China Sea claimants.74 Since their construction, China has positioned weapons systems and military infrastructure—including radars, artillery,
runways, and military barracks—on them despite their being highly contested,
and despite Chinese claims that it is not “militarizing” the islands.75
China has not issued threats in relation to these artificial islands and has not
used them as yet to blockade others’ freedom of navigation. However, U.S. intelligence officials openly express concern that China gradually is putting in place
the physical ability to impose and enforce constraints on freedom of navigation
through the South China Sea, should it choose to do so.76 While the United States
maintains a commitment to freedom of navigation and open sea-lanes, that commitment is open-ended and abstract. The U.S. redline concerning freedom of
navigation is “arbitrary” and “imprecise”; the United States has issued no specific
“redline” threat to resort to military force to fulfill such a commitment, particularly in the South China Sea.77
This makes China’s land-reclamation activity a gradualist fait accompli that
does not overstep directly any retaliatory boundaries, and is not inherently
coercive or aggressive—even if such actions improve China’s position should
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it take aggressive actions in the future. Any direct military action to blockade
or attack Chinese artificial islands would require a decisive act of aggression
disproportionate to the mundane (if strategically significant) activities of engineers building artificial structures in international waters. So, while the United
States has increased its “presence” in the South China Sea in response to China’s
actions—including through maritime patrols, freedom-of-navigation military
exercises, and enhanced security assistance to Indonesia and the Philippines—
none of these actions have been aimed at, nor have they had the effect of, curbing
or rolling back China’s land-reclamation activity, which effectively establishes a
new status quo in the South China Sea.78
Russian Intervention in Ukraine
In 2014, Russia employed all three revisionist tactics in a campaign that culminated in the annexation of Crimea, formally and formerly part of Ukraine. Although the conflict had political antecedents dating back to the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, what immediately precipitated it was pro-European social forces
in Ukraine mobilizing to oust the country’s then president Viktor Yanukovych,
who was seen as subservient to Moscow. Within days of Yanukovych’s removal,
Russia capitalized on Ukraine’s domestic turmoil to insert large numbers of “little
green men”—undesignated and unidentifiable yet armed forces, widely believed
to belong to Russian special forces—who occupied key choke points and government buildings in Crimea, claiming to be separatists.79 Russia denied responsibility for these forces. Once the “little green men” established territorial control, a
controversial referendum of secession was held in Crimea, which led to Russia’s
formalized annexation of it.80
As these events evolved, in March 2014 the Donbas region of Ukraine filled
with anti-Ukrainian protests conducted largely by members of an ethnically Russian diaspora. These pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian protests quickly militarized,
and separatists in Donbas unilaterally declared independence from Ukraine. As
fighting continued throughout the year and into 2015, the Russian military provided arms and logistics to the separatist forces—some members of whom were
Russian citizens—that were fighting against the Ukrainian government. Russia
denied any military involvement in and culpability for the events.81 Thus, under
the cover of mobilized separatist forces in Ukraine, Russia waged what some describe as a “hybrid war” against the Ukrainian government to secure the political
independence of a region of sovereign Ukrainian territory.82
Russia’s “little green men” perpetrated a decisive fait accompli, and they did
so in a manner that avoided triggering retaliation or military incursions from
NATO or the United States. U.S. and European observers were quick to recognize
that Russia was behind the intervention of the “little green men” in Crimea.83
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Moreover, mounting evidence increasingly made Russian involvement—
especially in providing logistics support to the Donbas separatists—undeniable
to outside observers, although the use of such intermediaries allowed Russia to
continue its narrative of denial.84 But the rapid ability of the West to attribute the
conflict to Russia did not translate into any kind of military reaction, and Russia’s
aloofness made it virtually impossible to negotiate a cease-fire. As Russian foreign
minister Sergei Lavrov responded when confronted with evidence of Russia’s role
in events in Ukraine and demands for a cease-fire, “[B]efore demanding from us
that we stop doing something, please present proof that we have done it.”85
At the end of the Cold War, the United States, along with Russia and the
United Kingdom, agreed to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances,
which afforded Ukraine underspecified “security assurances” after the latter relinquished the Soviet nuclear weapons remaining there.86 But this security commitment was ambiguous in terms of what was required of the United States, and
at any rate was not formalized in a treaty. In response to accusations that standing
by while Ukraine was being ravaged damaged U.S. and NATO credibility, the
United States was quick to point out that Ukraine was not a NATO member and
that Russia’s intervention in Ukraine did not invoke NATO’s article 5 collective
defense requirement; neither did the Budapest Memorandum require U.S. military commitments to Ukraine’s security.87
As a former U.S. defense official observed, Russia effectively succeeded in
“avoiding alliance tripwires while still subversively contributing to instability,
unrest, and violence in Ukraine.”88 By July and August 2014, Russian rank-andfile conventional forces, including artillery units, were crossing into Ukraine.
Yet even when Ukrainian forces captured Russian soldiers—a seeming “smoking
gun” of Russian culpability—Moscow persisted with its denials, claiming such
soldiers had crossed the border by mistake.89
Subsequently, the United States and NATO, both of which were unable to do
much beyond monitoring the situation from the outside, have strengthened their
ties to and presence in Eastern Europe. They have attempted to make clear that
a Crimea-like intervention would not be acceptable in a NATO country—even if
the populations of some of them, such as Estonia, contain sizable ethnic Russian
minorities.90
This article has attempted to examine several underlying tactics found in what
contemporary security practitioners sometimes reference as a “gray zone” of
conflict. Tactics other than war that seek to revise the status quo are historically
common yet undertheorized. As an initial remedy, this article has proposed that
avoidance of a defender’s clearest commitments, use of intermediary actors, and

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 56

61

4/21/17 8:35 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13

JA C K S O N

57

presentation with faits accomplis are indeed old tactics, long wielded by actors
seeking to challenge the status quo without resorting to conventional military
force.
But just because something is not new does not mean it has been conceptualized adequately. Revisionist tactics plausibly condition strategic interactions in
important ways: they encourage defender inaction, strengthen aggressor threat
credibility, allow aggressors to obscure culpability, and introduce proximate
escalation risks resulting from aggressor misjudgments or intermediaries going
rogue. As international politics becomes defined more in terms of a “diffusion of
power” and increasingly complex interdependencies, motivations for revisionism
are likely to endure. Such an environment may increase reliance on the tactics
examined here.91
While the gray zone is not a new concept, as an area of concern to military
commanders and policy makers it is understudied. This article has attempted to
fill that gap by identifying and examining the role of tactics in conflicts short of
conventional war, and by showing that such tactics make it possible for revisionists to secure gains while paralyzing defenders. This bolsters the claim that these
tactics constitute something distinct in international security and are worthy of
study, even if they are not new.
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IMPAC TS OF THE ROBOTICS AGE
ON NAVAL FORCE DESIGN, EFFEC TIVENESS,
AND ACQUISITION
Jeffrey E. Kline

It is not in the interest of Britain—possessing as she does so large a
navy—to adopt any important change in ships of war . . . until such a
course is forced upon her. . . . [T]his time has arrived.

T

ADMIRAL BALDWIN WALKER, ROYAL NAVY, 1860

he twenty-first century will see the emergence of maritime powers that have
the capacity and capability to challenge the U.S. Navy for control of the seas.
Unfortunately, the Navy’s ability to react to emerging maritime powers’ rapid
growth and technological advancement is constrained by its own planning, acquisition, and political processes. Introducing our own technology advances is
hindered as well. The planning and acquisition system for our overly platformfocused naval force structure is burdened with so many inhibitors to change that
we are ill prepared to capitalize on the missile and robotics age of warfare.
Yet by embracing the robotics age, recognizing the fundamental shift it represents in how naval power is conveyed, and refocusing our efforts to emphasize
the “right side” of our offensive kill chain—the side that delivers the packages
producing kinetic and nonkinetic effects—we may hurdle acquisition challenges
A retired naval officer with twenty-six years of and bring cutting-edge technology to contemservice, Jeffrey E. Kline is currently a professor of porary naval warfare. 1 Incorporating robotics
practice in the Operations Research Department at
technology into the fleet as rapidly, effectively, and
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and holds the
efficiently as possible would magnify the fleet’s
OPNAV N9I Chair of Systems Engineering Analysis.
He teaches joint campaign analysis and executive capacity, lethality, and opportunity—all critical
risk assessment and coordinates maritime security
to strategic and tactical considerations. Doing so
education programs offered at NPS. Jeff supports applied analytical research in maritime operations and also would recognize the fiscal constraints under
security, tactical analysis, and future force composi- which our present force planning cannot be sustion studies.
tained. As Admiral Walker advised above, it is now
Naval War College Review, Summer 2017, Vol. 70, No. 3
time to change.2
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After addressing the traditional foundations of force structure planning and
the inhibitors to change, this article will discuss how focusing on the packages
delivered rather than the delivery platforms would allow us better to leverage
new technologies in the 2030 time frame. What would a naval force architecture
look like if this acquisition strategy were employed? This article will present a
force-employment philosophy and a war-fighting strategy based on the tactical
offensive that align with this acquisition approach. The article does not present
an alternative force structure with actual numbers of ships and platforms, but
suggests a force-acquisition strategy and force-design concept that provide a
foundational underpinning by which a specific force architecture can be developed. Three strategic force measures—reactivity, robustness, and resilience—will
be used subjectively to assess this fleet design compared with our traditional
programmed forces.
STRATEGIC FOUNDATIONS OF NAVAL FORCE-STRUCTURE
PLANNING AND THE GREAT INHIBITORS
Ideally, a country’s naval force structure changes with national strategy, national
treasure, technological advancement, and potential adversary capabilities. National strategy provides the rationale for, purpose of, and priority among choices
to be made in creating a fleet. National treasure defines the resources and constraints dictating strategic choices. New technologies provide opportunities for
increasing fleet effectiveness, yet also may endanger fleet survival should potential adversaries expose and exploit vulnerabilities in these technologies. This is
a complex problem even when one takes into account only these four factors;
however, U.S. naval acquisition also is challenged by other influences that inhibit
capitalization of new technologies.
The most powerful of these inhibitions is inertia. The existing fleet represents a capital-heavy investment by the country, one with long build times and
lifetimes. Ships and aircraft cost billions to design, build, and maintain. They
require a capital-intensive industry featuring heavy equipment, infrastructure,
and a skilled workforce—all generations in the making. As a consequence, annual
programming and budgeting decisions are marginal in nature. It is the nature of
a large fleet to evolve slowly, as opposed to undergoing revolutionary changes
to its composition. This is a reality the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) faces
when considering changes to the naval forces. Each CNO’s relatively short tenure
restricts the ability to formulate, market, and execute any maritime strategy that
would have a comprehensive effect on ship and aircraft procurement.
Since the first six USN frigates were authorized in 1794, national internal
political and economic factors have been another major influence on fleet
composition. As Ian Toll illustrates well in his Six Frigates: The Epic History of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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the Founding of the U.S. Navy, the potential windfalls for local economies when
selected to build warships generate powerful political pressures for stabilization
once these selections are made.3 Now just as then, senators and congressmen representing districts that build ships (and aircraft) may be expected to defend existing programs and seek new ones, to the economic benefit of their constituents.
Next, the compartmentalization of fleet planning, budgeting, building, and
maintenance caused by large, resource-competing bureaucracies creates a lethargic environment inefficient for change. Multiple oversight agencies and bodies,
including Congress, subject every decision that program managers make to
often-paralyzing scrutiny. Our agility to implement rapid change is lost when the
number of stakeholders exceeds the point at which responsibility and authority
can be defined clearly. This is a structural issue common to all capital-heavy investment programs—the space shuttle, large multimission warships, long-range
bombers—that require bureaucracies to design and implement them.
Finally, the very nature of a fleet’s strategic value engenders conservatism in a
senior naval leadership faced with the options for change. This is not necessarily
an unhealthy view, as loss of the fleet could mean loss of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and therefore likely a war. Nonetheless, overvaluing what worked
in the last major maritime war—which occurred in the 1940s—at the expense
of recognizing that missile, robotics, and cyber technology has changed the primary conveyance of naval power may result in a fleet unprepared to combat an
enemy that is not so inhibited. A less formally “capable” adversary untethered
by allegiance to past precedent may be more flexible and therefore much more
dangerous.
Individually, none of these influences on force structure planning can be
dismissed. The danger is that in aggregate they result in a harmful escalation of
commitment toward obsolete platforms, permitting only marginal changes in
force structure amid opportunities for major technological changes. The result
today is a brittle U.S. fleet that is susceptible to tactical surprise and slow to react
to adversaries’ technological initiatives.4
The United States is not unique in facing these challenges. Historically, major
changes to naval force structure have resulted from war, great technological leaps,
or both. Rowing, ramming, and boarding vessels gave way to the naval cannon
and sail; sail to steam; armor and rifled guns to aircraft; and aircraft to missiles.
Now comes the dawn of a robotics age. Missiles, robots, miniaturization, hypersonic technologies, and artificial intelligence give the advantage to many smaller,
faster, and more lethal offense capabilities.5 Our challenge today is to not allow
the restraints on current force structure planning to cede these advantages to
potential adversaries.
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MISSILES, ROBOTS, AND AN OFFENSIVE TACTICS–
ENABLING STRATEGY
Meeting all the desired maritime strategic capabilities—all-domain access, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security—while constrained
by the budget and procurement process will require new thinking in platforms,
weapons, and command and control (C2). Embracing the combined capacity
of missiles and robotics in this new era creates options for achieving a desired
tactical end state that enables our operational and strategic goals. Strategists will
regard this as a reversal of the traditional hierarchy of the levels of war; yet it is
historically accurate. Technology empowers a tactical edge in maritime warfare,
providing new operational and strategic choices. For example, the advances in
submarine technology during the first half of the twentieth century resulted in
a new form of commerce raiding and sea-lane interdiction. The reach of carrier
aircraft changed the nature of naval combat in World War II. Advances in nuclear
propulsion and ballistic-missile technology in the second half of the twentieth
century led to a third way of offering nuclear strategic deterrence: from the
sea depths. Parallel examples can be made for missile-carrying aircraft and the
guided torpedo.6
Today, investing in a very “smart” long-range autonomous offensive missile
that can outrange those of our adversary may permit us to build less-expensive,
less-well-defended ships from which to launch them, thereby making sea combat
more affordable. Shifting emphasis to the weapon’s ability and the force’s targeting capability, rather than concentrating on the platform itself, changes both the
risk and cost calculus.
Take a specific example. Purchasing one fewer Burke-class guided-missile destroyer (DDG) would allow the acquisition and operation of thirty-five to forty
large autonomous surface vessels (LASVs).7 If each of the latter were armed with
eight antiship cruise missiles, from 280 to 320 offensive missiles could be dispersed in a contested region, as opposed to the eight missiles (canister) or at most
ninety (vertical launch systems) that the DDG could bring to one location. Our
potential adversaries show an appreciation for this concept by building smaller,
missile-capable combatants, establishing a clear missile gap between themselves
and U.S. surface forces in contested regions.8
The proposal here is not to replace all DDGs with unmanned surface vessels,
but to refocus our investments on less expensive “payloads” delivered, kinetic or
cyber, not the more expensive delivery platforms.9 The goal is greater affordability paired with enhanced fleet capacity and employment options, thereby creating
uncertainty in our potential adversaries’ strategic calculus. A stark example is a
weapon that has huge maritime influence—changing our strategic risk calculus
—yet has no maritime platform: the Chinese DF-21 antiship ballistic missile.
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As important as it is to focus on offensive payloads so as to provide rapid
change capacity, doing so yields other benefits as well. It lessens many of the
political, economic, and bureaucratic challenges associated with investing in
capital-heavy platform programs. Since it is easier to modify weapons than platforms, technological upgrades to weapons systems can be accomplished quicker.10 The forty-year-old Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo illustrates how an offensive
weapon may evolve with new capabilities, even with no major modifications to
its platform. There is also less political interest invested in weapon procurement,
as these systems do not require the resources associated with a new submarine
or aircraft carrier. Fewer stakeholders burden weapon design, procurement, assembly, and modification. These factors enable us to modify offensive capabilities quickly as new technology emerges, or to respond better when an adversary
surprises us with a new capability. The ability to test, fail, and quickly change a
portion of the fleet that is less capital heavy than our traditional forces is an advantage from any perspective.
This philosophy is particularly exploitable in the electromagnetic (EM) and
cyber realm. Inexpensive, disposable unmanned aerial vehicles employing radar
reflectors or chirp jamming systems can be more cost-effective delivery platforms
for EM packages than a single EF-18 Growler. The introduction of inexpensive,
credible, and numerous decoys into the air, on the surface, and undersea also
is enhanced by the robotics age’s ability to deliver confusing effects with little
risk to manned systems. In defense, developing left-of-launch effects against
an adversary’s surveillance systems—countertargeting—need not be expensive,
and, if synchronized with the movement of actual forces, mitigates risk to sailors
operating in contested areas.
In other words, when building a fleet for contested environments while operating under real financial constraints, our investments should concentrate on
technologies that enhance the right side of our offensive kill chain and enable us
to disrupt the left side of an adversary’s kill chain prior to his launch. Building
kinetic weapons for offense and nonkinetic weapons for defense are more costeffective options than building multimission, hardened, and therefore expensive
platforms. Robotic vehicles for delivering these weapons put the focus of warfare
close to the enemy and farther from us.
We are not there yet. If resource allocation is a mirror of strategic choices, in
the president’s fiscal year 2017 Defense Department budget, of the $183 billion allocated for modernization (which includes procurement and research and development), about 40 percent is allocated for aircraft procurement and shipbuilding,
less than 8 percent for munitions.11 Substantial change, involving Congress and
the Navy Department, will be required to move past procuring a platform-centric
force to procuring a sensor/weapon-centric force. However, we are beginning to
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explore the value of naval offense in employing our current fleet, and this, combined with opportunities presented in the robotics age, provides the opportunity
to affect positively both fleet architecture and fleet design.
A TAILORED MARITIME OPERATIONAL AND
ACQUISITION CONCEPT
Faced with real challenges to sea control by emerging competitors, we are relearning the basic tenet that offense is the most cost-effective form of naval
warfare—in both acquisition and employment. Our surface navy is exploring
distributed lethality, an offensive operational concept enabled by the missile age,
and its principles are being adopted for a distributed fleet, with enhanced lethality and targeting capabilities across the force and across multiple domains. We
find that the range of an offensive missile matters, but only if its reconnaissance
and targeting system holds the advantage over a potential adversary’s reconnaissance and targeting system. As a result, we are reinvigorating EM warfare for
surveillance, deception, and countering rival EM systems. Employing some old
Cold War tricks enhanced with new technologies, we are considering seriously
the use of and training in methods to find, target, and kill in an EM “night” (i.e.,
when advanced surveillance and targeting systems are available to neither side).12
These are necessary steps to provide an immediate credible threat, and therefore
a deterrent, to potential adversaries’ adventurism in regions we hold to be critical
to our national interest.
Yet we cannot abandon tactical and operational defense and still maintain
use of the oceans. Only in an ideal Mahanian total battle fleet–on–battle fleet
engagement, in which all an enemy’s sea-command capabilities are defeated in a
single massive exchange, can offense achieve sea control. The twentieth century
showed this idea to be limited to the age of sail, if it applied even then. Preserving SLOCs and associated logistic-hub availability will require defense against
ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, and torpedoes, mines, and guns. Our
countersurveillance, countertargeting, and close-in soft-kill systems become as
critical as our hard-kill systems. Dedicated multimission platforms still will be
required to defeat an enemy’s attacks across our sea and air logistics lines.
For the past forty years, the cost-effective way to provide both offensive and
defensive capabilities at sea has been to leverage economies of scale by placing
as much multimission capability as possible in a ship hull. Our advanced Aegis
Burke-class DDGs are the result. Once deployed to, say, the Central Command
area of operations, this DDG can conduct counterpiracy activities in the morning, then relocate on short notice to mount theater ballistic-missile defense in
the afternoon. It can hunt other surface ships and defend an aircraft carrier from
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cruise-missile attack. It is versatile, fast, and multifunctional. Operationally, it is
limited only by its draft.
But these ships also are limited by their expense. Plus, if a war starts and we
begin to lose them, replacement time will be problematic. In a major war at sea,
we may find that our cost-effective peacetime strategy of concentrating on economies of scale has created a situation of “too many eggs in one basket.” The loss of
a DDG while conducting an independent offensive surface action becomes a loss
of missile and air defense, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and escort capacity to
the fleet—as well as a highly skilled crew.
In the past we addressed economic constraints that prevented our entire fleet
from consisting of advanced multimission ships by building a “high-low” mix,
incorporating a few special-mission ships to conduct mine countermeasures and
logistics. We envisioned the “low” ships in the mix filling the constabulary and
escort duties farther from harm’s way during times of conflict. But if we consider
distributed lethality and the advantage of the offense, combined with advances
in unmanned systems, autonomy, and longer-range, smarter missiles, a new opportunity for an economical fleet mix emerges. Its fleet design is the opposite of
the traditional high-low mix: we would employ smaller, cheaper offensive platforms to operate forward, and larger sea-control ships to defend against our adversaries’ advanced sea-denial capabilities.13 A fleet employment of such a force
results in finding and destroying the enemy with offensive systems that are more
numerous, less expensive, and lower manned.14 They will be the sea-denial force.
More-expensive defensive platforms will be deployed in areas of vital interest, or
to protect high-value ships and convoys that are within the enemy’s reach.15 This
“protection” force will be the sea-control force. The adversary cannot disregard
our threat of offensive force to focus on attacking our interests while we have
placed the best multimission ships to defend those interests. This is distributed
lethality combined with smart defense.16
As the distributed lethality concept evolves into distributed maritime operations and multidomain concepts, the offsetting of constraining budgets with
opportunities in new technologies will nudge us naturally toward this mixed
approach. Offensive antiship missiles are becoming smarter and our adversaries
have learned to employ them in various ways: from shore, shipping containers,
bombers, and missile boats. Our own offensive fleet could be just as versatile,
composed of missile corvettes paired with missile-equipped LASVs working
in coordination with undersea systems and long-range bombers armed with
hypersonic missiles. The objective of the components of this force is to close
silently and deceptively; deliver their missiles, torpedoes, mines, or cyber packages; then retire or, if unmanned, stay as a reconnaissance node, if desired.17 This
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concept leverages technological advances in missiles, unmanned systems, and
countertargeting methods to provide a threat more credible, practical, useful,
and economical. (In a calculus of value, a commander is more willing to risk what
he or she values less; the more so when its capabilities nonetheless enjoy his or
her confidence.) Our traditional fleet primarily will fill the role of the protective
force, using strike when necessary to kill threats advancing toward our SLOCs.
This concept is an operational expression of tactics that Arleigh Burke developed during the Solomons campaign. Commodore Burke championed sending
the small, maneuverable destroyers ahead of the battle line to conduct coordinated torpedo attacks. Frederick Moosbrugger executed these tactics at Vella
Gulf, and Burke did so at Cape Saint George. Burke’s fighting doctrine of simplicity, surprise, and delegation of authority also provides the tenets for employing
today’s offensive force. And, like Burke’s skillful employment of radar to provide
a tactical edge, the offensive force will be enabled with the latest targeting, countertargeting, and killing technology as it becomes available.18 A characteristic of
light, inexpensive delivery platforms is their ability to be upgraded quickly and
cheaply through payload replacement or, if desired, whole-platform change-out.
As the sea-control force evolves through retirement of the top-end multimission platforms, it too will become more tailored by employing the latest technology to counter specific threats, although, by the nature of its purpose, it will
remain multimission in character. For example, theater ASW ships still will be
required to protect themselves from submarine-launched antiship cruise missiles, and escort duty will require some form of area defense from all threats.
During more-peaceful times, the offensive force can fill peacetime constabulary duties and engagement exercises in forward regions. But dividing a force
into offense and protective defense elements is a war strategy, not a peacetime
maritime security strategy.19 Building a portion of the force dedicated to offense,
exercising and testing tactics using new technologies in robotics and automation
in this force, and engaging allies in its employment signal serious intentions on
our part to prepare for actual combat and the willingness to accept some losses.
As a result, the new, offensively disposed force provides a stronger deterrence.
The evolution to a tailored fleet from our current force will be more effective
and less expensive than simply adding offensive capability to each new ship built
in a total multimission force. The tailored fleet will distribute offense to morenumerous platforms, while concentrating defense on areas of vital importance to
maintain the true strategic end of our nation’s Navy: use of the seas. Such a fleet
provides a way to distribute offensive lethality economically and to distribute defense efficiently. Making the offensive force both lethal and sufficiently resilient
to ensure its deterrent credibility is addressed next.
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WEB FIRES, FOOTBALL,
AND ACCELERATED CUMULATIVE WARFARE
In a 2016 report to the CNO, Strategic Studies Group (SSG) 35 identified the
next “capital ship” as the network of machines and humans.20 It recognized that
emerging technology enables a multitudinous, disaggregated force of manned
and unmanned systems to challenge adversary situational awareness and targeting. It is the end vision of a sensor/weapon-centric force and describes a way to
employ the offensive fleet. But, in this model, what now is a capital ship? Under
the traditional definition, it is the most heavily armed and powerful warship, one
of the first rank in size and armament.21 The capital ship is the main conveyance
of naval power. The SSG implicitly selected the “main conveyance of combat
power” definition to describe its network of systems and concept of employment. However, if the main conveyance of naval power is defeated, so is the Navy.
Capital ships can be viewed as a naval center of gravity. In a network of manned
and unmanned systems, the network becomes the naval center of gravity—and
therefore a target of interest to an adversary.
Like the SSG’s network, the maturing “web fires” or “netted fires” concept
is a vision of netted sensors, shooters, and communications linked together to
provide multiple options in executing detect-to-engage sequences across an area
of operations. Information will be ubiquitous and accessible to all sensor and
weapon operators via a web construct, linked through various methods of mesh
networks, burst transmissions, and traditional communication channels resistant to enemy jamming and interference.22 The mesh network “capital ship” is
designed to survive against interference and intrusion, just as the battleship was
armored to survive against rifled rounds. It will enable distributed operations or
massing of fires across all domains, including the human domain. It provides the
surveillance and information advantage needed to employ long-range weapons
before an adversary does. This web fires concept will be enriched by the use of
unmanned systems, smart weaponry, and autonomy. It is the natural technological evolution of the Soviets’ reconnaissance-strike complex.23 It is the realization
of the third offset, as envisioned by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work.24
It is the implementation of the SSG network of machines and humans.
Then the fighting starts. How battle resilient the web fires and distributed
forces will be depends on the technology that enables them; on the C2 and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and tactical philosophy
envisioned when the elements are built; and on the sailors who operate them.
The United States cannot be assured of technological superiority in the future,
so our Navy must retain war-fighting methods that do not assume assurance
of continuous information to all elements of the force. It must create a force
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design—defined as the way we fight—to leverage the greatest advantage of American forces: individual command initiative and innovation in the face of adversity.
Web fires and a distributed force to be used as the offensive or sea-denial
force should be built from the bottom up, not from the top down, meaning that,
if necessary, every manned node in the web can act independently as a scout,
commander, and shooter within its own area of responsibility. This decentralized
execution is not a new concept for U.S. naval forces (every submariner will recognize the C2 concept), but unless the web is built with self-reliant, capable nodes
from the start, we may not be able to implement fully a command philosophy of
distributed decision making, particularly if we must fight in the electromagnetic
night. “Offboard” information provided by the web, or subelements of the web, is
then viewed as an enhancer, but not necessary to employ weapons. The offensive
force will be network enabled, not network dependent.
Employing the offensive fleet as a distributed force comprising self-sufficient
weapons-launch platforms, augmented by web fires’ off-platform information
when available, achieves a highly resilient force structure. In a fight, the force network leverages a strategy of accelerated cumulative warfare, relying on individual
engagements to create the desired emerging operational and strategic effects.25 It
confounds an adversary by offering a multidomain, independent, dispersed, and
offensively oriented challenge to defeat. This foundational philosophy turns the
focus to tactical offense, reorients acquisition from platforms to weapons (kinetic
and nonkinetic), and accelerates employment of technologies in missiles and robotics. It leads to a more numerous force composed of smaller platforms, as John
Arquilla envisioned in his 2010 Foreign Policy article “The New Rules of War.”26
In execution, such an offensive force resembles an offensive football squad. After a play is called, each player proceeds to his assigned area, with full knowledge
of his role in the called play. No communication is required after the ball is hiked.
Although everyone has a role, each, if necessary, also can carry the football, run
for a touchdown, or tackle. If the quarterback views new information after the
play is called, a short audible at the line may change the play. Employment of the
offensive fleet in a distributed force is similar. Pairs of delivery systems may move
into position on the basis of commander’s intent and up-to-date intelligence;
no communication is required. If an audible is called, it can be communicated
through brief signals in code along short-burst, mesh-network paths.27 And each
player, if necessary, can target and shoot independently within his or her area of
responsibility.
The emergent effect of this cumulative strategy is sea denial close to the
enemy’s objectives, with or without a continuous C2 network. This achieves
the intent of both the web fires and manned-and-unmanned network concepts
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without dependency on an actual network, thereby eliminating a possible singlepoint vulnerability for the enemy’s attention. This enhances force resiliency and
increases each unit’s survivability.
ASSESSING THE CONCEPT
For a comprehensive quantitative assessment of a future naval force, we would
need a complete force architecture with specific numbers of ships, aircraft, submarines, weapons, unmanned platforms, facilities, and basing locations. We also
would need a concept of employment, operations, doctrine, and tactics for the
force architecture—a force design. These types of studies are conducted cyclically, with the most recent set requested by Congress and delivered to it in 2017.28
The intent of this article, however, is to present a foundational precept on
which to build both a fleet architecture and a fleet design: seeking to increase the
fleet’s offensive power and ability to adapt by leveraging the robotics age’s emerging technologies in kinetic and nonkinetic warheads, missiles, and platforms to
deliver them. In lieu of a detailed quantitative assessment, a subjective overview
of the concepts will be discussed using more-strategic metrics. Although many
metrics could be selected to assess alternative future naval force structures, as its
strategic litmus tests this analysis will use reactivity, robustness, and resilience.
For this purpose they are defined as follows:
• Reactivity is a fleet’s ability to capitalize quickly on new technology advancements and react to a “capability surprise” from a potential adversary.
• Robustness is a fleet’s ability to be relevant across a variety of futures that differ in national priorities, geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions, maritime
strategies, and conflict scenarios.
• Resilience is a fleet’s ability to sustain damage in a particular future and
conflict scenario while still accomplishing national objectives. Resilience is a
subset of robustness, and is similar to the concepts addressed in current Navy
staff analyses conducted to assess programmed fleet capabilities.
Reactivity
Much of the foregoing highlights the characteristics necessary for a payloadfocused force to be more adaptable than the current acquisition program’s expensive, long-lived, multimission ships and aircraft. By increasing the proportion
in the mix of smaller (whether unmanned or manned single-mission) delivery
platforms, we increase a fleet’s reactivity. Missile seekers, sensors, software, and
unmanned systems can be replaced or modified, tested, corrected, retested, and
introduced into the fleet with fewer challenges than a multimission destroyer.
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The former lend themselves to advantages in maintenance and repair as well,
with less nonavailability time fleet-wide. For example, when a DDG is in dry
dock availability, the fleet loses all its mission areas. This is an aspect of the “too
many eggs in one basket” finding in our previous wartime example. In contrast,
when a single-mission platform is undergoing maintenance, the fleet loses only
that one mission. In addition, numerous smaller platforms allow a greater portion of the fleet to be forward deployed while the remaining force is being updated in rear areas.
Robustness
Although the ability to perform the enduring missions of strategic deterrence,
protecting SLOCs (sea control), denying adversary sea communications (sea denial), and projecting power from the sea is desirable in naval forces, the capabilities and capacities of a nation’s navy to exercise these missions are influenced by
the political will, economic resources, and global power aspirations of its people.
These can change faster than the capital-intensive, long-lived, multimission ships
and submarines of our programmed force. A comprehensive assessment of a fleet
architecture’s robustness or utility across several international political and economic environments—with various competing national strategies and possible
conflicts—will involve extensive future scenario planning to assess strategic risk.
For brevity, only general observations are made here.
Our current programmed force is heavily invested in complex multimission
platforms that employ advanced technologies, mainly in defense. It seeks to
optimize the fleet’s influence in a future that is a projection of our current fiscal
and political environment, with operational concepts born during World War II.
Although any robust U.S. fleet will have some of these platforms, allocating too
large a share consumes and locks in future fiscal resources for maintenance, manning, training, and operations. In addition, if the fleet is successful in deterring
the very-high-end conflicts for which these platforms are built, those platforms
may find themselves conducting missions for which they are not well suited,
such as when cruisers conduct counterpiracy operations. Worse, if fiscal constraints become onerous, the expense of operating these platforms may become
prohibitive, so the only affordable strategy becomes to employ them as a “fleet in
being”—tied to the pier. Adding to the mix more smaller platforms, both manned
and unmanned, is a cost-effective way to provide policy makers with design options for fleet employment, reconfiguration, and basing. A core portion of the
fleet comprising long-lived, multimission ships remains dedicated to exercising
sea control, while the offensive sea-denial force composed of smaller, less expensive systems may grow or diminish as the national strategy and available national
treasure vary.
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Resilience (or Toughness)
As mentioned, fleet resilience is a subset of fleet robustness. The ability of the
fleet to sustain damage yet continue to operate in a contested environment
against an adversary may be achieved in two major ways: build in a vigorous
damage-containment design through redundancy and compartmentation in
individual platforms, or have many platforms.
Advanced weaponry’s ability to inflict a mission kill makes building individual
ship resilience challenging and costly. Having many ships in a fleet also imposes
costs, but can be achieved if the fleet, not individual ships, is built with a redundancy of smaller, mission-specific platforms organized into task groups that are
dispersed while in contested waters.
A fleet with numerous offensive sea-denial forces, as in the fleet mix proposed
here, would enjoy greater resilience than the current programmed force. The latter relies more on active defense and individual platform survivability to sustain
the fleet in a contested environment, but in the missile and robotics age this will
remain difficult and expensive to achieve and maintain.
We are in the missile age and at the dawn of the robotics age. Cyber warfare
already has arrived in peacetime and will affect combat operations in wartime.
Emerging technologies give us new ways to convey naval power and may allow us
to overcome the inhibitors to changing a capital-intensive, long-lived, platformcentric fleet.
We would begin this journey by tailoring the fleet into offensive sea-denial
forces and protective/defensive sea-control forces. The offensive force would be
built using manned and unmanned systems, in all domains, in relatively large
numbers, to deliver kinetic and nonkinetic effects. This would be a “package”centric force, with short testing, learning, and upgrading cycles. It would be
employed under a netted-web-fires and distributed-fleet concept, but from the
bottom up, with each manned node capable of independent weapon employment. The manned systems, such as missile corvettes, would be built in sufficient
numbers to conduct the mainstay peacetime presence and constabulary duties,
in cooperation with allies.
Our traditional fleet, with its advanced multimission capabilities, would have
the more difficult defensive or sea-control role. It too could be upgraded with
lessons learned from the offensive force and to counter new enemy technologies. With constraining budgets, our traditional fleet would have to be somewhat
smaller to fund the less expensive offensive fleet, but it no longer would have to
meet the presence requirements that drove up its force numbers.
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This fast-evolving wartime fleet concept will challenge potential adversaries with a close-in, lethal, yet resilient threat, while providing robust defense to
our nation and our own SLOCs. A fleet architecture founded on leveraging the
missile and robotics age in this manner will increase its capability to be reactive,
robust, and resilient.

NOTES
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ORGANIZATION AND INNOVATION
Integrating Carrier-Launched UAVs
Greg Smith

I

n 2015, the Secretary of the Navy asserted that the F-35 likely would be the last
manned fighter aircraft the Navy would buy, and the Department of Defense
(DoD) embarked on a Third Offset Strategy that plans to leverage unmanned and
autonomous systems (UASs) and human-machine teams to ensure technological superiority over potential adversaries.1 Yet in spite of significant advances in
robotics, artificial intelligence, and UAS technology, the Navy’s unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) remain predominantly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and none are carrier based. Effective employment of UAVs by
the Navy’s carrier air wings requires more than the acquisition of new technology,
and without focused efforts to accelerate integration it likely will take several more
decades before carrier-launched UAVs (CL-UAVs) are optimized across the entire
spectrum of carrier aviation missions. Throughout history, organizational changes
have been instrumental to enhancing the effectiveness of military technology.
The integration of CL-UAVs can be accelerated by
Commander Greg Smith, USN, is a naval flight offimaking organizational changes that facilitate the
cer and former commanding officer of Patrol Squadron 26. He graduated with distinction from the U.S. development of an internal constituency within the
Naval Academy in 1997 and holds master of arts decarrier aviation community and foster experimengrees in international relations from the University
tation and bottom-up innovation.2
of Maryland and in national security and strategic
It has been one hundred years since Secretary
studies from the Naval War College, College of Naval Command and Staff. Commander Smith recently
of the Navy Josephus Daniels authorized the
served as a Federal Executive Fellow at the Johns
U.S. Navy’s first investment in UAVs.3 During
Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab. Currently
he is assigned to the staff of the Deputy Chief of Na- World War II, the Navy became the first service
val Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy to use UAVs in combat, employing TDR-1 as(OPNAV N3/N5).
sault drones at Bougainville and Balalai Islands in
Naval War College Review, Summer 2017, Vol. 70, No. 3
1944.4 These early UAV investments contributed
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 79

84

4/21/17 8:35 AM

80

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue

to the development of target drones in the 1920s and ’30s, then cruise missiles
in the 1950s and ’60s. However, with the exception of these two mission areas,
neither of which required the aircraft to return safely after a mission, naval aviation’s manned aircraft have outperformed unmanned systems. Even when high
casualty rates for reconnaissance aircraft and crews during the Cold War and
Vietnam conflict led the U.S. Air Force to invest heavily in UAVs and satellites,
the Navy eschewed significant investment in UAVs, especially for carrier-based
operations.5
The U.S. military has operated UAVs continuously since World War II, and
today all services employ UAVs in some capacity. The most extensive operational
employment of UAVs during the twentieth century involved the Air Force’s derivatives of Ryan Firebee target drones, which executed more than 3,400 reconnaissance “sorties over North Vietnam and China in the 1960s and early 1970s.”6
The U.S. Navy did employ UAVs, such as the QH-50 Drone Anti-Submarine
Helicopter (DASH) between 1960 and 1971 and the RQ-2 Pioneer beginning
in 1986, but these were developed to meet narrow mission requirements of the
surface fleet and were never integrated into naval aviation. Since the 1990s, UAVs
have demonstrated increasing reliability and utility in combat, and have become
integral to ISR and counterterrorism missions around the globe. The Navy has
accumulated more than 26,000 flight hours in its two largest UAV programs, the
MQ-8 Fire Scout and MQ-4C Triton, but neither operates from the centerpiece
of naval aviation—the aircraft carrier.7
There are many reasons the U.S. Navy has not fielded a CL-UAV yet, but
certainly technological immaturity long rendered tactically effective naval UAVs
cost prohibitive, and the additional performance requirements for carrier aviation exacerbated the cost-capability dilemma that plagued nearly all large UAV
programs in the twentieth century.8 The Navy’s dismal experience with its first
unmanned helicopter, the QH-50 DASH, of which nearly 50 percent were lost in
peacetime accidents, highlighted the technological shortcomings of shipboard
UAVs and may have contributed to a bias for manned aircraft among both surface
warfare officers and aviators.9 However, in 2004 a Defense Science Board task
force concluded, “There is no longer any question of the technical viability and
operational utility of UAVs,” and a 2008 study coauthored by Robert O. Work,
now Deputy Secretary of Defense, observed that “the combat value of unmanned
aircraft is no longer much debated.”10 A CL-UAV has been in various stages of
research and development since 1999, but fiscal constraints and prioritization of
other naval aviation requirements have slowed its development, even though the
rise of great-power competitors and the proliferation of antiaccess/area-denial
(A2/AD) capabilities pose the most significant challenges to carrier air wing operations since World War II. As DoD embarks on a Third Offset Strategy that is
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based on human-machine teams, the aircraft carrier and its air wing—together,
the centerpiece of U.S. power projection for nearly seventy-five years—must
adapt to integrate CL-UAVs.
Optimizing the military effectiveness of CL-UAVs involves much more than
the introduction of a new platform. The Navy made important organizational
changes to sustain and improve UAV development in recent years and is on pace
to deliver the carrier-launched MQ-25 Stingray by 2020; in a competitive fiscal
environment, merely programming a CL-UAV is something of a bureaucratic
accomplishment. However, it represents only one step toward realizing the potential of the CL-UAV innovation, which still faces institutional and cultural barriers. Organizing to support the development of a CL-UAV constituency within
the carrier aviation community will facilitate adoption and integration of the new
technology, and organizations that enable experimentation and exploit end-user
innovation will accelerate the development of innovative operating concepts and
follow-on requirements that will optimize its effectiveness.
TECHNOLOGY, ORGANIZATION, AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
The ultimate goal of pursuing and acquiring CL-UAVs, or any new military
technology, is to increase military effectiveness.11 George Raudzens observed
that even significant technological advantages merely influence the way wars are
fought, rather than the “outcomes of combat.”12 Stephen Biddle has argued that
force employment was as much the key to the success of the U.S.-led coalition
during the 1991 Gulf War as was technological superiority.13 Although there is
room for disagreement with these well-defended assertions, there is little doubt
that the utility of a new weapon system in combat depends as much on the training of associated personnel, the system’s interoperability with other systems, the
ability to support and maintain it in sufficient numbers, and the development of
appropriate doctrine, operational concepts, and tactics as it does on the system’s
technological superiority. Organization greatly influences all these elements,
from the unit to service levels, and therefore is integral to optimizing the effectiveness of the technology. The hoplite phalanx that optimized the shield and
spear and Napoleon’s corps d’armée that enhanced employment of artillery, infantry, and cavalry illustrate the influence of organization on military effectiveness.
Furthermore, greater technological leaps may necessitate a more significant
departure from traditional organizational constructs to optimize employment.14
As Edward Luttwak has argued, “If the new is a real innovation, not just a new
model, . . . then the armed forces must change their structure to absorb it, usually by creating new units.”15 For example, the U.S. Air Force (and its predecessor, the Army Air Corps) and U.S. Cyber Command were created to facilitate
the application of new technologies to warfare. It remains to be seen whether
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CL-UAV optimization will require new units or merely the introduction of CLUAV platforms into existing organizations. The U.S. Air Force created an entire
air wing with subordinate squadrons to employ its remotely piloted aircraft, but
also found it necessary to assign some remotely piloted aircraft squadrons to
fighter wings. The Navy created a new squadron to operate the MQ-4C Triton as
a subordinate command under an existing maritime patrol and reconnaissance
wing; after originally planning independent MQ-8 Fire Scout units, it now is
assigning the rotary-wing UAV to existing helicopter squadrons. These organizational decisions are driven by considerations of cost, safety, and manpower,
with the unstated goal of minimally disrupting current operations, but they also
should take into account how organization will influence military effectiveness
over the long term.
Failing to make organizational changes or making poor organizational decisions can reduce the military effectiveness of new technology drastically. In
the case of the French introduction of a carriage-mounted machine gun, the
mitrailleuse, in 1870, poor organization not only prevented optimization of
the weapon but completely negated its technological advantage. Prior to the
Franco-Prussian War, the French secretly procured the mitrailleuse, which was
capable of accurately firing three hundred rounds per minute to ranges of five
hundred meters—a vast improvement over existing weaponry.16 However, the
French army assigned the mitrailleuse to the artillery, largely on the basis of the
capacity of that branch to provide the necessary logistical support (e.g., wagons
and horses that could transport the weapon and its ammunition), without due
consideration to how the weapon would be employed on the battlefield or how
its firepower could alter fundamentally the way the infantry engaged in combat.
Although the mitrailleuse provided the French with sufficient firepower to repel
Prussian infantry, the weapon remained with the artillery—which, in keeping
with doctrine, was positioned behind the infantry on the field of battle.17 In that
position, the mitrailleuse rarely could be brought to bear on the enemy without
fratricide until the Prussians had broken through the French infantry lines. Organizational changes would have been required to provide the necessary logistics to
the infantry or to modify artillery employment doctrine. Assigning the weapon
system to the “wrong” branch and failing to make organizational changes negated
the firepower advantages of the mitrailleuse and drastically reduced its military
effectiveness.18
Effective military innovation is a continuous process that is rarely complete
before the end user employs new technology in combat or realistic exercises.
In the case of the mitrailleuse, the project’s extreme secrecy prevented end users from performing the experimentation and concept development that likely
would have identified the need for organizational or doctrinal changes. There is
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a substantial body of literature that analyzes military innovation and the factors
that aid or hinder the adoption of technology.19 In a 2006 review of that literature, Adam Grissom highlighted a lack of analysis of bottom-up innovation.20 He
described the U.S. Army’s experience with the Force XXI initiative to illustrate
how users employed the system’s chat, e-mail, and moving-map capabilities in
combat in ways the system’s designers never envisioned. He also observed that
this end-user influence mirrored what was being discussed in scientific and technical literature about bottom-up innovation in the commercial sector.21 Since that
observation, much of the innovation literature has used bottom-up innovation
or adaptation to explain commercial and military changes, and it suggests an important and perhaps increasing role of the end user in technological innovation.22
In an environment of rapidly changing and proliferating technology, there is
a natural tendency to refine a system continuously in the laboratory, attempting
to incorporate all the latest scientific and technical advances before releasing it
to the operators; but definitive innovations may not occur before the end user
has adopted that technology and applied it for tactical advantage. In Grissom’s
words, “the impact of a new technology, doctrine, or organizational schema may
not solely be in the hands of the senior officers and civilians.”23 Those making
organizational decisions regarding the MQ-25 Stingray and future CL-UAVs
should consider the likelihood that innovation will continue and may accelerate
when the UAVs are introduced to the fleet.
In the past, the U.S. Navy demonstrated a willingness to explore the potential
of unmanned platforms to solve unique tactical or operational challenges of the
surface fleet—and a tendency to abandon UAVs in favor of competing manned
platforms or more reliable and affordable alternatives as soon as those were
available. The individual decisions, such as the one to cancel the QH-50 DASH,
were influenced by poor reliability and technological immaturity, but they also
contributed to a clear preference for manned aircraft in the Navy. Subsequent
technological improvements have been insufficient to ensure adoption of UAVs
by carrier aviators, so senior leaders have found it necessary to make policy and
organizational changes to preserve the Navy’s UAV development and accelerate
the acquisition of supporting technologies. Additional organizational changes
will be necessary to optimize the military effectiveness of CL-UAVs.
ORGANIZING TO SUPPORT UAV PROGRAMS
Bureaucratic organizations such as the military services tend to preserve the status quo and resist disruptive changes. As a result, peacetime military innovation,
if it occurs at all, usually is an evolutionary process. Adopting new approaches
during peacetime usually requires clear recognition of a changing security environment, an outside threat, or strong top-down leadership.24 Even though the
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United States has been at war for the past fifteen years, its air superiority has
not been challenged, and therefore there has been no natural motivation for the
carrier air wing to adopt disruptive innovations such as UAVs into all carrier air
wing missions. Some have argued that the growing threat that A2/AD technologies pose to the survivability of the carrier air wing warrants greater prioritization
of CL-UAVs.25 However, the carrier air wings plan to address the A2/AD threat
through weapon system improvements, including next-generation manned
aircraft, and new countermeasures rather than through integrating UAVs or
disruptive technologies that might require a more dramatic shift in war-fighting
concepts.
The introduction of CL-UAVs is essentially a peacetime innovation that is proceeding at an evolutionary pace and has required strong leadership to overcome
institutional and cultural barriers to change. UAV development has benefited
from technological advances in navigation, communications, autonomy, and
computer processing, as well as strong support from senior DoD and congressional leaders for most of the past fifteen years; but to ensure program survival,
especially in competitive budget environments, organizational changes have been
necessary.
In 2015, the Navy created the office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Unmanned Systems (DASN UxS) and the Unmanned Warfare Systems Directorate (OPNAV N99) to coordinate better the disparate efforts to develop UASs to
support naval operations in the air, land, surface, and subsurface environments.
These changes reflect the commitment of civilian and military leaders to achieving a technological advantage over adversaries through UASs. The centralization
of authority and accountability for immature unmanned systems under OPNAV
N99 removed risky investments from the budgets and portfolios of the other
warfare directorates and provided the opportunity to expedite the acquisition
of UASs and supporting technology and to ensure their technological readiness
prior to commencing initial production.26 It also facilitated the authorization of
additional funding for Navy UASs in the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act.27
However, neither DASN UxS nor OPNAV N99 is adequately manned or resourced for the task of fully integrating unmanned systems.28 The establishment
of such offices reflects the high priority senior leaders place on acquiring innovative unmanned and autonomous technology, but, as discussed previously, the
acquisition of technology is only one aspect of successful military innovation.
Even though the Director for Unmanned Warfare Systems will play a critical
role in evaluating prototypes and ensuring the technological readiness of UASs,
OPNAV N99 lacks the authority over manpower and organizational decisions
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that ultimately will determine the pace of integration and the effectiveness of the
new technologies.
Prior to the establishment of OPNAV N99, the Navy found it necessary to
insulate unmanned platforms from direct budget competition with manned platforms. To accomplish this, the Navy assigned responsibility for unmanned programs to the Director for Information Dominance (OPNAV N2/N6) rather than
the Director for Air Warfare (OPNAV N98). This organizational construct has
been reflected formally in the Navy Program Guide since 2012, when coverage of
all Navy UAV programs of record moved from the Naval Aviation / Aircraft section to the Information Dominance / ISR section of the report.29 OPNAV N2/N6
is responsible for providing ISR capabilities to support fleet and combatant commanders, and UAVs are an effective way to do so. OPNAV N2/N6 also is responsible for the command, control, communications, and information systems that
are essential to the performance of networked UASs.30 So it is not unreasonable
for UAV requirements to be addressed by OPNAV N2/N6, even though OPNAV
N98 is responsible for the majority of naval aviation programs, including aircraft
carriers and most manned aircraft.
Locating UAVs organizationally in the OPNAV N2/N6 portfolio essentially
reduces direct budget competition with manned aircraft (for missions other than
ISR) and has facilitated UAV development and initial procurement. In spite of
the challenging fiscal constraints of recent years and the need to recapitalize the
majority of naval aviation’s manned platforms, the decision to cut or delay UAV
programs to sustain the procurement of manned aircraft could be made only at
the highest levels.
However, the assignment of UAV requirements to OPNAV N2/N6 perpetuates
the perception that naval UASs are “only” ISR assets. This artificially channels
UAVs toward the ISR mission, inherently restricting UAV integration across the
spectrum of carrier air wing missions. This raises the question whether assigning
the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) or followon CL-UAVs to OPNAV N2/N6 is analogous to assigning the mitrailleuse to
the French artillery in 1870. Is the Navy limiting the military effectiveness of its
UAVs by making organizational decisions on the basis of the perception that they
will remain ISR platforms, without due consideration of how CL-UAVs could be
employed in other carrier air wing missions?
Perceptions about the role(s) of CL-UAVs also influence decision making
about organization and manpower for CL-UAVs at the unit and wing levels.
Ultimately, the Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF), who typically is a carrier
aviator from the strike fighter community, will determine the structure of CLUAV units. CNAF balances manpower requirements to support UAVs with those

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 85

90

4/21/17 8:35 AM

86

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue

for aircraft carriers and manned aircraft units. The Director for Air Warfare is
the resource sponsor for the vast majority of the naval aviation budget, including
manpower, but, as noted previously, is not responsible for UAV programs. This
structure, combined with the perception that UAVs are ISR-only assets, creates
institutional challenges to prioritizing manpower and organizational support for
UAVs, especially for missions other than ISR.31
In sum, the organizational changes the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) made in recent years were designed to ensure the continuation of UAV programs and to influence the acquisition of innovative UAS
technology in the face of bureaucratic and institutional resistance. By separating
UAVs from other air warfare requirements, the Navy distributed financial and
technical risk to (and therefore resistance from) influential parts of the Navy’s
bureaucracy. These changes will continue to facilitate the introduction of new
unmanned and autonomous systems for ISR missions, but the institutional separation of UAVs from much of the carrier aviation community perpetuates the
perception of UAVs as external, ISR-only assets.
Therefore, integrating CL-UAVs across carrier aviation missions will require
deliberate efforts to overcome institutional and cultural perceptions. Historically,
optimization and integration of technological innovations have been facilitated
by creating an internal constituency and conducting experimentation that encourages bottom-up innovation.
ORGANIZING TO DEVELOP AN INTERNAL CONSTITUENCY
In his doctoral dissertation on UAV weapon system innovation, Thomas Ehr
hard explains that “although external advocates and agencies undoubtedly play
an important role in weapon system development and adoption, the symbiosis
between service and machine required for combat innovation depends on the
mobilization of an internal constituency.”32 Ehrhard is referring to the inadequacies of joint acquisition programs that plagued UAV development following the
enactment of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, but the same is true within the
Navy as various internal constituencies vie for a portion of a finite budget. The
establishment of OPNAV N99 and DASN UxS created external advocates for
unmanned systems, but not constituents within the carrier aviation community.
Stephen Rosen explains in Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern
Military that developing such a constituency to support a technological innovation typically requires a generation—the amount of time it takes for the junior
officers who operated the technology in combat to rise through the ranks to
positions of influence.33
Ehrhard also argues that “full integration includes the establishment of
dedicated units, the adoption of follow-on systems, and the development of a
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 86

91

4/21/17 8:35 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13

SMITH

87

dedicated officer constituency.”34 An internal officer constituency is critical in
the face of cultural or institutional resistance because it can advocate for program
continuation, explain system shortcomings, identify requirements to improve the
technology, develop new operating concepts, and be held accountable for success
or failure. The fact that past UAV programs have failed to develop an internal
officer constituency within naval aviation may have contributed to their failure
to endure.
The Navy’s first combat UAV, the TDR-1 assault drone that was used against Japanese targets in the Solomon Islands in 1944, did develop an officer constituency
—but for guided missiles, as opposed to UAVs. After successful demonstrations in early 1942, Commander Delmar S. Fahrney was assigned as program
manager of Project OPTION. Leveraging the latest television technology from
Radio Corporation of America (i.e., RCA), OPTION developed the TDR-1, which
was guided remotely by pilots in the rear seats of specially configured TBM-1C
Avengers.35 The mixed combat performance of the assault drones (thirty-one of
fifty struck their poorly defended targets, and fewer than half inflicted meaningful damage) encouraged its advocates regarding the viability of the concept but
failed to gain the support of carrier aviators. The assault drone program was
canceled in September 1944 owing to a combination of technological immaturity
and competition from other platforms.36 However, the experience with Project
OPTION developed a constituency of officers and technical experts who became
the lead advocates for the development of guided missiles. Fahrney went on to
command the Naval Missile Test Center at Point Mugu, California (now the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division), retired at the rank of rear admiral,
and has been called the “Father of the Guided Missile.”37
In spite of eight years of operationally employing the QH-50 DASH, no internal officer constituency developed. To the contrary, DASH was rejected by both
the surface and aviation communities. Aviators were wary of flying in proximity to the drones and often discouraged their integration into fleet operations.
The surface community was not committed to training its personnel to operate
the UAVs, and ship captains who employed the unreliable drones risked being
held accountable for their many failures.38 Overcoming DASH’s technical shortcomings would have required a strong constituency to advocate for expensive
improvements to its control systems or extensive training for personnel. The
development of antisubmarine rockets, which gave the surface Navy the ability
to attack submarines at range, and Light Airborne Multipurpose System (i.e.,
LAMPS) helicopters, which provided an officer constituency that integrated
the manned platform into fleet operations and could be held accountable for
mishaps, offered suitable alternatives to DASH, which were preferred by both
aviators and surface warfare officers.39 Lack of technological reliability was the
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most important impediment to DASH’s acceptance, but without developing an
internal officer constituency the innovation would not have been integrated into
naval aviation even if it had been more reliable. A quick comparison between
the respective integrations of the RQ-2 Pioneer into the Navy and Marine Corps
further illustrates this point.
The establishment of dedicated units contributed to development of an internal constituency for small, tactical UASs (STUASs) and enabled Marine Corps
aviation to integrate the RQ-2 Pioneer and follow-on platforms. The Navy and
Marine Corps acquired Pioneer in the 1980s, and both employed the system during the 1991 Gulf War. The Marine Corps established remotely piloted vehicle
(RPV) companies under its surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence groups.
Then, in the mid-1990s, the RPV companies became Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Squadron 1 (VMU-1). Integration continued as two VMUs were established and
assigned to Marine aircraft-control groups, and today they are being integrated
into Marine aircraft groups with other fixed-wing aircraft. The Marine Corps’s
stated objective for STUASs is for them to “play a key role in all USMC missions
across the range of military operations, to include forward presence, security
cooperation, counterterrorism, crisis response, forcible entry, prolonged operations, and counterinsurgency.”40 This should not imply that the integration of
UAVs into Marine aviation has been seamless, but—especially when compared
with the Navy’s experience with the same platform—it demonstrates the value
of establishing a constituency of dedicated units to support the UAV innovation.
The Navy, which acquired Pioneer to provide reconnaissance and targeting
support for its battleships, employed aviators to run Pioneer detachments but did
not establish dedicated UAV squadrons. When the battleships were decommissioned, the Navy lacked an internal constituency to support follow-on models,
so since the mid-1990s the RQ-2 has been used primarily as a test and evaluation platform.41 Certainly there were other factors, such as cost, unique mission
requirements, and the post–Cold War security environment, that influenced the
rate of integration of Pioneer into the Navy and Marine Corps aviation communities, but the fact that the service that developed an internal constituency with
dedicated aviation units also better sustained and integrated the innovation is an
important correlation.
In addition to a service’s establishing dedicated units, Ehrhard argues that
to explore the utility of UAVs and completely integrate them into the service,
UAV operators should remain a part of their aviation subgroup and maintain
“currency in manned flight operations [to] develop their aviation professionalism and give them some credibility when teamed with rated pilots on staffs.”42
Written more than a decade prior to the restrictions of the Budget Control Act
of 2011 and the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, these sentiments represent an
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unachievable ideal for the naval aviation community in 2017.43 However, still
relevant is the need to ensure that UAV operators possess sufficient credibility to
positively influence interoperability across the air wing and adequate experience
to develop effective operating concepts and tactics. Attracting qualified personnel who are also competitive for future promotion will be critical to developing
the internal constituency and will enhance greatly the integration of the CL-UAV.
The U.S. Air Force has taken deliberate steps to create an internal constituency
for its remotely piloted aircraft—with mixed results. The Air Force originally
employed pilots from other communities to operate its remotely piloted aircraft
(RPA). Many who were competitive for promotion within their original communities were able to stay on track for continued promotion and command; for
example, the current Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General David Goldfein,
lists the MQ-9 in his official biography among the aircraft he has piloted.44 The
number of RPA pilots in the Air Force is increasing, but there remain manpower
and organizational challenges that have required significant policy adjustments,
including creating an RPA pilot officer community, increasing incentive pay
for RPA pilots, and authorizing enlisted airmen to serve as RQ-4 Global Hawk
pilots.45 It is unclear whether RPA pilots will be competitive for wing command
or promotion to the highest levels.46 It also is not yet possible to determine how
separating RPA pilots from the fighter and bomber communities will influence
the integration of UASs into non-ISR missions. In spite of these challenges, there
is little doubt about the Air Force’s commitment to UAV integration.47 Navy and
Air Force war-fighting requirements and officer career paths are distinct, but
additional analysis of Air Force organizational decisions regarding UASs may
provide insights for the Navy.
Thoughtful organization can provide incentives for highly qualified naval
aviators, including both pilots and naval flight officers, to pursue assignments in
UAV units. In a study of military aviators published in 2007, James FitzSimonds
and Thomas Mahnken found that opportunities for promotion and command
were likely adequate and provided key incentives for “drawing junior officers into
new operational specialties” such as UAVs.48 Command at sea remains the primary goal and the key to continued promotion for career-oriented naval officers.
Therefore, the Navy should articulate viable career paths for officers assigned to
duties operating CL-UAVs.
Organizational changes, such as establishing separate CL-UAV squadrons, can
provide additional command opportunities for CL-UAV aviators. As Stingray
is introduced to the fleet or CL-UAV units are established, consideration also
should be given to processes and career timing that will enable junior officers to
complete successful tours in manned platforms, operate CL-UAVs in subsequent
tours, and return to manned platforms as department heads and commanding
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 89

94

4/21/17 8:35 AM

90

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue

officers. This will both enhance integration between manned and unmanned
units and ensure that officers assigned to operate CL-UAVs remain competitive
for command. To accomplish these objectives so as to support the introduction
of the MQ-4C Triton, which theoretically can be controlled from anywhere via
satellite, the maritime patrol community intends to man its operational Triton
squadrons with aircrews on shore duty so they can continue to achieve their
critical sea-duty milestones in manned maritime patrol and reconnaissance
squadrons.49 Employing officers on shore duty likely will not be an option for
carrier-based units, so other solutions will be required. In any event, CL-UAV
operators will need viable career paths if they are to form an influential constituency within the carrier aviation community.
If separate CL-UAV units are created, consideration should be given to establishing CL-UAV squadrons as commander (O-5) at-sea commands to attract
top aviators and facilitate the development of an internal constituency whose
members are competitive for promotion to captain (O-6).50 Another option
would be to select postcommand commanders who are already competitive for
promotion to fill the initial officer-in-charge or squadron commanding officer
roles, to build a senior internal constituency rapidly. Thoughtful organizational
decisions could attract high-quality officers and greatly facilitate the creation of
an internal constituency to support the development of operating concepts and
follow-on platform requirements.
In making organizational decisions, the naval aviation community should verify assumptions about the professional desires of junior officers and assess their
impact on the fleet’s UAV manpower over the long term. Many have argued that
aviators have not integrated UAVs readily because the systems challenge what it
means to be an aviator and a warfighter.51 Stereotypes suggest that aviators always
will avoid assignments that keep them out of the cockpit. However, neither factor
emerged as the most significant barrier to UAV acceptance in the comprehensive
historical review of empirical analysis of officer attitudes toward UAVs reviewed
during this study.52 A 2006 survey of “400 officers with aviation specialties” that
examined their perceptions of the impact of UAV adoption revealed that “aviators had attitudes that diverged markedly from popular stereotypes.”53 This does
not mean there is no resistance to weapon system innovation among aviators, but
it does suggest that failure to integrate UAVs into carrier aviation is not simply
the result of irrational responses by carrier aviators. Therefore, organizational
changes that are informed by empirical understanding of cultural and institutional barriers instead of stereotypes can be effective mechanisms for developing an
internal officer constituency to support the integration of CL-UAVs. Additional
empirical analysis to refine the conclusions of previous studies would provide
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insights into the types of organizational changes that would facilitate best the
adoption and integration of CL-UAVs by carrier aviators.
Naval aviation has the opportunity to create organizations that will facilitate
the integration of the MQ-25 Stingray and future UASs. Certainly, establishing
Stingray units under existing carrier air wings and assigning Stingray platforms
to existing squadrons should be explored. Organizing with the goal of developing
an officer constituency within carrier aviation will complement the organizational changes at higher levels that preserve funding and facilitate the acquisition of
UAS technologies. An internal constituency would advocate for improvements to
the MQ-25 Stingray and for increasingly effective follow-on models. The optimal
constituency also would enable the integration of CL-UAVs into all carrier air
wing missions. Integrating a new technology, such as the CL-UAV, and developing a constituency for it during peacetime typically require a generation. CL-UAV
integration can be accelerated by encouraging experimentation and adopting
bottom-up innovations.
ORGANIZING TO ENCOURAGE EXPERIMENTATION AND
DEVELOP INNOVATIVE OPERATING CONCEPTS
Developing effective operating concepts involves the employment of technology in realistic conditions, typically during combat or military exercises. Initial
operating concepts are developed to inform the design of new technology, but
innovation continues for years (sometimes decades) after technology reaches the
end user. Eliot Cohen, writing about the U.S. Army in Afghanistan in 2001 and in
Iraq in 2003, observed a lag between the introduction of information technology
and the related organizational and operational concept development. He argued
that “[t]hroughout most of military history, to include the current period, change
tends to come more from below, from the spontaneous interactions between
military people, technology, and particular tactical circumstances.”54 This is
entirely consistent with the observations of Grissom and others discussed previously who have explored the phenomenon of bottom-up innovation. In a similar
way, integrating and optimizing the effectiveness of CL-UAVs across all carrier
air wing missions will require adopting input from end users. The Navy should
consider how organizational changes can expedite and facilitate experimentation
and bottom-up innovation.
CNO Admiral John M. Richardson embraced the role of end-user or bottomup innovation in explaining a recent decision to revise the requirements for the
UCLASS program. The low-observable and deep-strike capabilities that were
envisioned when the program was known as the Joint Unmanned Combat Air
System (i.e., J-UCAS) in 2003 were removed in the latest request for proposals
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for the MQ-25 Stingray.55 In March 2016, Richardson explained, “It will get us
unmanned on deck . . . so we can start to confront those operational challenges
and we can learn our way forward.”56 Introducing the MQ-25 as a refueling and
reconnaissance CL-UAV provides the Navy with the opportunity to explore organizational, manpower, logistics, and operating challenges, while building confidence in the ability to execute closely coordinated carrier operations. It certainly
will result in significant end-user innovation.
However, it would be a mistake to assume that getting the MQ-25 Stingray
safely to the fleet will deliver desired advances in military effectiveness automatically. The Navy’s official goal for the UCLASS program remains an “autonomous
aircraft capable of precision strike in a contested environment,” as the Secretary
of the Navy described in 2014.57 Therefore, organizations that are sufficient for
the integration of the MQ-25 as an ISR and aerial refueling platform might not
be sufficient to support simultaneously the development of innovative operating
concepts or to refine requirements for follow-on CL-UAVs that will be employed
across the full spectrum of carrier aviation missions. To balance these competing
demands, it may be necessary to create organizations dedicated to experimentation for both the Stingray and follow-on CL-UAVs.
Experimentation can be the key to developing optimal operating concepts. Senior leaders in DoD in fact have called for greater experimentation, for increased
use of war games, for “failing fast,” and for innovation at every level. There
are institutional and cultural barriers to such an approach, but organizational
changes could facilitate overcoming these barriers. Requiring a squadron, air
wing, or ship to take on the risk of experimentation and primary responsibility
for developing operating concepts for CL-UAVs without alleviating other predeployment or operational requirements places an additional burden on an already
overstressed force.
Today, the Navy is unable to meet combatant commander demands fully,
not only for carrier strike group presence, but for ISR and maritime patrol assets, exercise participation, and the like. The need for and development of the
Optimized Fleet Response Plan, the carrier gap in the Persian Gulf in the fall
of 2015, and the extension of aircraft carrier deployments are all symptoms of
a force stretched thin. However, failing to prioritize experimentation cannot be
attributed wholly to operational requirements. The Navy also proved unable to
experiment effectively during the 1990s when the fleet was much larger than it is
today and faced fewer urgent threats and operational commitments. As Robert
C. Rubel testified to the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee in February 2016, “Despite all the lip service
that has been paid to innovation and concept development over the past twenty
years, the Navy has not been able to free up significant forces for experimentation
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duty.”58 This is consistent with the findings of another Mahnken and FitzSimonds
study, published in 2003, which found that officers “were unwilling to support
tradeoffs between force structure and readiness, on the one hand, and investment
in transformation, on the other.”59 At that time, the emergence of a near-peer
competitor was still a decade away, but the pressure on units to meet current missions impeded investment in or experimentation with future capabilities. Similarly, budget limitations cannot take all the blame for the lack of experimentation.
The successful Fleet Problem series of exercises and experiments were begun in
1923 on a tight budget and continued during the Great Depression, albeit by a
Navy with fewer obligations around the globe.60 Clearly, there is institutional or
cultural resistance to diverting Navy resources to large-scale experimentation,
even though such experimentation is recognized widely as required to optimize
technology.
The CL-UAV provides a superb basis around which to build new organizations dedicated to experimentation and rapid adoption of bottom-up innovations. There is a strategic need to accelerate the integration of CL-UAVs and
rapidly identify and articulate the requirements for follow-on UASs, such as the
unmanned combat air vehicle (i.e., UCAV) envisioned in the early part of this
century. There is also broad support for CL-UAV innovation from senior civilians in DoD and Congress. The Navy should explore organizational changes that
encourage greater experimentation and rapid concept development.
Naval aviation’s strike fighter community already supports expedited refinement of technical requirements on a small scale by employing new technology
in its aggressor squadron aircraft at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center
(NSAWC) in Nevada. These limited efforts provide rapid feedback to systems
engineers by allowing experienced aviators to employ new technology in scenarios that reflect the anticipated operating environment. Unfortunately, with
UAVs seen as ISR assets that are operated by personnel outside the carrier air
wing, there is little internal incentive to prioritize experimentation at NSAWC
with UAVs in non-ISR roles. This experimentation also is not something a fleet
squadron is organized to do, operating as it does with inexperienced aviators and
the minimal required personnel, aircraft, and flight hours to meet established
training and readiness standards. Therefore, dedicated experimentation units
may be required.
Many will argue that such experimentation is the purview of Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and indeed NAVAIR is critical to operational and
developmental testing. However, NAVAIR ensures that new technology and
platforms meet minimum standards; it is not organized to conduct extensive
experimentation dedicated to identifying entirely new operating concepts. Navy
test and evaluation squadrons are tied to programs of record and acquisition
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milestones. Engineers and test pilots have much to contribute to the acquisition
of UAS technology, but expanding the role of NAVAIR could perpetuate the perception that speeding up technology acquisition is the silver bullet of CL-UAV
integration. A better approach would involve new or repurposed experimentation units that are not focused on operational readiness or program acquisition.
Even if new experimental units cannot be established, the need to develop innovative operating concepts and identify requirements for CL-UAVs of the future
will remain. Given DoD’s stated intention to pursue human-machine teaming
for future warfare, it would be wise to include officers from all carrier aviation
communities in the development of such concepts and requirements, especially
if Stingray is limited to ISR and aerial refueling missions. This is contrary to the
model planned for the MQ-8 Fire Scout and MQ-4C Triton, which relies primarily on one or two communities to take ownership of UAV integration; but those
are both ISR platforms. CL-UAV optimization will require expertise from across
the spectrum of carrier air wing missions.
Consider the likely possibility that the unmanned ISR and aerial refueling mission would be assigned to the airborne early warning (VAW) community. While
the VAW community, which currently operates the E-2 Hawkeye, might absorb
these missions readily and employ the MQ-25 Stingray innovatively in support
of air wing datalink and battle-space management requirements, its members
are less well suited to develop the CL-UAV requirements and operational concepts required for conducting unmanned deep strikes or jamming in an A2/AD
environment than are the pilots and naval flight officers from the strike fighter
(VFA) or electronic attack (VAQ) communities.61 Assigning CL-UAVs to a single
community that readily accepts them likely would contribute to building an
internal constituency, but it also could detract from the development of followon requirements for CL-UAVs integrated across all air wing missions. Stingray
organizations should facilitate the participation of all aviation communities, especially the strike fighter community, to optimize the effectiveness of follow-on
CL-UAVs. Units comprising officers from all carrier air wing communities would
support that objective.
As the naval aviation community assesses the trade-offs of various organizational options, it should consider the effect of organizational decisions on the
pace of integration across all air wing missions and how new organizations can
influence experimentation and bottom-up innovation.
The U.S. Navy, which operated its first UAV in combat in 1944, is still more than
a generation away from fully integrating CL-UAVs across the spectrum of carrier air wing missions. Advances in data communications, computer processing,
navigation, and autonomy have overcome technological barriers to employing a
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tactically effective CL-UAV, but they have done little to address the institutional
and cultural barriers to innovation within the carrier aviation community. Optimizing the military effectiveness of the CL-UAV innovation will require continued top-down leadership and additional organizational changes.
The Navy already has made organizational changes and programmatic decisions to speed the development of the MQ-25 Stingray and UAS technology, but
fielding the MQ-25 Stingray will be only one step toward realizing the potential
of the CL-UAV innovation. The Navy should complement its pursuit of technology by organizing to develop a CL-UAV constituency within the carrier aviation
community and to encourage experimentation and bottom-up innovation. Organizational decisions should be based on empirical analyses of the attitudes of carrier aviators, especially within the strike fighter community, to understand fully
the cultural and institutional barriers to CL-UAV integration and experimentation. Organizations and processes also should be designed to adopt bottom-up
innovations rapidly and to exploit the role of end users in refining the requirements for future innovation and follow-on CL-UAVs. Experimentation should
be prioritized and, when possible, the responsibility for experimentation should
be assigned to dedicated organizations that are not simultaneously responsible
for operational deployments or formal test and evaluation of programs of record.

NOTES

		The author would like to express his appreciation to Hans Mair, Ian MacLeod, Tom
Mahnken, and Ted Smyth for their comments
on earlier drafts of this article.
1.	Sam LaGrone, “Mabus: F-35 Will Be ‘Last
Manned Strike Fighter’ the Navy, Marines
‘Will Ever Buy or Fly,’” USNI News, April 15,
2015, news.usni.org/; Robert Work [Deputy
Secretary of Defense], “Reagan Defense
Forum: The Third Offset Strategy” (speech
delivered at the Ronald Reagan Presidential
Library, Simi Valley, CA, November 7, 2015),
available at www.defense.gov/.
2.	The creation here of a new acronym, CLUAV, is intentional and done for three reasons. First, it is important to emphasize when
the UAVs being discussed are designed to
operate from an aircraft carrier, as opposed to
shore stations or other surface ships. Second,
since 1999, at least five acronyms (N-UCAV,
J-UCAS, N-UCAS, UCAS-D, UCLASS) have
been used to describe the Navy’s programs for
a UAV designed to launch and recover from

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 95

its aircraft carriers. The goal here is to discuss
the technological innovation more generally,
without specific reference to any of those programs. For an explanation of these acronyms
and brief descriptions of the programs, see
Jeremiah Gertler, History of the Navy UCLASS
Program Requirements: In Brief, CRS Report
R44131 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, August 3, 2015). Third, a
new acronym was necessary because those associated with a previous UAV program would
imply inadvertently the employment applications and capabilities commonly associated
with that program.
3.	Daniels approved two hundred thousand dollars for “an improved Sperry Flying Bomb using gyroscopically-controlled Curtiss N-9 seaplane.” See Thomas P. Ehrhard, “Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles in the United States Armed
Services: A Comparative Study of Weapon
System Innovation” (PhD dissertation, Johns
Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 2000),
p. 662. The Navy started experiments in 1916.

100

4/21/17 8:35 AM

96

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue

“The first successful Aerial Torpedo flight in
March 1918, marked the first time a full-size
automatically-controlled unmanned aircraft
had actually flown.” “Curtiss-Sperry Aerial
Torpedo,” Cradle of Aviation Museum and
Education Center, www.cradleofaviation
.org/.
4.	Steven J. Zaloga, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:
Robot Air Warfare 1917–2007 (Oxford, U.K.:
Osprey, 2008), p. 8.
5.	Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in
the United States Armed Services”; Zaloga,
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. For a brief overview of manned reconnaissance aircraft lost
during the Cold War, see John R. Schindler,
A Dangerous Business: The U.S. Navy and
National Reconnaissance during the Cold War
(Fort Meade, MD: National Security Agency,
Center for Cryptologic History, 2000).
6.	Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the
United States Armed Services,” p. 699.
7.	The Fire Scout Program “‘clocked’ more than
14,000 total flight hours . . . prior to . . . FY15.”
U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Program Guide 2015, p.
130, available at www.navy.mil/. Hours for the
Triton include those conducted as the Broad
Area Maritime Surveillance—Demonstrator
(BAMS-D). As of January 2014, BAMS-D had
flown over 750 sorties and twelve thousand
flight hours, including ten thousand combat
flight hours. Naval Air Systems Command,
“Unmanned Demo Aircraft Exceeds 10,000
Combat Flight Hours,” news release, January
13, 2014, www.navair.navy.mil/.

System (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), p. 234,
available at csbaonline.org/.
11.	The Williamson Murray and Allan Millett
definition of military effectiveness, “the process by which armed forces convert resources
into fighting power,” is used throughout this
article. Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray,
and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness
of Military Organizations,” in Military Effectiveness, vol. 1, The First World War, ed. Allan
R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston:
Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 2.
12.	George Raudzens, “War-Winning Weapons:
The Measurement of Technological Determinism in Military History,” Journal of Military History 54, no. 4 (October 1990), p. 432.
Raudzens reviews numerous cases in which
technological superiority has been credited,
historically or popularly, with achieving victory. From the chariot and crossbow to sailing
ships and gunpowder, and from the Spanish
conquest of the Aztecs to the British conquest
of India, Raudzens argues that technology
had limited impact on the outcomes of
conflicts.

8.	Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the
United States Armed Services.”

13.	Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood:
What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future
of Conflict,” International Security 21, no.
2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139–79. Biddle argues (p.
140) “that a synergistic interaction between
a major skill imbalance and new technology
caused the radical outcome of 1991.” Also see
Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, “Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper
Look,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 4
(August 4, 2004), pp. 525–46.

9.	Zaloga, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, p. 16;
Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the
United States Armed Services,” pp. 320–26;
John F. Keane and Stephen S. Carr, “A Brief
History of Early Unmanned Aircraft,” Johns
Hopkins APL Technical Digest 32, no. 3
(2013), p. 567.

14.	Clayton Christensen refers to comparable
leaps in the commercial sector as “disruptive
innovation” or “disruptive technology.” See
Clayton M. Christensen, Michael E. Raynor,
and Rory McDonald, “What Is Disruptive
Innovation?,” Harvard Business Review (December 2015), available at hbr.org/.

10.	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Uninhabited
Combat Aerial Vehicles (Washington, DC:
Defense Science Board, February 2004), p. iii;
Thomas Ehrhard and Robert Work, Range,
Persistence, Stealth, and Networking: The Case
for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air

15.	Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of
War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of
Harvard Univ. Press, 2001), p. 99.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 96

16.	Raudzens points out that the mitrailleuse
“actually beat the [more well-known American contemporary] Gatling Gun in a French
army competition.” Raudzens, “War-Winning
Weapons,” p. 418.

101

4/21/17 8:35 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13

17.	Luttwak argues that the tactical effectiveness
of the mitrailleuse was demonstrated at the
battle of Gravelotte, Lorraine, France, on
August 18, 1870. When “the Prussian infantry
advanced far enough to come within range
of some mitrailleuses . . . the new weapons
executed a massacre, accounting for many
of the 20,163 Prussian casualties of that day.”
Luttwak, Strategy, p. 101.
18.	Luttwak concludes that, “had the innovation not been aborted by the failure to adapt
organizationally, it might have averted the
disastrous French defeat” in the war. Ibid.
19.	See, for example, Barry Posen, The Sources of
Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell Univ. Press, 1984); Stephen P. Rosen,
Winning the Next War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Univ. Press, 1991); and Williamson Murray
and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation
in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1996).
20.	Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies
29, no. 5 (2006), p. 920. Grissom suggests that
four “schools of military innovation research”
could be distilled from the contemporary
literature: the civil-military, the interservice,
the intraservice, and the cultural. He found
that each was supported with empirical case
studies that involved some level of top-down
process to overcome barriers to military
innovation. Grissom argues (p. 925) that
bottom-up cases of innovation were not explained adequately by any of the four schools
of thought, and that additional analysis might
reveal a “more empirical understanding of
bottom-up innovation” that would ultimately
provide insights into “causality and contingency” and reveal “necessary and sufficient
conditions for bottom-up innovation.”
21.	Ibid., pp. 928–30.
22.	A quick search on Google Scholar revealed
that Grissom’s article that called for studying
bottom-up innovation has been referenced
ninety-eight times in books and scholarly
journals in the decade since its publication.
See, for example, Nina A. Kollars, “War’s
Horizon: Soldier-Led Adaptation in Iraq and
Vietnam,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no.
4 (January 3, 2015), pp. 529–53; Theo Farrell,
“Improving in War: Military Adaptation and

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 97

SMITH

97

the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009,” Journal of Strategic Studies
33, no. 4 (August 20, 2010), pp. 567–94;
and James A. Russell, “Innovation in War:
Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar
and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007,”
Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (August
20, 2010), pp. 595–624. In popular literature,
some have gone so far as to assert that in the
commercial sector “top-down innovation is
dead.” See Ryan Caldbeck, “Top Down Innovation Is Dead,” Forbes, February 12, 2013,
www.forbes.com/.
23.	Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation
Studies,” pp. 926–27.
24.	James R. FitzSimonds, “Cultural Barriers to
Implementing a Competitive Strategy,” in
Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century:
Theory, History, and Practice, ed. Thomas
G. Mahnken (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ.
Press, 2012), chap. 17, pp. 297–98. Also see
Rosen, Winning the Next War. In Thomas
Mahnken and James FitzSimonds, The Limits
of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward
the Revolution in Military Affairs, Newport
Paper 17 (Newport, RI: Naval War College
Press, 2003), the authors observe (p. 106) that
“change is often triggered by the recognition of a pressing strategic or operational
problem that cannot be handled through
improvements to the existing force, but rather
requires a new approach.”
25.	See, for example, Colin Clark, “McCain to
Carter: Make UCLASS a Long-Range Strike
Drone,” Breaking Defense, March 24, 2015,
breakingdefense.com/; Ehrhard and Work,
Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking;
U.S. Defense Dept., Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 2006), pp. 45–46; and
Senator John S. McCain to Honorable Ashton
Carter, Secretary of Defense, March 24, 2015,
available at www.scribd.com/.
26.	The Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program, which
is still early in the acquisition process, was assigned to OPNAV N99, but the more-mature
UAV programs, Small Tactical Unmanned
Aerial Systems (STUAS), MQ-4C Triton, and
MQ-8 Fire Scout, remained the responsibility
of the Director for Information Dominance
(OPNAV N2/N6).

102

4/21/17 8:35 AM

98

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue

27.	The bill added “$350 million in additional
development funding for the Unmanned
Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and
Strike (UCLASS) system.” S. McDougall, “U.S.
Defense Policy Bill Increases Modernization
Funding, Authorizes Budget Cap Loophole,”
Forecast International, October 15, 2015,
www.forecastinternational.com/. “The Navy
had originally requested $134.7 million for
its Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne
Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system.”
Megan Eckstein, “House, Senate Armed Services Committees Agree to Support UCLASS,
Additional Aircraft Procurement,” USNI
News, September 29, 2015, news.usni.org/.
28.	The official administrative message directing
and authorizing the establishment of ONPAV
N99 states, “In terms of resources, this realignment will be zero-sum to Navy.” John M.
Richardson [Adm., USN, CNO], “Establishment of the Unmanned Warfare Systems
Directorate,” NAVADMIN 255/15, November
2, 2015, available at www.public.navy.mil/.
29.	U.S. Navy Dept., Navy Program Guide 2012
(Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, 2012), available
at www.navy.mil/.
30.	“N2/N6 is the Navy’s lead office for resourcing Intelligence, Cyber Warfare, Command
and Control, Electronic Warfare, Battle Management, Oceanography, and Meteorology capabilities, among others. The office’s mission
is to deliver end-to-end accountability for
Navy information requirements, investments,
capabilities, and forces.” Joe Gradisher, “Vice
Adm. Branch Takes Charge of Information
Dominance and Naval Intelligence,” America’s
Navy, July 25, 2013, www.navy.mil/. The
assignment of programs such as the longendurance, high-altitude MQ-4 BAMS-D,
a derivative of the Air Force’s RQ-4 Global
Hawk that relies on satellite communications
links for remote operations, was practical, but
the real benefit to the program was taking it
out of competition with programs such as the
P-8, SH-60R/S, E-2D, F/A-18G, F-35C, and
the Ford-class CVN. The Navy did delay introduction of the MQ-4 to avoid cuts in these
programs, but the decision was made above
the N2/N6 and N98 level.
31.	For example, cost and end-strength considerations create a bias for introducing UAVs with
the minimal number of new personnel, such
as assigning UAVs to squadrons operating

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 98

manned platforms. In some situations this
may be feasible, as can be seen by looking at
recent Fire Scout detachments that deployed
with aircrew and maintenance personnel who
were dual-trained in both the SH-60R and
the MQ-8B. See Matthew Schnappauf [Cdr.,
USN], “Now Hear This—It’s Time to Push
Rotary Manned-Unmanned Teaming,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 142/5/1,359 (May
2016), available at www.usni.org/. This model
may or may not be suitable for the MQ-25
Stingray. Trade-offs are required with the
introduction of any new platform, and being
aware of entering biases can facilitate sound
decision making.
32.	Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the
United States Armed Services,” pp. 566–67
[emphasis in original].
33.	Rosen, Winning the Next War. Also see James
R. FitzSimonds and Thomas G. Mahnken,
“Military Officer Attitudes toward UAV
Adoption: Exploring Institutional Impediments to Innovation,” Joint Force Quarterly 46
(3rd Quarter 2007), p. 97.
34.	Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in
the United States Armed Services,” p. 569.
“The first characteristic of a mature, fully
integrated weapon system is the existence of a
dedicated officer corps that serves as an internal UAV constituency. UAVs lack traction in
this area, for non-aviators make substandard
operators, enlisted operators (common in
ground forces) lack political power, and rated
pilots stray when the siren song of manned
flight calls them to return to the cockpit.
Dedicated UAV units also contribute to the
establishment of a constituency by providing
command opportunities critical to advancing
in rank. The second metric that should be a
goal of innovation policy is the development
and adoption of follow-on models.” Ibid., pp.
610–11.
35.	Takeoff was conducted remotely by pilots at
airfield towers, who handed off control to the
Avengers in the vicinity of the targets. A pilot
in the rear cockpit of the modified TBM-1C
Avengers received a television video link from
the TDR-1 drones and sent remote-control
commands to direct the aircraft. Each TBM1C could control two TDR-1s. See “TDR-1
Edna III,” National Naval Aviation Museum,
2016, www.navalaviationmuseum.org/. Also
see Bill Lee, “TDR-1: First Operational US

103

4/21/17 8:35 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13

Navy Drone,” Newport News Shipbuilding Apprentice Alumni Association, September 2013,
www.nnapprentice.com/.
36.	Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the
United States Armed Services,” pp. 671–74;
Lee, “TDR-1: First Operational US Navy
Drone.”
37.	“Unmanned Systems Branch Honors WWII
UAV Pioneer,” Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center, San Diego (SSC San Diego)
Robotics Update 7, no. 2 (Winter 2007), p. 2,
available at www.public.navy.mil/.
38.	Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the
United States Armed Services,” p. 321. Even
though the QH-50C and QH-50D follow-on
models were introduced and logged more
than 15,000 flight hours between 1966 and
1969, including combat support during the
Vietnam War, they still failed at unacceptable
rates. “From July 1, 1966, through April 30,
1969, QH-50C drones flew over 4,600 hours
and QH-50D drones flew over 11,600 hours.
During this period, 76 QH-50C’s and 109
QH-50D’s were lost as a result of material
failures.” Comptroller General of the United
States, Adverse Effects of Producing Drone
Anti-Submarine Helicopters before Completion of Development and Tests, GAO Report
B-160877 (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Dept.,
1970), p. 21.
39.	Owen R. Cote Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War
Struggle with Soviet Submarines, Newport
Paper 16 (Newport, RI: Naval War College
Press, 2003), p. 37; Zaloga, Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles, p. 16.

SMITH

43.	The Optimized Fleet Response Plan was
designed to deal with the consequences of
extended carrier deployments and reduced
funding for maintenance and upkeep at repair
facilities following the budget reductions
implemented under the Budget Control Act
of 2011, also known as sequestration. For
additional information on the optimized fleet
response plan, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response
Plan: Information Provided to Congressional
Committees, GAO Report 16-466R (Washington, DC: 2016), available at news.usni.org/.
44.	“General David L. Goldfein,” U.S. Air Force,
July 2016, www.af.mil/.
45.	Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “AF
Introduces Enlisted Global Hawk Pilots,” U.S.
Air Force, December 17, 2015, www.af.mil/;
Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “Air
Force Approves RPA Initiatives,” U.S. Air
Force, April 11, 2016, www.af.mil/; Secretary
of the Air Force Public Affairs, “ACC Charts
Path for Remote Aircrews, Units,” U.S. Air
Force, December 10, 2015, www.acc.af.mil/.
46.	Lawrence Spinetta [Lt. Col., USAF], “The
Glass Ceiling for Remotely Piloted Aircraft,”
Air & Space Power Journal (July–August
2013), pp. 101–18, available at www.airpower
.au.af.mil/.
47.	Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “Air
Force Senior Leadership Addresses Need
to Stabilize RPA Enterprise,” U.S. Air Force,
January 15, 2015, www.af.mil/.
48.	FitzSimonds and Mahnken, “Military Officer
Attitudes toward UAV Adoption,” p. 100.

41.	“RQ-2A Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV),” America’s Navy, September 9, 2013,
www.navy.mil/. The Navy special warfare
community and the Navy Expeditionary
Combat Command did employ Pioneer and
follow-on STUASs, but the Navy failed to develop a follow-on that was suitable for either
the aviation or surface community. In 2006,
the Navy decided to procure the MQ-8 Fire
Scout to meet the unmanned ISR requirements of the surface fleet.

49.	First-tour officers in unmanned patrol
squadrons (VUPs) will complete their initial
operational tours in fleet maritime patrol and
reconnaissance squadrons (VP or VQ) prior
to serving in a VUP squadron. It will be more
than a decade before the first of those officers
will be eligible for command. Today, the most
reliable path to command involves duty as
an instructor during an officer’s first shore
assignment, so the viability of the career path
remains to be seen. Department head and
commanding officer billets will be filled by
board-screened officers on sea duty, so it may
be possible to observe their promotion rates
within the next five years.

42.	Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the
United States Armed Services,” p. 613.

50.	Command ashore and special mission command are other categories of command that

40.	U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Aviation Plan
2016 (Washington, DC: Deputy Commandant for Aviation, 2016), p. 85.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 99

99

104

4/21/17 8:35 AM

100

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue

do not have the same rate of promotion to the
rank of captain (O-6) as command at sea.
51.	Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “Why No Transformation?,” Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn–
Winter 1999–2000), p. 98; Mahnken and
FitzSimonds, The Limits of Transformation,
p. 3.

confront those operational challenges and we
can learn our way forward.’” Ibid.
57.	Ray Mabus, “Future Platforms: Unmanned
Naval Operations,” War on the Rocks, January
21, 2014, warontherocks.com/.

52.	Ehrhard explains that “[t]he ‘white scarf
syndrome’ is the colloquial name for culturally based obstruction of UAV integration
by pilots. . . . Like many articles of faith, the
‘white scarf syndrome’ tends to be tautological and anecdotal.” Ehrhard, “Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles in the United States Armed
Services,” p. 30. FitzSimonds and Mahnken
specifically analyzed Ehrhard’s assertion
that there was “no parochial, pilot resistance
standing in the way of UAV development in
the Air Force.” They found “no widespread
or deep-seated opposition to UAVs beyond
technological uncertainty.” FitzSimonds and
Mahnken, “Military Officer Attitudes toward
UAV Adoption,” p. 102.

58.	
Carrier Air Wing and the Future of Naval
Aviation: Hearing Before the Seapower and
Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong., p.
6 (February 11, 2016) (testimony of Robert
C. Rubel [Capt., USN (Ret.)]). Rubel testified
that he “witnessed the failure of the Navy’s
Fleet Battle Experiment Program in the
late 1990s and early 2000s. Among the key
problems was the need to superimpose the
experiments on forces that were in training for deployment.” He suggested reducing
carrier deployments to make more assets
available for experimentation. “The legendary
success of the fleet battle experiments in the
1920s and 1930s was predicated on having the
battle fleet available for exclusive focus on the
exercises.”

53.	FitzSimonds and Mahnken, “Military Officer
Attitudes toward UAV Adoption,” p. 97.

59.	Mahnken and FitzSimonds, The Limits of
Transformation, p. 109.

54.	Eliot A. Cohen, “Change and Transformation
in Military Affairs,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (2004), p. 400.

60.	Albert A. Nofi, To Train the Fleet for War: The
U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940, Historical Monograph 18 (Newport, RI: Naval War
College Press, 2010). Regarding the 1929
Fleet Problem IX, see Andrew F. Krepinevich
Jr., “Military Experimentation: Time to Get
Serious,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 1
(Winter 2001), pp. 76–89.

55.	Gertler, History of the Navy UCLASS Program
Requirements: In Brief; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.,
“Navy Hits Gas on Flying Gas Truck, CBARS:
Will It Be Armed?,” Breaking Defense, March
11, 2016, breakingdefense.com/.
56.	Sam LaGrone, “Navy Wants to Shed RAQ
Designation from Stingray Carrier UAV,”
USNI News, March 10, 2016, news.usni.org/.
“‘There’s just so much to learn about integrating unmanned carrier aviation into the carrier air wing right now and I just want to get
started,’ Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John
Richardson said. . . . ‘[MQ-XX Stingray] will
have a very valid mission for the current and
future airwing—ISR and tanking. It will get
us unmanned on deck and so we can start to

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 100

61.	Incidentally, assigning responsibility for
Stingray to the VAW community also would
return MQ-25 Stingray requirements from
N99 to N2/N6 (as opposed to N98), perpetuating the separation of the CL-UAV from
carrier aviation, as discussed earlier. This may
be desirable from an institutional and cultural
perspective, but inherently it will delay full
integration of the CL-UAV for non-ISR
missions.

105

4/21/17 8:35 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13

EPIC TETUS VS. ARISTOTLE
What Is the Best Way to Frame the Military Virtues?
Mark N. Jensen

T

he virtue theoretic approach to ethics locates moral value primarily in the
character of the agent rather than in the rules governing an act or the consequences that follow from it. Concerns about the character of the agent long
have been a central preoccupation of military organizations. To be sure, modern
military organizations in the United States and other Western, liberal, democratic
states pay close attention to the rules governing acts and the consequences of
these acts. Nevertheless, virtue ethics are of first importance, insofar as military
organizations aim to cultivate soldiers, sailors, and airmen with specific sets of
character traits, habits, and practices. This interest in moral development and
moral virtue is especially evident in the missions and operations of service academies, officer training schools, and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs.
It also can be found in the programs for training enlisted personnel as well as the
regular, annual training provided to operational forces.
When we consider virtue ethics as a moral theory, it is important to understand that there is no single account. Virtue ethics includes a family of theories
with a rich and complex history, including ancient
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While military theory and practice have not been insulated from these contemporary developments, military thinkers have tended to be attracted to the
Stoics. The leading voices here are James Stockdale, Nancy Sherman, and Michael Evans.3 The Stoics themselves do not speak with one voice, and the extant
writings that we have from ancient Stoic authors do not offer the same kind of
substance and depth that we find in contributors such as Aristotle and Aquinas.
Epictetus’s Handbook, for example, is a series of loosely connected aphorisms and
short reflections. The same can be said of Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations. Nevertheless, a close reading of Stoic texts reveals a set of themes that together outline
a distinct and different approach to virtue ethics. In brief, while the ultimate good
for humans is happiness, the Stoics regard the social world in which we try to
attain this good as opaque, unfair, and out of our control. As a result, happiness
must be achieved entirely in the inner life, as it is the only realm we can control.
Emotions, insofar as they are responses to external events, must be regulated
tightly or eliminated. The virtues themselves are inner, rational dispositions that
contribute to self-control. Public service is valuable not for the attainment of
honors or external goods, but as an opportunity to practice the virtues. Social
attachments are grounded in a cosmopolitan respect for shared humanity. In the
military context, the Stoic approach is thought to resonate with the international
nature of conflict; the chaos of warfare; and the need for order, discipline, and
bravery on the battlefield.
It seems to me, however, that military organizations’ attraction to the Stoic approach to virtue ethics is misplaced. In this article, I will argue that an approach
to virtue ethics inspired by Aristotle provides a better theoretical and practical
foundation for military organizations than the approach offered by the Stoics. It
is not just that Aristotle offers a more sophisticated account of human flourishing
and the attendant virtues; his approach has the added value of speaking to military organizations on and off the battlefield in ways that are especially relevant to
the nature of modern Western militaries and their activities. I will not be arguing that the approach of the Stoics is false or dangerous; I will argue instead that
Aristotle’s is simply better. In particular, the Aristotelian approach (1) is a better
match for the institutional nature of modern Western military service, (2) incorporates a higher degree of flexibility, which allows the account to be adjusted
appropriately to the variety of circumstances in which modern militaries operate,
and (3) is better able to contend with the kinds of tragedies that are at the heart
of the military experience in war.
The article is organized as follows. I begin with a comparative sketch of
Aristotle’s approach and the Stoic approach. I then point out salient features of
modern Western military practice, noting how they comport with the systems of
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Aristotle and the Stoics. At this stage I develop in detail the three areas in which
I take Aristotle’s account to be superior. I conclude with a comparative practical
example: a brief sketch of how Aristotle’s ethics might provide better resources
for tackling the current challenge that modern Western militaries, especially the
U.S. military, face in terms of eliminating sexual assault and sexual harassment.
COMPARATIVE ETHICS: ARISTOTLE
All virtue theoretic approaches begin with an account of the excellent person,
especially the habits, traits, and practices that together constitute human excellence.4 This focus on excellence of character contrasts with other prominent
theoretical approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism, which focuses on the
good that we bring about through our actions, and deontology, which focuses
on the moral laws that we should obey. Among the virtue theoretic approaches,
Aristotle’s account is a complex affair with many moving parts. To frame a useful comparison with the Stoic account, I will focus on each account’s answer to
two questions. First, what is moral excellence? Second, what are the intrinsic
limitations that we face in trying to achieve moral excellence? While there is
much more that could be said, and indeed has been said, in defense of these two
accounts in general, my argument here will focus narrowly on their comparative
fitness for military professionals and their organizations. It is my view that our
accounts’ comparative answers to these two questions will be sufficient to determine which is better for the military context.
Moral Excellence according to Aristotle
Aristotle believed that moral excellence is found in a happy human community.
By happiness we mean a life of “doing well” or “being well.”5 Many commentators
propose that the happy life is understood best as the flourishing life, to distinguish
it from the various trivializations of “happiness” that seem to have taken over
contemporary Western culture. The flourishing human life, in turn, is defined
in terms of human function.6 In other words, just as we can determine what
it means to be an excellent or flourishing dolphin if we have an account of the
purposes, lives, and nature of dolphins, so we can determine what it means to be
an excellent or flourishing human if we have an account of the purposes, lives,
and nature of humans.7 On that score, we observe that a full account of human
function will make reference to psychological and sociological contexts, as these
are main contexts within which humans live.
Psychologically speaking, every human being is composed of rational and
nonrational faculties, where the nonrational faculties include those that are
capable of listening to reason (appetites and passions) and those that are not (involuntary bodily functions).8 According to Aristotle, moral excellence is found
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at the intersection of the rational faculties and the nonrational faculties that are
capable of listening to reason.9 The morally excellent person uses her reason—or,
more specifically, her deliberative and decision-making powers—to regulate her
appetites and passions so she can fulfill those functions specific to the appetites
and passions themselves. Aristotle is not suggesting that we suppress or eliminate
our appetites and passions; instead he argues that, in a flourishing person, appetites and passions will be expressed in ways that accord with right reason. Simply
put, the morally excellent person is the well-regulated person.
Moving from psychology to sociology, we note that the functions of our faculties of appetite and emotion often are connected to our social roles. At the same
time, part of the human function is defined in terms of the various social and
political roles that we fulfill in human community. For each of these discrete
faculties and roles, Aristotle maintains that we can isolate a specific moral excellence in the mean between extremes. Consider three examples. Fear is an aspect
of human emotion that serves as an indicator of and a response to a threat. As Aristotle puts it, when we are fearful at the right time, toward the right people, to the
right degree, and so on, we achieve an excellence with respect to fear: bravery.10
If one is fearful in the wrong circumstances, one has an excess of fear: the vice
of cowardliness. If one fails to be fearful when the circumstances require it, one
has a deficiency of fear: the vice of foolhardiness. Consider another example. In
our everyday interactions with others, we find some people who are ingratiating:
they never disagree and always offer praise. Others are quarrelsome: they object
to everything and everyone. The mean between these extremes, according to Aristotle, is friendliness.11 Finally, consider the hierarchical ordering of our various
social and political roles. Given the contributions that we make in our families,
communities, and businesses, we should expect an appropriate response, whether
that be remuneration, recognition, or gratitude. In terms of extremes, those who
seek out honors that do not befit their respective places in the community we call
“honor loving,” while those who are deficient fail to enjoy the honor that is their
due. Aristotle does not give us a clear name for the virtue, other than to call it the
virtue concerned with small honors.12
Multiplied across our passions, appetites, and social roles, overall moral excellence can be captured in a catalog of the virtues. Aristotle’s own catalog names ten
virtues of character; subsequent virtue theorists have provided different, often
longer, lists. While Aristotle himself does not provide us with an explicit story of
how we might determine which traits belong in our catalog and which do not, the
theory behind his catalog suggests an account. Excellent character is a composite
of excellences attached to our humanity, to our socioeconomic status, and to our
social and political roles. In other words, the catalog of virtues is tied to one’s
specific psychological, sociological, and political functions.
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As a result, the list of virtues for each person will be slightly different. Where
we share a function with everyone else, we will have common virtues. Where we
do not share a function with others or share a function with only a subgroup, we
will have special virtues. Common virtues, in other words, include those attached
to our universally shared features. These include virtues tied to our emotional life
(e.g., bravery), our appetites (e.g., temperance), and the inescapably social nature
of our species (e.g., friendliness).
Special virtues are those determined by the specific circumstances of our social, economic, and political conditions. Magnificence, Aristotle’s virtue for generosity as it pertains to large gifts, will be relevant to me only if I have significant
wealth. The virtue concerning small honors will be relevant to me only if I have
no social and political potential for magnanimity, which is the virtue concerned
with big honors. Outside of Aristotle’s catalog, we can conceive of a host of additional special virtues. The virtues associated with being the firstborn (perhaps
including special responsibilities for younger siblings and for older parents) will
apply only if one is in fact the firstborn. The virtues associated with democratic
citizenship (e.g., being well-informed, capable of deliberating over public policy,
and committed to democratic decision-making processes) will apply only if one
happens to live in a democracy. And the virtues associated with officership in
the military of a democracy (e.g., loyalty, honor, integrity, and courage) will be
determined by one’s specific responsibilities and rank and the overall mission of
the military institution.
Understood in this way, the catalog of virtues is derived from psychological
and sociological facts about us. On the one hand, these grounds provide for a kind
of universality and permanency in the catalog, insofar as our nature as human
beings and the basic features of human life are unchanging. On the other hand,
insofar as our roles and functions are defined at least in part by the particulars of
our social and political circumstances, the catalog will have variations across individuals in their various social, cultural, and political circumstances. There will
be lots of ways in which the specific conditions of our lives imply different roles
and functions, which in turn will specify modified, and possibly novel, virtues.
It will be helpful, then, to notice the way that Aristotle organizes our various
roles and functions within the broader social and political context. Moral excellence is not an individual achievement but instead the achievement of a community. Every flourishing person, in virtue of her humanity, is part of a larger social
and political project. We are, as he phrases it, “political animals.”13 Put another
way, humans are members of a species that flourishes in a particular type of community. Just like the ant, bee, wolf, or lion, the character of the individual human
being cannot be understood fully apart from an understanding of her particular
role or function in the community to which she belongs.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 105

110

4/21/17 8:35 AM

106

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue

For his part, Aristotle describes a nested set of three communities: family,
village, and community.14 Our roles and functions in each of these communities
imply an account of performing specific roles and functions excellently and, in
turn, define part of the catalog of virtues that apply to us. In the family we might
be a son or daughter, brother or sister, father or mother, husband or wife. In the
village we have roles in terms of our vocation, in terms of our property and neighbors, and in terms of our local institutions. In the community we are defined in
terms of our citizenship in general as well as in terms of any specific role we might
occupy in the institutions of the community (e.g., legislator, soldier, judge). With
respect to each role that I occupy in my family, village, and community, we can
specify what it means to flourish, and then in turn identify those virtues that contribute to, as well as constitute, my flourishing in that context. Some of these will
be specialized versions of virtues of which I make use in other contexts; others
will be unique to my particular roles. Insofar as our roles change over the course
of our lives, our catalog will change as well. This does not mean that morality is
relative; it means instead that moral excellence is context sensitive. Human life
is not a static or uniform experience; any description of the excellences required
for flourishing must be adjusted to fit our circumstances.
Despite the variety of catalogs of virtues that apply to individuals, Aristotle
argues that we can identify an unchanging common good: the good of the community. The good of the community is the flourishing of the community qua
community. This is the chief good, such that the goods of all the other components of the community are subordinate to it. We must be careful here, however:
to say that the goods of the components of the community are subordinate is not
to say that they simply are means to achieving the chief good. Nor are we saying
that the chief good is simply the aggregate of all the goods of the components.
Aristotle’s account here is more nuanced. The goods of the subordinate communities are ends in themselves as well as means to achieving the chief good. It is
also correct to say that they are constituents of the chief good, although the chief
good cannot be defined purely in terms of the achievement of its subordinate
elements. Overall excellence or flourishing is achieved not merely by my excellence as a family member and a village member; it also requires my excellence as
a citizen—a role that cannot be reduced to the others.
Moral Limitations according to Aristotle
The excellent or flourishing community, together with the morally excellent
people who constitute it, is vulnerable on Aristotle’s account. Some forms of attack or corruption will be sufficient to impair excellence and flourishing both for
individuals and for the community as a whole. We can distinguish two kinds of
challenges to the flourishing of the community: internal challenges and external.
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Consider one form of internal challenge. The moral virtues are habits that
must be cultivated through a program of education that includes apprenticeship
under those who have a high degree of mastery of the virtues already. For example, one learns to be brave under the tutelage of brave people. But if a sociopolitical system lacks a program of education in the virtues or lacks exemplars, moral
excellence becomes very difficult to achieve. A second form of internal challenge
is associated with the intelligibility of the social world. Identifying the special
virtues associated with one’s various social roles presupposes a clearly defined set
of social roles as well as a clear understanding of what one’s social roles are. Otherwise, one’s account of excellence in one’s various functions will be incomplete,
vague, or perhaps missing altogether. But in contemporary societies, especially
the large, complex, and disorganized societies that characterize the West, we find
just these kinds of challenges to the clarity of social roles and our understandings
of our respective places.
External threats to the flourishing of an otherwise morally excellent community are often more straightforward. External threats such as war, natural disaster,
or the scarcity of natural resources can undermine the ability of a community to
achieve and maintain flourishing. Sometimes, despite our best efforts, circumstances that are completely out of our control can get the better of us.
Taken together, the vulnerabilities associated with these two types of challenges imply that a people can fail to achieve moral excellence and that, in many
cases, this failure can happen through no fault of their own. In other words, moral
tragedy is a real possibility in Aristotle’s world; human excellence or flourishing is
dependent on circumstances that are, at least in part, out of our control.
COMPARATIVE ETHICS: STOICISM
Let us turn now to the Stoic account and consider the Stoic answers to these same
questions. Of course, in one sense there is no single Stoic answer, insofar as Stoicism is a philosophical school with many adherents but no dominant voice. We
also do not have a complete record of Stoic teachings. Nevertheless, we can detect
themes that run throughout Stoic writings—themes that provide a sense of the
Stoic account, and themes that have been picked up by military ethicists such as
Sherman, Stockdale, and Evans. In fact, since these contemporary writers serve
as the primary lens through which many military members and organizations
have been introduced to Stoicism, it is their interpretation that provides the best
target for our discussion here. Just as with Aristotle, we cannot hope to provide a
comprehensive account, but we can present a contrasting picture that will be sufficient for discussing the relative merits of the Stoic perspective for contemporary
military service.
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Moral Excellence according to the Stoics
It is important to keep in mind that the Stoic approach to virtue ethics is deeply
indebted to Aristotle. While virtue theory, broadly considered, is the central approach to ethics for most of the thinkers throughout the Greek and Roman world,
Aristotle’s account is among the most prominent, and philosophers who come
after him presuppose aspects of his view even when they attempt to depart from
it. Stoic philosophers, for their part, see themselves as developing or improving
on earlier accounts. One way to exercise charity in reading the Stoics is to regard
their comparative lack of theoretical sophistication as a reflection of a common
philosophical background and a common set of assumptions. In other words,
perhaps they are understood best as taking much of Greek philosophy, including
Aristotle, for granted, and then focusing their own efforts on the few places where
they believe the account should be updated.
Taking this approach, we can see a variety of ways in which the Stoics modify
Aristotle’s account of moral excellence. With Aristotle, we saw that my happiness
is only partly under my control. Since I am a dependent and social creature, my
own good is bound up with the good of others: if my community is not flourishing, then I am not flourishing. In other words, living a flourishing life depends,
at least in part, on good moral luck. The Stoics find this approach entirely wrongheaded. As they see it, the excellent or flourishing life ought to be in my power,
not arbitrarily subject to the choices of others. Aurelius writes, “[T]rue good
fortune is what you make for yourself. Good fortune: good character, good intentions, and good actions.”15 In other words, my happiness should be entirely up
to me: if I can develop the right kind of character, I can control my own destiny.
Evans provides a summary as follows:
In the Stoic catechism there is no such category as “victimhood” because there is no
moral economy outside of the workings of our inner selves. Stoicism is thus about
empowerment by perception—a cultivation of an invincibility of the will through
minimizing personal vulnerability by a mixture of Socratic self-examination and
an emphasis on control of the emotions. Stoicism teaches concentration on what
individuals can control, what Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations called the “inner
citadel” of the soul.16

The Stoic focus on controlling our fate changes the nature of our moral life in
many ways, but for the purpose of developing an argument with application to
contemporary military service I will focus on just two: individualism and interiorization. By individualism, I mean the way in which Stoics focus on the ethics of
the individual rather than the ethics of the community; by interiorization, I mean
the way in which Stoics focus on the mental lives of individuals rather than their
actions. Both of these modifications reflect Stoic objections to Aristotle’s program.
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Let us begin with individualism. Stoics agree that the flourishing person has
excellent character, and excellent character is a matter of having a specific set of
moral virtues.17 Stoic catalogs of the virtues are different from Aristotle’s: sometimes they include virtues that appear to be broader in scope, such as righteousness, honor, and dignity; at other times, Stoics hint at virtues that reflect a disengaged or aesthetic life. Aurelius, for example, lists honesty, gravity, endurance,
austerity, resignation, abstinence, patience, sincerity, moderation, seriousness,
and high-mindedness.18
The more important contrast, for our purposes, can be found in the different
aims of the Stoic virtues. On the Stoic account, the cultivation and exercise of
these virtues have value primarily for the development of the character of the
individual, not for the sake of the community. Aurelius writes, “[P]eople are our
proper occupation. Our job is to do them good and put up with them. But when
they obstruct our proper tasks, they become irrelevant to us—like wind, sun, and
animals. Our actions may be impeded by them, but there can be no impeding our
intentions or dispositions.”19
Every action stands on its own as a measure of the character of the agent who
performs it, independent of the value of the action for the community. I am not
responsible for the actions of others, and they cannot be responsible for my own
actions. After all, I cannot control them and they cannot control me. My own
good is therefore my ultimate point of reference, as it is the only thing I truly can
control. In this way, the Stoic approach to happiness is far more individualistic
than the approach offered by Aristotle. Where Aristotle views the ethical life as a
joint enterprise aimed at building our social and political world, the Stoics view
the ethical life as an individual enterprise aimed at achieving excellence despite
our social and political world.
This contrast should not be especially surprising. Aristotle’s starting point in
his writing, as in his life, is the self-contained social and political unity of the
Greek city-state. Stoic writers, in contrast, are lost in the vast, diverse, cosmopolitan expanse of the Roman Empire. Correspondingly, the Stoics view the social
world as opaque, cruel, and arbitrary—utterly outside the control of the individual. To be sure, Stoics were not the kind of pessimists who aim at disengagement;
they were not the Roman equivalent of modern doomsday preppers. Stoics call
for service, kindness, and other forms of social engagement. Moreover, Stoics
themselves were active for the good of their friends and their communities, whatever their stations and circumstances. Cicero and Seneca were Roman politicians;
Marcus Aurelius was a soldier and emperor. But all these exercises of the social
virtues reflect a much more detached approach to our social and political world,
an approach centered on the character of the individual agent. At the same time,
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Stoic social and political engagement did not have as its primary objective the
achievement of a common good or the construction of a flourishing community.
In the midst of this chaotic world, it seems fair to ask the Stoic whether moral
excellence or flourishing is even possible. This brings us to the second point of
contrast between the Stoic approach and the Aristotelian approach: the interiorization of the moral life. When Aristotle allows that tragedy can make an otherwise virtuous person unhappy, the Stoics recoil. They propose instead a system
in which happiness is not at all dependent on one’s social, political, and physical
circumstances. Aurelius writes as follows:
If you do the job in a principled way, with diligence, energy and patience, if you keep
yourself free of distractions, and keep the spirit inside you undamaged, as if you
might have to give it back at any moment—If you can embrace this without fear or
expectation—can find fulfillment in what you’re doing now, as Nature intended, and
in superhuman truthfulness (every word, every utterance)—then your life will be
happy. No one can prevent that.20

In other words, the happy life is a matter of internal rather than external fulfillment. Whatever the state of the world around me, it is still possible for me to
have excellent character. I can accomplish this, the Stoics explain, provided that
I achieve the following.
First, I must come to terms with the fact that happiness has nothing to do with
external successes. Epictetus writes, “Do not seek to have events happen to you as
you want them to, but instead want them to happen as they do happen, and your
life will go well.”21 If happiness lies entirely within my control, and the only things
over which I have complete control are my internal responses and my internal
life, then I must learn to master my internal life and avoid seeking happiness in
external goods. External goods of wealth, fame, and power are outside my control;
it would be a mistake to put my happiness in them. To be sure, this does not mean
that Stoics eschew these goods. Stoicism need not imply a monkish way of life;
such a way of life itself could become an object of worship. Instead, the Stoic avoids
emotional attachment to external goods. Epictetus explains somewhat graphically:
“It shows lack of natural talent to spend time on what concerns the body, as in exercising a great deal, eating a great deal, drinking a great deal, moving one’s bowels
or copulating a great deal. Instead you must do these things in passing, but turn
your whole attention toward your faculty of judgment.”22 In other words, it is our
attitude toward external goods that matters, not the goods themselves.
Second, I need to learn to be guided by reason alone. While our social and
political world may be chaotic, the universe as a whole is guided by reason. There
is a natural order or a law of nature that I discover and toward which I can orient my will. Again, Epictetus: “On every occasion you must have these thoughts
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ready: lead me, Zeus, and you too, Destiny, wherever I am assigned by you; I’ll
follow and not hesitate, but even if I do not wish to, because I’m bad, I’ll follow
anyway. Whoever has complied well with necessity is counted wise by us, and
understands divine affairs.”23
To do this, I must learn to control my emotions. In particular, I must recondition my emotional life so that I am not emotionally sensitive to the things that I
see and the events that befall me, no matter how pleasurable or cruel they may
be. Sherman explains the Stoic perspective here: “They hold that emotions, as
most of us experience them, typically involve assent to false opinions. That is, the
impressions we assent to have a propositional structure . . . and emotions typically
involve false opinions of good and evil.”24 It is not that Stoics eschew emotions
altogether; what they claim instead is that our emotional responses must be keyed
solely to our mental life. We can take pleasure in our virtuous intentions, but not
in the results that come from actions that accord with those virtuous intentions.
After all, the results of our actions, no matter how well intended they may be, are
not in our control.
Third, and in keeping with the previous achievements, I must cultivate inner
strength, especially fortitude, if I am to flourish in the midst of the cruel and
harsh world in which we live. Not only is my social and political context outside
my control; it actually tends to pose a threat to my physical, social, and political
well-being. In this way, inner happiness is something that I must achieve despite
my suffering. Suffering and death are inevitable. Aurelius’s Meditations, in particular, are preoccupied heavily with reminders of the shortness of life and the
inevitability of death: “[K]now this: Human lives are brief and trivial. Yesterday
a blob of semen; tomorrow embalming fluid, ash. To pass through this brief life
as nature demands. To give it up without complaint. Like an olive that ripens and
falls. Praising its mother, thanking the tree it grew on.”25
Moral Limitations according to the Stoics
From the preceding discussion, it should be evident that if the Stoic life can be
achieved, there will be no limits on my happiness. Insofar as I resist the temptations of worldly goods and worldly pleasures, I can create for myself an impenetrable mental fortress—a place where I am immune to the effects of tragedy,
a place in which I can be happy, though the world may fall apart. As Sherman
explains, for the Stoics, “[H]appiness must be a matter of virtue alone.”26
This is not to say that Stoicism is easy. Reconditioning my emotional life according to the Stoic program is especially difficult, as my emotions seem to be
naturally responsive to my experience in the world and not to the particulars
of my character. Stoics recognize the challenges here. They remind followers
that Stoic ideals are achieved to one degree or another; one need not achieve
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perfection to have made progress. Flourishing does not require the complete
realization of the ideal; further achievement with respect to happiness is always
possible. Whatever the world may throw at me, my happiness remains in my
control, and I can take steps to achieve it all the more. Evans quotes Henley’s 1875
poem “Invictus” to make the point:
Out of the night that covers me,
Black as the Pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever gods may be
For my unconquerable soul.
In the fell clutches of circumstance
I have not winced nor cried aloud.
Under the bludgeonings of chance
My head is bloody, but unbowed.
Beyond this place of wrath and tears
Looms but the horror of the shade,
And yet the menace of the years
Finds, and shall find, me unafraid.
It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishment the scroll.
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul.27
THE SUPERIORITY OF ARISTOTLE IN THE MODERN
MILITARY WORLD
At first blush, one can see the attraction of the Stoic approach to the military context. Soldiers on the contemporary battlefield are expected to perform excellently
when their lives are under constant threat, often in the midst of great suffering,
and under strategic and tactical conditions that are nearly always out of their
control. The fear of death can be psychologically paralyzing; the Stoic power to
eliminate that fear and concentrate single-mindedly on the tasks at hand sounds
like liberation for the soldier in combat. James Stockdale famously remembered
thinking to himself, as he parachuted into a North Vietnamese village, that he
was “entering the world of Epictetus.”28 Stockdale believed the Stoic approach
described above was vital to his survival as a prisoner of war (POW) in North
Vietnam, and vital to his effective leadership there.
On the one hand, we should not dismiss Stockdale’s experiences, or those of
other soldiers who have found resilience and liberation in Stoic philosophy, with
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a mere wave of the hand or a short piece of philosophical argument. Certainly
under POW conditions, there is very little among our externalities that we can
control, and any happiness that we find likely will be a matter of the inner character and strength that the Stoics describe. It may be that the Stoic approach to
pain and suffering could be a helpful addition to certain parts of military training, especially those concerned with survival and capture.
On the other hand, the conditions in which Stoicism seems especially pertinent are not the experiences of the vast majority of soldiers in the modern
military. Instead, soldiers in modern militaries are contributors to an enormous
and complex social and political project, a project that requires creativity and
flexibility, and a project that can and sometimes does go wrong. In my view, this
is the world of Aristotle, not the world of Epictetus. In providing a detailed argument for the superiority of Aristotle’s approach, I will focus on three features:
the institutional setting of modern Western military service, the need for higher
degrees of flexibility, and the reality of tragedy.
In the first place, Aristotle’s account is better suited to the institutional conditions of contemporary military service. Unlike the Stoics, Aristotle does not view
the social world as opaque and arbitrary. Aristotle’s theory is not concerned with
explaining how we might flourish in spite of our institutions, but more optimistically provides a road map for the creation and development of excellent institutions in which we can flourish together. The fact is, modern Western military
conditions and practices are well suited for this approach, especially in those
aspects that extend beyond individual psychology. Each soldier has a specific
role to play associated with her unit, and the description of this role implies an
account of excellence. Each unit, in turn, is part of a larger unit in the military
organization, where that military organization in turn plays a very specific role in
the good of the state. Thus we have a set of elements analogous to the family, the
village, and the community. The chief good for the soldier is found in the good
of the state, while the military itself plays a specific role in sustaining that good.
As with Aristotle’s other intermediate institutions, the good for the military is
neither a mere means to nor a mere constituent of the good of the state. Soldiering is both an end in itself and a means to the achievement of other ends. At the
same time, the achievement of the good for the military and its units is a necessary condition for the achievement of the good for the state, but in the sense that
the specific good for the military organization is an end itself, a means through
which other aspects of the state can achieve their good, as well as a constituent
element in the complex common good by which we assess the state as a whole.
This organizational structure is not merely thrust on soldiers in modern
militaries; instead they construct and sustain it. Both officers and enlisted personnel are expected to take on leadership roles gradually, using their experience,
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together with the guidance of their superiors, to build and rebuild the organization in keeping with an account of its good that they are responsible for formulating and reformulating. In this way, the institution presupposes that its members
will exercise control over it, despite the challenges of size and complexity. Notice
that this account contrasts sharply with the Stoic approach to social and political
institutions. While Stoics allow for public service and contributions to the good
of the community, the Stoic must not take on the good of these institutions as her
own. To do so would be to accept the existence of external goods and subject one’s
own happiness to the judgments and actions of others. Insofar as social trust is
built on identity of interests, shared commitments, and common purpose, Sto
ically oriented soldiers will not be as trustworthy as Aristotelians in the project
of building and sustaining modern military organizations.
In the second place, Aristotle’s account allows for significantly more creativity
and flexibility than the account we get from the Stoics. Aristotle’s virtue of prudence is proactive: one evaluates the circumstances in which one finds oneself,
identifies the goods relevant to one’s circumstances and the circumstances of
one’s group, and then identifies practices and activities that will contribute to the
accomplishment of those goods. Since the common good is always in view, Aristotle’s soldiers never are preoccupied with their own individual happiness—after
all, their own individual good is a constituent of and a means to accomplishing
the common good, given the natures of their particular roles. By definition, the
Aristotelian does not interiorize her ethical life—the common good is exterior,
at least with respect to the others that compose her group.
War is, at least in one sense, a violent competition among groups with (at
least) two different visions of the good. Stoics who distance themselves from the
common good, and who view the external world as a place of temptation and
cruelty, seem to be unattractive partners in the social and political project that is
modern warfare. To be sure, it appears that Stoic detachment could be useful in a
narrow range of circumstances in modern warfare, such as when captured by the
enemy—Stockdale’s experience. Nevertheless, it seems to me that proponents of
Stoicism under these conditions miss the fact that Aristotle’s virtue of prudence,
with its context-sensitive adjustment to new circumstances, could prescribe an
account of flourishing similar to that prescribed by the Stoics under conditions
of capture. In other words, where the Stoics propose a rigid morality of detachment, Aristotle proposes a kind of adaptability that could recommend a degree of
emotional detachment when circumstances call for it. When an Aristotelian finds
himself in a social structure that is inimical to flourishing in the conventional way
(e.g., family, village, community), he will look for ways to make the best of his
circumstances. In fact, Stockdale’s own experience as a POW had far more Aristotelian elements than he seems to have recognized. By accepting a leadership role
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among the other captured Americans, by promulgating principles for prisoner
behavior, and by finding ways to encourage others in the midst of their suffering,
Stockdale remained committed to the good of the American prisoners, not just
as individuals but as Americans committed to the good of the United States.29
Finally, Aristotle’s account has a better approach to error and tragedy. Where
the Stoic is expected to be “astonished at nothing,” Aristotle recognizes the possibility of genuine errors, mistakes, and tragedies in the context of military service
and war. Not every social structure conforms to the ideal; warfare, quite obviously, is a nonideal social circumstance. Things have gone wrong, possibly quite
badly, and this is a genuine tragedy for Aristotelians—the social structures that
support a life lived according to the virtues and in pursuit of joint goods have broken down, thereby reducing the amount of happiness that is possible in the moment. The Stoic response would appear to be to chide the Aristotelian for looking
for happiness outside herself; the Stoics insist that it can be found reliably only
within. In this way, the Stoic detaches herself from the possibility of tragedy, from
the very idea that our circumstances can be described as bad or good. However,
it seems to me that if we do not recognize tragedy, we will have little motivation
to work to prevent it in the future. Whatever the merits of the Stoic approach as it
concerns the resilience of the individual, the fact is that modern soldiers in modern militaries strive for more. Military action often aims at stopping and responding to tragedy, and even learning from it so as to put in place measures to prevent
it from recurring. Tragedy cannot be eliminated from warfare, insofar as good
men and women always will suffer and die; however, our response should not be
to structure our mental life so we are not affected by tragedy, but instead to rejoin
more forcefully the challenge of building institutions, practices, and soldiers who
are adept at minimizing internal and external harms. Modern institutions like the
military aim to improve performance, achieve efficiencies, and accomplish very
specific common ends. More generally, our political systems and political leaders
should be striving to find peace and support flourishing nations and citizens. The
Stoic ethic, with its much more limited focus on the good of the individual, does
not seem to be as good a fit as the Aristotelian ethic, with its focus on building a
flourishing set of nested institutions.
THE SPECIAL CASE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In recent years, the U.S. military has become especially concerned with incidents
of sexual assault and harassment inside the organization. Leaders are looking for
better ways to catch and remove those who perpetrate these crimes, as well as
ways to build a culture of zero tolerance. Both are goals of long standing, but they
have proved elusive. Insofar as virtue theorists are concerned with cultivating
individual and social moral excellence, and a culture of sexual harassment and
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sexual assault falls well short, they would seem to have something to contribute
to the conversation.
Stoicism, with its virtues of righteousness and decency, offers an account of a
moral soldier and a military culture consistent with the elimination of sexual assault and sexual harassment. The Stoic focus on cultivating resilience in the face
of personal suffering also might prove useful to victims. However, there seem to
be very few resources in Stoicism that might provide better guidance for solving
the problem. As it stands, it is not as if the message of treating one’s fellow soldiers
with decency is absent, nor is resilience missing from contemporary military
training. Quite the opposite: in the annual sexual assault prevention and response
training that members (including myself) of the U.S. Defense Department of all
ranks receive, respect and resilience as ethical virtues are central themes. Yet
sexual harassment and assault persist.
Aristotle provides a richer theoretical framework from which to start our reflections on how to make progress on this issue. We begin with the observation
that the vast majority of the sexual assault and harassment incidents involve men
assaulting or harassing women. Instead of focusing on individuals qua individuals and promoting general virtues such as respect and decency, Aristotle would
begin by identifying the psychological, sociological, and political conditions that
give rise to the trends we observe. In other words, if there is a problem that seems
to be connected to a particular demographic, it makes sense to start at the level
of sociological investigation to determine root causes across the population. Why
do men tend to be the perpetrators; why do women tend to be the victims?
At the same time, Aristotle would begin to think about solutions from inside
the sociological circumstances. What are the social norms and virtues that we
expect men and women to cultivate in the context of their relationships, both to
the military and to each other? Notice that, in answering this question, Aristotle
would be concerned not only with preventing bad behavior but with cultivating
good behavior. Remember, in Aristotle’s virtue theoretic account, bad moral behavior occurs when a person tends toward the extreme of some feeling, appetite,
or social role, rather than toward the mean. The cowardly person has too much
fear, the brave person has the right amount; the overly social person is ingratiating, the friendly person is social to the right degree.
If sexual assault and harassment are actions attached to vices that are akin to
cowardice, then what is the feeling, appetite, or social role that is in question?
Suppose, insofar as sexuality is a psychological and sociological aspect of human
beings, that there are virtues and vices associated with human sexuality. If sexual
assault and sexual harassment are vices with respect to human sexuality, then
it follows that there also must be virtues associated with sexual excellence and
sexual flourishing. Moreover, since vices fall on the extremes and virtues fall in
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the mean between the extremes, any program to reduce vice is, for Aristotle, at
the same time a program to improve virtue; we cannot help but cultivate bravery
in the process of reducing cowardice.
In other words, an Aristotelian program for reducing or eliminating sexual
assault and harassment must be, at the same time, a program aimed at cultivating
sexual excellence and sexual flourishing. The important practical implication of
this story, Aristotle would argue, is that we cannot institute programs to change
the culture and practices that encourage sexual assault and harassment until we
have a clear account of the culture and practices that cultivate sexual excellence
and flourishing. This, of course, means that we need a robust account of sexual
excellence and sexual flourishing in the first place. For Aristotelians, such an account cannot simply be a set of rules, e.g., all sex must be consensual. Although
Aristotelians are happy to include laws, rules, and principles in their social and
political schemes, they would not want their approach to be confused with or
reduced to a deontological approach. Instead, Aristotelians will search for an account of how human sexuality contributes to the excellent functioning of human
beings as individuals and in their relationships with others.
It is these two pieces of information—an account of sexual flourishing, together with an account of the social conditions that will cultivate and sustain
it best—that we need if we are to make genuine progress in eliminating sexual
assault and harassment from military organizations. On the one hand, the unfortunate fact is that at present we do not possess either of them. While the second
piece of information is something we could investigate as a matter of psychology
and sociology, the first is not. An account of sexual excellence and sexual flourishing is a matter of ethics, and therefore not a matter of conventional empirical
research. Certainly, ethical research, together with common and historical experience, has resulted in agreement on important issues. We reject slavery, murder,
and adultery, and we affirm the importance of equal treatment and opportunity
across distinctions of race and gender. Nevertheless, the content of sexual ethics does not appear to be one of these areas of agreement. At present we do not
have a social or political consensus sufficient to serve as the basis for a program
of improvement.
Unfortunately, Aristotle’s own views will not be of much help here. Among
the things on which we do agree is that Aristotle’s patriarchal approach to family
relationships, grounded on his belief that women are inferior to men, is wrong.
While he does not offer an explicit theory of sexual excellence or sexual flourishing, we safely can assume that any theory he would offer would be grounded on
assumptions that we reject.
On the other hand, if we are in agreement that these two pieces of information are what we need if we are to make progress, we can devote our attention
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to acquiring them. This means, in the first place, that we need to have a serious
discussion about human sexuality, with an eye toward developing an account of
an excellent and flourishing sexual life. Perhaps we never will agree on all the
particulars, and perhaps there are groups that always will insist on their own
eccentric views. But we may find that there are areas of agreement that will be
sufficient to establish a counterweight to the vices of sexual assault and sexual
harassment, even if we cannot agree on a comprehensive account of the ideal.
With these areas of agreement in hand, we then can turn to social science to
make progress in determining what types of institutional and cultural changes
will achieve these ends best. Together, these two pieces of information constitute
the heart of an Aristotelian approach to solving the problem of sexual harassment
and sexual assault in military organizations.
Stockdale kept a copy of Epictetus’s Handbook on his bedside table aboard
ship during the Vietnam War. Admittedly, the Handbook may be better suited
for bedtime reading in wartime; its short paragraphs and aphorisms are pithy,
memorable, and challenging, and have the appearance of offering important and
profound wisdom on how an individual might find happiness amid daily mortal
threat and uncertainty.
In contrast, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and his Politics do not make for
good bedtime reading. They offer complicated and open-ended arguments that
require serious interpretive work to be relevant to our modern conditions. In this
way, Aristotle is a bit like the road less traveled. And yet the implication of the argument I have made here is that our military forces and our character-education
programs would be much better off following the Aristotelian than the Stoic path.
While it might be more difficult, the payoff will be much better.
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FOUNDATIONS OF MOR AL OBLIGATION
After Forty Years
Thomas J. Gibbons

I

n these times of ethical uncertainty, especially among senior Navy leaders amid
the ongoing “Fat Leonard” fiasco, we need to look to our roots. The Foundations
of Moral Obligation elective, otherwise known as “The Stockdale Course,” has
been a mainstay at the Naval War College (NWC) for most of the past forty years.
Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale, USN, the fortieth President of the College,
collaborated with Dr. Joseph Brennan, a professor emeritus from Columbia University’s Barnard College, to develop the elective shortly after Stockdale assumed
the presidency. Little did they know how popular the elective would become and
the positive impact it would have on graduates over the years. The Foundations
elective has become a part of the moral fabric of both the institution and the U.S.
Navy.
One indication of this is that NWC’s formal role in both leadership and ethics has expanded relatively recently. Then–Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan
W. Greenert approved the first Navy Leader Development Strategy in January
2013 to “synchronize the Navy’s leadership and
Thomas J. Gibbons has worked for the associate prostrengthen our naval profession by providing a
vost at the Naval War College since 2008. Before re1
tiring from the U.S. Army in the grade of colonel, he common framework for leader development.” In
was a rotary-wing aviator, flying from USN ships in
early 2014, Greenert directed the President of the
Operations DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD. He
Naval War College to be responsible for all officer
commanded 1st Battalion, 10th Aviation Regiment
(ATTACK) at Fort Drum, NY, and served as J1 of and enlisted leadership and ethics curricula for
the U.S. Pacific Command before coming to the Colthe Navy.2 A few months later, in March 2014, the
lege as the Army adviser. He has a BS from the U.S.
Naval Leadership and Ethics Center was created at
Military Academy, an MS from George Washington
University, an MA from the Naval War College, and Naval Station Newport to provide leadership eduan EdD from Johnson & Wales University.
cation and training, curriculum support, research,
and assessment.3 With their Foundations elective,
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Stockdale and Brennan laid the foundation for leadership and ethics instruction
at the Naval War College, and their work continues to have a profound impact on
leaders throughout the Navy today.
Stockdale and Brennan wrote the Foundations syllabus and cobbled together
the reading list and assignments in about six months during the first half of
1978. The course was offered for the first time in the fall trimester of academic
year (AY) 1978–79, then was taught again during the winter trimester that same
academic year. Stockdale himself only taught the course that bears his name for
one year (actually two trimesters). Brennan continued to teach the elective until
he retired in 1992. Professor Paul Regan began teaching the Foundations elective
in the fall trimester of 1994 while on active duty as a U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
captain. He retired from the Coast Guard the following year, but continued to
teach the Foundations elective for the next sixteen years, through 2010. Dr. Martin L. Cook assumed duties as the Stockdale Chair at the Naval War College in
June 2009 and cotaught the elective with the author until his retirement in 2016.
Each of these men brought passion and vigor into the classroom to make the
course successful.4
The purpose of this article is to highlight the history of the Foundations of
Moral Obligation elective and to illustrate how it has changed over time—and
yet how much it has remained the same. The article also will attempt to answer
the question of why this elective has remained one of the most popular at the
College. It seems deeply counterintuitive, on the face of it, that midgrade and
senior military officers and government civilians—a group typically educated in
technology and management and focused on the practical—would find the reading of difficult primary sources in philosophy and literature such an important
part of their NWC education.
Stockdale graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with the class of 1947.
His classmates include former president Jimmy Carter; Senator John McCain;
and Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret.), who later became director of the
Central Intelligence Agency.5 While serving as President of the College, Turner
made sweeping changes to improve the curriculum, based on his experience as a
Rhodes Scholar. In fact, many of the improvements instituted during the “Turner
Revolution” are still in effect today. Stockdale, having spent nearly seven and a
half years as a prisoner of war at the infamous Hanoi Hilton, came to Newport
intent on making an impact and establishing an elective course in ethics. In a letter to Brennan dated December 5, 1977, Stockdale wrote, “I have come to the conclusion that if I am to leave a legacy here it must be done from the classroom. My
boss, Jim Holloway, and my predecessor, Stan Turner, and others advise against
‘getting tied down’ to a lecture schedule. I’m going to ignore their warnings—and
try, by next fall, to structure an elective course in something like ethics.”6
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The Stockdale legacy of leadership and ethics has grown exponentially
throughout the U.S. Navy over the years. As Dr. Cook highlighted, “I think the
most remarkable thing . . . [is] that every major institution and activity explicitly
dedicated to questions about ethics and leadership in the U.S. Navy is named after
James Bond Stockdale.”7 Stockdale’s legacy in leadership and ethics throughout
the U.S. Navy is unquestionable. However, he was not always interested in ethics.
THE INFLUENCE OF EPICTETUS
After his graduation from the Naval Academy, Stockdale pursued tough operational Navy assignments. He eventually attended flight training and became
a fighter pilot and later an experimental test pilot. In 1960, he was selected to
attend graduate school for two years at Stanford University to get a master’s degree. While at Stanford, Stockdale wandered over to the halls of the Philosophy
Department one morning. He became enamored of philosophy, although his
academic adviser tried to discourage him, telling him it was a waste of time.
We all experience moments like these, those crossroads at which we choose
a path that fundamentally changes the course of our lives. This visit to the Philosophy Department was a life-changing moment for Stockdale. That morning
he met a USN veteran of World War II, Professor Philip Rhinelander, who was
teaching in the Philosophy Department after a long and distinguished academic
career. Rhinelander took Stockdale under his wing, enrolled him in his course,
and over the next few weeks tutored him privately. Stockdale thrived, and even
took additional philosophy courses from other professors at Stanford.8
In their last meeting together prior to his graduation, Rhinelander gave
Stockdale a copy of Epictetus’s handbook, The Enchiridion.9 Stockdale was dumbfounded, but took the book and read it, out of respect for Rhinelander. In a letter
to Brennan years later, Stockdale confessed, “I recognized nothing that applied to
the career I had known. I was a fighter pilot, an organizer, a motivator of young
aviators, a martini drinker, a golf player, a technologist—and this ancient rag
talked about not concerning oneself with matters over which he had no control,
etc. I thought to myself, ‘Poor old Rhinelander—he’s just too far gone.’”10
Little did Stockdale know that this small book would be his salvation, his
source of strength in the prison camps of North Vietnam. Stockdale would
embrace the Stoic philosophy and make it his own. He would write essays and
deliver speeches to audiences throughout the country. In fact, years later as
President of the College, he often began his remarks to students with the phrase
“Remember, life is not fair. Once you accept that, you can move on.”11
Epictetus’s teachings and the Stoic philosophy would play a major role in
Stockdale’s life, especially while he was imprisoned in North Vietnam. He wrote
to Brennan, “My ‘secret weapon’ was the security I felt in anchoring my resolve to
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those selected portions of philosophic thought that emphasized human dignity
and self-respect. Epictetus certainly taught that.”12 While in prison, Stockdale
lived in the world of Epictetus and applied the lessons and teachings from The
Enchiridion to survive. “The Stoic philosopher Epictetus was foremost among my
consolations in the pressure cooker of Hanoi.”13
After his release from prison in 1973, Stockdale spent nearly a year in recovery
healing his physical wounds—and pressing charges against fellow prisoners who
had collaborated with the enemy and violated the Code of Conduct. Stockdale
wrote, “To the Stoic, the greatest injury that can be inflicted on a person is administered by himself when he destroys the good man within him.”14 Stockdale
argued that the collaborators had betrayed the trust of their fellow prisoners and
deserved punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice; however, the
U.S. government took no action against the collaborators and eventually allowed
them to retire. In 1976, Stockdale became a national hero and received the Medal
of Honor for his service in Vietnam, which included spending almost seven and
a half years as a prisoner of war, much of it in solitary confinement.15
STOCKDALE AND BRENNAN
In 1975, Dr. Joseph Brennan was teaching philosophy at Columbia University.
He became intrigued by what he read about Stockdale and his study of Epictetus
and the Stoics. He sent Stockdale a letter asking how philosophy had given him
inner strength throughout his time as a prisoner of war in Vietnam. Brennan
subsequently requested to add Stockdale’s lengthy response to an upcoming book
he was writing. This exchange laid the groundwork for a friendship that would
endure for the rest of their lives.16
Stockdale took command of the Naval War College as its fortieth President
on October 13, 1977. Shortly after taking over, he contacted both Brennan and
Rhinelander to get their assistance with and feedback on his proposed philosophy
course. Although they had corresponded by letter for almost two years, Stockdale
and Brennan did not meet until the change of command. In a letter to Brennan
dated December 5, 1977, shortly after taking command, Stockdale wrote, “What
are the philosophic roots of a military profession? What are the watershed distinctions that separate bureaucrats from warriors, winners from losers? I know
this is no simple matter to get a layman up to speed to teach such sensitive
material—but I want my students to have something more than a few mutually
contradictory slogans when their backs are against the wall. . . . I need a theme, a
recommended reading list, and a lot of time to think.”17
Brennan visited Newport and the College again over the Christmas holidays
in 1977. He met with Stockdale several times during the visit to discuss the proposed ethics course. Brennan was on track to accept a position in India with the
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State Department, but turned it down when Stockdale offered him a part-time
job as his assistant to develop and teach the course. In a letter to a friend dated
January 21, 1978, Brennan wrote as follows:
My job title is Consultant to the President, term: 11 months of 1978; my duties include preparing the course, getting up a reading list, conferring with the admiral until
17 August when my wife and I will move to Newport for the 16 weeks that the class
runs. I’ll be on standby to give classes when the admiral is called away. The hardest
part will be to prepare the course—it’s easy enough to do that for oneself, but when
somebody, who is not a professional, is to teach it, that’s a new one for me.18

Brennan immediately went to work preparing the course. In his undated
NWC journal notes, Brennan wrote, “When I suggested I’d like to visit classes
and talk to other faculty, he [Stockdale] said, ‘Don’t pay too much attention to
those guys.’”19
As the new President of the College, Stockdale spent time reviewing the curricula for all courses. He was concerned about what he found, and decided to
implement electives for all students during the following AY, 1979–80. In a letter
to Brennan dated January 13, 1978, he wrote as follows:
I’ve created quite a stir with the Departments, asking for electives—not only for
myself—but for Constitutional Law, Soviet foreign policy, etc. I’m telling ’em that I
can drive a truck through the Gaps our three departments leave in the educational
base for mid-career officers and that the option is to let me supervise a broad electives program or move over and give me 25 percent of the room for my 4th department (Philosophy & Law—or whatever). The profs Love it; the Administrators are
adapting.20 [emphasis original]

Stockdale was passionate about implementing changes to make sure the curriculum and the faculty met the needs of its graduates, then and in the future. The
existing curriculum did not address any of the things that Stockdale had found
most valuable during his time as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam. As Stockdale noted, “‘No philosophical survival kits are issued’ when man goes to war.”21
Stockdale and Brennan both spent long hours trying to decide on an appropriate name for the course they would teach. As Brennan noted, “Stockdale did not
like the word ethics. He thought the contemporary ‘ethics explosion’ had eroded
the older, nobler sense of the word. He knew that ethics courses were spreading
rapidly, not only in military institutions but also in business, industry, and the
professions.”22 Stockdale thought that the term moral philosophy was more suitable because it tied into the humanities.23 Stockdale and Brennan finally agreed
on the course title Foundations of Moral Obligation. But they spent many additional hours deciding on the absolute best readings and lessons for the course.
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In a letter to a friend dated January 21, 1978, Brennan wrote: “I do know that he
is interested in anything that has to do with prison camps—he is trying to get
Alex. Solzhenitsyn up to the War College for a lecture. He also wants to put some
literary works on his reading list, and mentioned Camus. Since he, Stockdale,
is an enemy of bureaucracy, I thought that something of Kafka might do. Even
Darkness at Noon occurred to me as a possibility. . . . If you have any suggestions,
I’d be grateful.”24
In a letter to a friend dated February 5, 1978, Brennan wrote as follows:
I spent this last long weekend, Thursday through Saturday, with Adm Stockdale at
Newport and Providence. . . . He is a very intense, very attractive man. . . . We now
have a course title, “The Foundations of Moral Obligation,” as well as a tentative
reading list which includes the Book of Job, the Socratic Dialogues of Plato, selections
from Aristotle’s Ethics, Kant’s Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals,
Mill’s Utilitarianism, Sartre on Existentialism, as well as fiction readings including
Conrad’s Typhoon, Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, Kafka’s Trial . . . and Solzhenitsyn’s
Ivan Denisovich.25

Stockdale and Brennan finalized the course readings and syllabus during the
spring of 1978 and prepared to offer the elective during the fall trimester.
THE STOCKDALE-BRENNAN ERA
Neither Stockdale nor Brennan knew how well the new course would be received
by students once they actually started teaching. Both worked diligently to ensure that the syllabus, reading list, and subsequent seminar discussions would
provide valuable information to midgrade military officers in search of a moral
compass. Brennan wrote, “Through the winter, spring, and summer of 1978,
Admiral Stockdale and I met frequently for intensive discussions concerning the
organization of the course.”26 Stockdale fervently believed the course would fill
a void in the students’ careers. He told a reporter, “Today’s ranks are filled with
officers who have been weaned on slogans and fads of the sort preached in the
better business schools—that rational managerial concepts will cure all evils. This
course is my defense against the buzz-word-nomograph-acronym mentality.”27
In an address he gave at Trinity Church in Newport on Sunday, May 7, 1978,
for Rhode Island’s Independence Day, Stockdale used material from the upcoming course in his remarks. Stockdale highlighted both Viktor E. Frankl’s book
Man’s Search for Meaning and Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov to illustrate
the importance of freedom to the individual.28
The news of Stockdale’s Foundations of Moral Obligation course spread quickly to the Navy Staff. A retired Navy captain who was in the first seminar shared
the following: “By early 1978, the word on the street around DC was that this
course is a ‘must take’ if you wanted to think deeply about the business you were
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in and were lucky enough to get orders to the War College.”29 Stockdale’s reputation as a Medal of Honor recipient, along with Brennan’s prowess as a scholar,
fueled the media blitz. The fact that they were team-teaching a philosophy course
for military students, many with recent combat experience in Vietnam, added
to the attractiveness for the media. Brennan wrote, “Word got around that a
Vietnam war hero with the Medal of Honor was teaching a course in moral philosophy at the Naval War College, and the media moved in with tape recorders,
television cameras, and fast-writing reporters.”30
The initial seminar, offered in the fall 1978 trimester, was capped at fifty students. The second offering was in the winter trimester; it had thirty-five students
and fifteen auditors. Brennan related that the students idolized Stockdale, so
there was no difficulty filling all the seats.31 The course was designed for Stockdale and Brennan each to deliver one-hour lectures on Wednesday afternoon,
followed by a one-and-a-half-hour seminar discussion on Thursday afternoon.
The elective met for ten weeks during the trimester. Stockdale intended to use
original classic material along with popular novels, and he created a challenging
reading list.32 Stockdale said, “We studied moral philosophy by looking at models
of human beings under pressure, their portraits drawn from the best materials we
could find in philosophy and literature.”33 The syllabus included the following:
Week One

Introduction. The Prisoner of War and the Human Predicament. The World of Epictetus.

Week Two

The Book of Job and the Problem of Evil.

Week Three The Socratic Example. Four Platonic Dialogues.
Week Four

Aristotle and the Nichomachean Ethics.

Week Five

Law: Of Conscience and the State. Kant and Hart.

Week Six

Happiness as Utility; Justice and Fairness. Mill and Rawls.

Week Seven Individualism and the Collective I. Emerson; Sartre; Camus.
Week Eight

Individualism and the Collective II. Lenin and Soviet
Philosophy.

Week Nine

Science and Values. Monod and the Moral Ideal of Objective
Knowledge. Wittgenstein and the Ethic of Silence.

Week Ten

Return to the Beginning. The Stoic Ideal and the Ethic of the
Military.34

Each student took a midterm and a final examination and submitted a short
paper. The weekly readings were difficult for the students, especially those
without a background in philosophy. However, the seminar discussions allowed
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Stockdale and Brennan to interact with students and facilitate the learning process. Moreover, the elective gave students an opportunity to expand their horizons and to read and discuss material they never would have read on their own.
During the first academic year it was offered, the Foundations elective received
high ratings from students. In fact, in a report to the President of the Naval War
College, Brennan related that it “ranked highest of the 18 electives offered, topped
only by FE-117, a course in advanced electronic warfare.”35 Student evaluations
ranged from 6.19 to 6.58 on a 7-point Likert scale.36 Overall, the initial offering
was very successful. Brennan related that one of the few negative comments was
that “[t]here was not enough structure to the seminars and there was a tendency
to rely too much on unprepared class discussion to carry them.”37 Stockdale and
Brennan worked to improve the seminar discussions for the second offering.
Both Stockdale and Brennan were passionate about the Foundations elective
because it filled a void in the students’ professional development. This passion
was evident to the students, faculty, and staff at the Naval War College and
throughout the Navy. Unfortunately, Stockdale retired from the U.S. Navy and
left the College shortly after AY 1978–79 to accept a position as president of The
Citadel. However, his interest in and influence on the Foundations course continued long after he retired. Likewise, the bond of friendship that Stockdale had
forged with Brennan continued to grow and prosper over the years.
THE BRENNAN YEARS
After Stockdale’s retirement, Brennan decided to remain at the College and continued to teach the Foundations elective himself as a part-time employee for the
next thirteen years. Brennan did not change the course significantly during those
years. However, he limited the course to twenty-five students to make it more
manageable for only one instructor. Brennan continued to offer the course for
two trimesters each academic year.38
During the period 1986–91, Brennan developed and taught another elective,
“Philosophy in American Values.” This course was popular at the College and
allowed Brennan to dig deeper into American philosophy and literature. He also
served as an academic adviser to international students at the Naval Command
College. Although still a part-time employee, Brennan carried what many today
would consider a full load.39
Throughout this time, Brennan’s friendship with Stockdale and his family continued to blossom and grow. In a letter to Stockdale dated September 13, 1979,
Brennan wrote as follows:
Yes, Foundations of Moral Obligation did meet for the first time yesterday, but it
was a little like putting on Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. Still, the class is
delighted to know that you will come to deliver the valedictory lecture at the 10th
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session. . . . This academic year will show, I think, whether EL 101 (Foundations
of Moral Obligation) has what-it-takes to stand on its own feet. I think it can and
should, but the comparatively large audience for the course’s first trimester is still a
result of your personal contribution and fame.40

In a subsequent letter dated November 6, 1979, Brennan wrote, “Mid-term
is past, course papers are being busily written, and so far all seems to have gone
very well, though I do miss you. I’ve had to do a lot more restructuring [of] the
course than I had thought. Not that the content or the reading has changed—no,
just the way of doing the course without you.”41
Stockdale contemplated introducing the Foundations course to students at
The Citadel.42 He continued to rely on Brennan’s feedback and advice in his outside presentations and articles. But he also provided input to his successors as
NWC President about Brennan’s success with the elective at the College. In a letter to Brennan dated March 19, 1982, Stockdale wrote, “Before I forget it, please
let me know what you hear about the identity of Ed Welch’s successor. I’ll get on
the phone with him right away and make a plea to keep the Philosophy Department (i.e., You). All I need is his name.”43
Stockdale subsequently wrote to Rear Admiral James E. Service, Commander,
Carrier Group Two, the incoming College President, on August 5, 1982:
I’m always afraid that NWC will be put under pressure to rid itself of all apparently
quasi-military courses such as the Foundations of Moral Obligation which I founded
with my good friend Dr. Joe Brennan.
I have no idea that you would even consider discontinuing it, but just as a precaution,
let me give you my impressions of how it has gone under Joe Brennan alone since
I left. I speak to his classes nearly every year. (He has added an American Values
course which also draws a lot of subscribers in the spring trimester). As the classes
filed out of their joint session to hear me this spring, officer after officer—particularly
Marines—said “Best course, Best teacher in the place.” I think a review of the class
critiques will verify this. Joe rings the bell.44 [emphasis original]

Stockdale also spoke to Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, a later President of
the College, about Brennan and the Foundations elective. In a letter to Brennan
of January 10, 1992, Stockdale wrote:
Then at my request he buzzed the Admiral, and I told Joe [Strasser] how proud I was
to be a part of your project. We shared stories about the number of Marine and Naval
officers we’ve each run into, who, on mention of the Naval War College, immediately
mention “Joe Brennan’s courses.” As I count it, you are now in your 14th year there,
and some of our 42 year old students in ’78–79 are now 56! Some retired Admirals
and Generals telling young grandchildren about their career highlights. . . . Admiral
Strasser is a great fan of yours.45
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Upon his retirement in 1992, Brennan received many accolades, including
designation by the Secretary of the Navy as professor emeritus of philosophy.46
His book Foundations of Moral Obligation: A Practical Guide to Ethics and Morality was published in 1992, shortly before he retired.
Brennan died in 2004, but his legacy is well established at the Naval War College. He helped to develop the Foundations elective and continued the course for
thirteen years after Vice Admiral Stockdale retired. However, his legacy consists
of much more than that. Brennan touched the hearts and minds of hundreds of
NWC graduates and inspired them to look at things in a different light and to
consider alternate paths to achieve their own eudaimonia.47
At Dr. Brennan’s retirement ceremony, Stockdale said, “From the classics,
throughout 14 years of teaching here, you have conducted what I consider to be
the world’s best course in military leadership. Never after taking your course will
anyone be comfortable in believing that the analytic and reasoned approach is the
‘be all and end all’ of officership.”48
Perhaps that is the essence of the Naval War College education.
THE REGAN YEARS
Paul Regan began teaching the Foundations of Moral Obligation elective in the
fall trimester of AY 1994–95 while on active duty as a USCG captain assigned to
the College as the USCG adviser. There was a two-year gap in the course between
Brennan’s retirement and Regan taking over.
Originally, Regan was recruited, with two other faculty members, to teach the
Foundations elective to end the temporary discontinuation of the course. Regan
had a background in philosophy and volunteered to assist. When both the other
faculty members fell out, Regan agreed to teach the elective alone. Even after his
retirement from active duty in 1995, he continued to teach the elective one trimester every academic year for the next fifteen years. He worked for the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in Boston and drove to Newport one
afternoon each week to teach.49
Regan was also responsible for keeping the Stockdale name associated with the
elective. Regan wrote, “About halfway through my time with the course I began
to realize that many of the students no longer associated the course with him
[Stockdale], so I requested the name change to include ‘The Stockdale Course.’
Enrollment figures immediately jumped up.”50
Regan did not change the course significantly when he started teaching. In a
statement dated June 6, 2016, Regan confessed, “I made a conscious decision to
stick with the basic outline that Stockdale initiated and Prof Brennan continued.
Since my degree is in scholastic philosophy, which is heavily based in classic philosophy, I say—and continue to see—the value of reading the actual works of the
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great philosophers. Quite honestly, from my background in philosophy, were I
to design the course from scratch I would have used much the same approach as
Stockdale and Professor Brennan.”51 However, when the Berlin Wall came down
in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the original lesson on Lenin and
Soviet philosophy became outdated and was removed.
Regan continued to use Brennan’s book Foundations of Moral Obligation as a
major course text. The major change he instituted was to establish two different
paths, a reading path and a writing path. Students in the reading path completed
all assigned readings and the final examination; students in the writing path
completed only the major readings and Professor Brennan’s book, and were required to write a ten-to-twelve-page paper on a topic dealing with ethics or moral
judgment.52 Regan explained, “After a while it was clear that the workload for this
course was substantially greater than that of most other electives. Indeed, even
after a degree in philosophy and years teaching, I could read most of the material
at about 6 pages an hour. I attempted to level out the course by letting the students
choose to express their thoughts in a longer paper (the standard elective length)
or devote their time to the reading.”53
Although he only taught the course for one trimester each academic year, Paul
Regan’s legacy is that he kept the elective vibrant and exciting for the students.
He taught the course alone longer than Brennan had. His seminars were popular
and full of lively discussions. Regan admitted, “Having lived real lives, students
were not afraid to (courteously) say, ‘Captain, you’re full of crap’ . . . which [led] to
debate and, hopefully, the opening of minds.”54 Regan summarized it best as follows: “And finally, I think every good teacher realizes he or she learns as much as
the students. Teaching the Stockdale Course was a privilege for me. I mentioned
that in the last few years I taught by taking leave from FEMA every Wednesday
and got no reimbursement—but really would have paid to teach for all I learned
and all the fine and dedicated students I had over the years. . . . It was an honor
and has become part of who I am.”55 Regan left the College after AY 2009–10.56
THE COOK YEARS
Dr. Martin Cook came to the Naval War College in 2009 as the Vice Admiral
James B. Stockdale Professor of Professional Military Ethics. He cotaught the
Foundations elective with Dr. Tom Gibbons. Cook came from the U.S. Air Force
Academy but also had taught at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, for several years. His record of publication and teaching professional
military ethics was unsurpassed, and he integrated quickly into the College’s
leadership and ethics team.
Dr. Cook knew little about the Foundations of Moral Obligation elective
before he arrived but quickly realized its value for active-duty military officers.
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Accordingly, he made the decision to offer the elective during all three trimesters
of the academic year. Cook also modified the curriculum to reflect contemporary
issues affecting the military today. He added lessons on non-Western religion, including reading the Hindu Bhagavad Gita, and a lesson entitled “Finding Meaning in One’s Life,” reading Leo Tolstoy’s short story The Death of Ivan Ilych and
Elie Wiesel’s novel Night. Cook introduced Jostein Gaarder’s novel Sophie’s World,
an easy-to-read history of philosophy, to help students gain a better understanding of the different philosophers they studied.57 Karl Marlantes’s book What It Is
like to Go to War is one of the best accounts of modern combat ever written, and
became popular with students and faculty alike. Cook sponsored Marlantes as a
guest speaker at the College every year.
Cook’s syllabus included the following:
Week One

Greek and Roman Stoics. Epictetus. Stockdale’s Thoughts of a
Philosophical Fighter Pilot.

Week Two

The Greek Tradition. Socrates/Plato. “Euthyphro,” “Apology,”
and “Crito.”

Week Three Plato. The Republic.
Week Four

The Greek Tradition. Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics.

Week Five

The Western Religious Tradition.

Week Six

The Enlightenment. Immanuel Kant.

Week Seven Life in Society. UN Charter, Declaration of Independence, U.S.
Constitution, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, and Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.”
Week Eight

Finding Meaning in One’s Life. Tolstoy and Wiesel.

Week Nine

Non-Western (Hindu) Perspective. The Bhagavad Gita. Early
Christian “Just War,” and Karl Marlantes’s What It Is like to Go
to War.

Week Ten

Some Skeptical Challenges. Dostoyevsky’s “The Grand Inquisitor,” Camus’s The Myth of Sisyphus, and the Book of Job.

Cook established at the Naval War College the “Great Books” method taught at
his alma mater, the University of Chicago, and at St. John’s College in Annapolis,
Maryland, and Santa Fe, New Mexico. The students read original-source great
books and then discussed the readings in seminar, with the faculty members facilitating the discussion. In other words, the seminar discussion was the primary
focus, not the faculty members’ lecturing from the front of the classroom. Cook
and Gibbons sat at different ends of the classroom to facilitate and moderate the
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student discussions. Students learned just as much from each other and from the
readings as they did from the faculty moderators. Cook commented, “I personally believe that the modified great books method makes the students engage far
better than a lecture-discussion course would.”58
Cook also relied heavily on technology; he instituted use of the Blackboard
learning management system. The electronic syllabus he built within Blackboard
actually came alive on screen with links to podcasts, embedded videos, and
contemporary lectures on relevant topics. From the readings each week, every
student wrote a one- or two-page posting of thoughts, criticisms, comments,
and points to be explored. Students also were required to read and comment on
each other’s postings. This system had several advantages. First, students started
the weekly discussions before they even arrived at the classroom, by commenting on each other’s postings. Additionally, students improved their writing skills
through the weekly postings and immediate feedback, rather than writing a
ten-to-twelve-page paper at the end of the course. Blackboard enabled Cook and
Gibbons to jump-start the seminar discussion before they actually came to class.
Cook departed the Naval War College in 2016 to work at the U.S. Air Force
Academy as a distinguished visiting professor. His fame and reputation as a leading scholar in professional military ethics had enhanced the Foundations elective
and helped to establish it as one of the most popular electives during his tenure.
His legacy of using technology, along with the Great Books method, improved
the delivery of the course and brought it into the twenty-first century.
STAYING POWER
Why has the Foundations of Moral Obligation elective continued to be so popular after nearly forty years? This simple yet thought-provoking question has many
answers. The easy one is that the course owes its success to a triad of the faculty,
the syllabus and readings, and the students. But there is much more to answering
the question than that.
The faculty members who taught the elective over the years were all qualified
and competent in their discipline. Moreover, they were all gifted and talented
educators. Even more than that, they were passionate about the curriculum and
brought that energy and passion to the classroom. Each in his own way set the
conditions that enabled the students to think about the material, apply it to their
lives, and then share those experiences with others in seminar. Regan revealed,
“Most tellingly, in the class students would often bare their souls and bring to
light moral dilemmas they had to deal with—and most implicitly trust their classmates not to let their statements be repeated.”59 Rather than simply spouting information about ancient philosophers or literature in the seminar, the instructors
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empowered their students to apply what they learned to their daily lives and share
this with their classmates.
The syllabus and course readings that Stockdale and Brennan originally selected almost forty years ago have remained fairly consistent across time. Of the ten
lessons in the original syllabus, six are relatively similar today. In an after-action
report dated January 29, 1980, Brennan wrote, “[T]he course should center on,
though not be restricted to, important classical and modern readings in philosophy and the humanities. Moreover, whenever possible the readings should
consist of primary, not secondary, sources.”60 This guidance has stood the test
of time and still is reflected in the syllabus. In 1982, Stockdale noted that “[w]e
studied moral philosophy by looking at models of human beings under pressure,
their portraits drawn from the best materials we could find in philosophy and
literature. The professional implication for military men and women followed.
We did not have to draw diagrams: the military applications came up naturally
in seminar discussions.”61
Many of the readings are time-consuming and difficult to understand the first
time through. Students often ask themselves, “Now, what did I just read?” However, the lessons and pearls of wisdom in the readings are priceless. Cook wrote,
“I guess I was pleasantly surprised how many students seemed to make serious
and genuine efforts to read and understand the material, even if they really didn’t
get it until class.”62 In the seminar it is easy to see when the light goes on and a student suddenly “gets it” and really understands the text. This enables the learners
to apply a text to their own lives and share it with others. One important metric of
success is that, no matter how uncertain they were whether they had understood
the week’s assigned reading when they arrived in class, during subsequent lessons
most students would refer back unfailingly and accurately to previous readings.
Although they are difficult for many, the course readings are timeless and tend
to make a lasting impression on students. In fact, many times on the last day of
class the instructors provided supplementary reading lists for students to continue their studies in military ethics long after graduation. One student wrote, “I
believe that I am better prepared after taking the Stockdale Course. Dr. Regan has
given us a pretty impressive reading list to follow up our studies in this course. I’m
making it a mission in my life to try and read all these classic works. If anything,
this course has provoked a hunger in me to learn more about ethics and moral
behavior. It must surely be a positive thing in a man’s life if he at least yearns to
learn more about living a proper existence.”63
For some, the readings opened new doors and exposed them to material they
never would have selected on their own. In a letter to Brennan a student wrote,
“The readings introduced me to material that I should have read a long time
ago, and never had either the inclination or the opportunity.”64 Stockdale wanted
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students to read and discuss the classics. He trusted that doing so would help
them to develop a moral compass and enable them to think critically. Brennan
later wrote, “Training in the humanities, Stockdale believed, would show that
much of what goes by the name ‘social science’ serves up ideas expressed earlier
and better in classical philosophy and modern literature.”65 This course provided
an opportunity for many Naval War College graduates to read and discuss classic
literature, which shaped their personal and professional development and had a
positive impact on their lives.
The students are the third critical element in the triad of success. For the most
part, the students at the Naval War College are motivated, want to learn, and work
hard. In other words, they are avid consumers of the educational experience.
Many have recent combat experience and are willing to share those experiences
with classmates. They bring a willingness to learn and an insatiable desire to
question things that others often take for granted. Why do the students like the
Foundations elective? Regan’s analysis is as follows:
Almost any military career path is technical in one way or another. Rarely is there
the opportunity to answer the real questions: What makes life worth living? For the
military, what is worth dying for? How should I raise my children? These fundamental questions require a certain maturity to address. The students at the NWC have
reached an age where these questions are important, as are the answers. There are few
times in life when one has the opportunity to look in depth at such questions.66

The Foundations elective provides an opportunity for students to ask these
“hard questions” in a nonthreatening environment among peers who are asking
the same things. Cook opined, “I think it’s popular because I think Aristotle’s
observations about the study of ethics (that it’s not useful to do it with the young,
who lack experience) is borne out by the fact that after a couple of decades of
adult experience they seem so eager to think about these matters.”67 There is a
difference between studying philosophy as an undergraduate and as a graduate
student: the graduate student can relate more to the lessons because of his or her
greater life experiences.
Countless letters express students’ gratitude to the College for offering the
Foundations elective. A USN officer and future President of the Naval War College wrote to Stockdale, “Some students questioned the course’s relevance, if you
can believe it. For me it would be like questioning the relevance of oxygen. . . .
I find the subjects of the course extremely useful. Thanks for the effort—it is
still bearing fruit 20+ years later.”68 Another student wrote, “It’s a dangerous and
deadly working environment we have chosen to work in. Without this foundation
(pun intended) in moral and ethical behavior, when we do get in the buzzsaw, can
we really be sure we’ll be prepared?” (emphasis original).69
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Students continue to rate the course high on their end-of-course evaluations.
Recent students’ comments reflect this sentiment.
“Amazing course to only add to my tool box in becoming a better effective
leader and thinker.”
“Reading and understanding certain philosophers like Aristotle, Plato,
Socrates, Thomas Aquinas, Kierkegaard, etc. can be difficult. This course
definitely challenged my ability to read and interpret their works. Also, the
course work challenged my thinking and long-held beliefs, which was great.”
“Foundations of Moral Obligation is one of those courses that changes one’s
perspectives and the lenses that we perceive events in life—both of which is
[sic] important in an increasing multi-national world.”
“Had me think about why I did certain things or why I should do things
differently.”
“Excellent course. Needed for anyone who considers themselves a future
senior leader.”
“The best course that I have taken.”70
It is not just one or two things that have made the Foundations elective popular for almost forty years. It is a combination of many that contributed to making
possible those magical moments in seminar when students are able to discuss
controversial issues and then open their minds to a different way of thinking.
Naval War College graduates have liked the Foundations of Moral Obligation
elective so well that some have proposed making it part of the core curriculum,
to be taken by all students. This aspect is especially relevant given the recent spike
of events questioning the moral compass of senior USN leaders.
However, it would be a mistake to require all students at the College to take
Foundations of Moral Obligation. Part of the value of the course comes from the
well-qualified and passionate instructors who have taught the elective in the past.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to educate enough faculty members to offer the course to all students at the same level of proficiency. Nor would the quality of student participation be as high if the course was a mandatory requirement.
Those students who choose to take the course do so out of a desire to discover
new ways to think about life’s fundamental questions.
Vice Admiral Stockdale understood the importance of a liberal arts education
and the study of the humanities in a highly technical defense organization. “The
philosophy course he took at Stanford in his thirties, said Stockdale, did him a
lot more good in Hanoi than any of the Naval Academy’s technical subjects.”71
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Stockdale also realized that leaders need to develop more than just their technical proficiency. As Brennan noted in 1983, “The study of good philosophy and
literature, he [Stockdale] held, would benefit human beings; and, since military
officers were human, it would be good for them, too, not only as human beings
but as military officers.”72
Stockdale recognized the importance of military officers becoming lifelong
learners. Officers should never stop learning and questioning. Brennan related
that “[w]hat the officers liked best about the Stockdale course was the opportunity to reflect on questions they felt had always been in their own minds, but just
below the surface. This course, they agreed, provided them with the chance to
raise those questions to the level of mature consciousness.”73
The continuing relevance and popularity of the course only serve to reinforce
Stockdale’s original reason for establishing it: to develop a course for military officers, focusing on leadership and ethics, that gives them the moral tools for success, whether on the battlefield or in a staff job at the Pentagon. A reporter from
the Washington Post summarized it best when he wrote as follows:
Called “Foundations of Moral Obligation,” the course that Stockdale himself will
teach represents the latest attempt to help American fighting men cope with pressure,
including but not limited to that inflicted by captivity.
He will try to convey to young officers what teachings got him through his 7½ years
of captivity, which began on Sept. 9, 1965, when he parachuted from his damaged
A-4 fighter-bomber into a tree. He will try to explain how and why a man can summon up astonishing courage if he has committed himself to integrity—“one of those
words which many people keep in that desk drawer labeled ‘too hard,’” in Stockdale’s
words.74

Over 1,900 graduates and family members have taken the Foundations of
Moral Obligation course since Vice Admiral Stockdale and Dr. Brennan introduced it in 1978. Little did the two men know at the time how this one course
would impact the lives of so many over the years.
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REDISCOVERIES

REMARKS, STOCKDALE TO PILOTS, 1965

Martin L. Cook

Dr. Cook taught at the Naval War College from 2009 to 2016 and is the
Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Professor Emeritus of Professional
Military Ethics at the College. He now serves as a distinguished visiting
professor of philosophy at the U.S. Air Force Academy.

In Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot, his collection of reflective essays
published long after his time in Vietnam, Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale
writes eloquently about the importance of the study of philosophy in helping him
to endure the prisoner of war (POW) experience. While at Stanford completing a
degree in economics, he found his most important questions being deflected by
the economics faculty, often with the remark, “Well, we’re getting into philosophy
now.” Exasperated by that reaction, Stockdale found his way to the Philosophy
Department and embarked on a course of reading in the subject, guided by Professor Philip H. Rhinelander.
As Stockdale was leaving Stanford, Rhinelander gave him a copy of the work
on Roman Stoicism by the freed slave–philosopher Epictetus, which Stockdale read (he says) initially only out of respect for Rhinelander. But Epictetus’s
thoughts clearly stuck with him and, in the end, helped him find the resiliency
and determination to endure the POW experience honorably. The key tenet of
Stoic philosophy is the distinction between what one can control (only one’s own
actions and inner reactions to things) and what one cannot (the actions of others
and the unavoidable circumstances life brings).
Although written well before Stockdale began his POW experience, this
speech to his aircrews en route to Vietnam demonstrates the degree to which he
already was thinking about and articulating what they were about to undergo in
Stoic terms. His discussion about moving up bomb-release altitudes or adding
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fuel reflects exactly the Stoic notion of accepting the mission one is given, realistically and uncomplainingly. His unflinching dismissal of “Hollywood answers”
and straightforward recognition that, as military officers, his listeners do not get
to pick, or even to some degree judge, the war to which they are assigned are a
perfect illustration of recognizing what is within one’s own powers and what is
not. It recognizes that political decisions about where military force is used are
“above the pay grade” of his officers.
Stockdale reminds his listeners, “[Y]ou [are] an actor in a drama that you’ll
replay in your mind’s eye for the rest of your life.” In other words, you are not
the playwright, but how you perform in the play rests entirely in your hands. In
this remark, he is virtually paraphrasing Epictetus (Enchiridion 17): “Remember
that you are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the author pleases to make it.
If short, of a short one; if long, of a long one. If it is his pleasure you should act a
poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally.
For this is your business, to act well the character assigned you; to choose it is
another’s.”
So, in this short address, we see Stockdale the Stoic warrior attempting to
impart Stoic wisdom to his aircrews. It is the perfect illustration of the “operationalization” of the importance of philosophy that he will write about years later
with such eloquence. But already, here, he is attempting to help his aircrews steel
themselves mentally to accept the war and the missions assigned to them unflinchingly, realistically, without illusions. He is, as the Stoics would say, leading
them to live “in accordance with Nature” (kata phusin) by calling things what
they are and calmly facing what lies before them.
Remarks of wing commander James B. Stockdale to the pilots of Carrier Air Wing 16 aboard
USS Oriskany, at sea en route to the Gulf of Tonkin, on April 29, 1965, one week before they
entered combat. Presented as found in the archives of the Naval War College. Excerpted version
available in U. S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (Presidio, 1978).

Having reviewed for you the terrain of Vietnam, the enemy’s order of battle, the
rules of engagement, and to some extent the modern history of the conflict and
the evolution of America’s strategy, I think I owe you in addition a straight-fromthe-shoulder discussion of pilots’ mental attitudes and orientation in “limited
war” circumstances. I saw the need for this last summer aboard Ticonderoga—
after the start of the war had caught us by surprise and we had gone through
those first, exciting days pretty much on adrenaline. In the lull that followed, as
we prepared for a next round, I could sense that those fine young men who had
measured up so well in the sudden reality of flak and burning targets wanted to
talk and get their resources and value systems lined up for the long haul. Like
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most of you, they were well read, sensitive, sometimes skeptical—those educated
in the American liberal tradition to think for themselves—those who are often
our most productive citizens and, just as often, our best soldiers. They realized
that bombing heavily defended targets is serious business and no game—that it is
logically impossible, in the violence of a fight, to commit oneself as an individual
only in some proportion of his total drive and combative instinct. It has to be
all or nothing; dog eat dog over the target. I think they were asking themselves,
as you might—Where do I as a person, a person of awareness, refinement, and
education, fit into this “limited war,” “measured response” concept?
I want to level with you right now, so you can think it over here in mid-Pacific
and not kid yourself into imagining “stark realizations” in the Gulf of Tonkin. Once
you go “feet dry” over the beach, there can be nothing limited about your commitment. “Limited war” means to us that our target list has limits, our ordnance
loadout has limits, our rules of engagement have limits, but that does not mean
that there is anything “limited” about our personal obligations as fighting men to
carry out assigned missions with all we’ve got. If you think it is possible for a man,
in the heat of battle, to apply something less than total personal commitment
—equated perhaps to your idea of the proportion of national potential being
applied—you are wrong. It’s contrary to human nature. So also is the idea I was
alarmed to find suggested to me by a military friend in a letter recently: that the
prisoner of war’s Code of Conduct is some sort of a “total war” document. You
can’t go halfway on that, either. The Code of Conduct was not written for “total
wars” or “limited wars,” it was written for all wars, and let it be understood that it
applies with full force to this air wing, in this war.
What I am saying is that national commitment and personal commitment are
two different things. All is not relative. You classical scholars know that even the
celebrated “free thinker” Socrates was devoted to ridiculing the sophist idea that
one can avoid black and white choices in arriving at personal commitments; one
sooner or later comes to a fork in the road. As Harvard’s philosophy great, Alfred
North Whitehead, said: “I can’t bring half an umbrella to work when the weatherman predicts a 50 percent chance of rain.” We are all at the fork in the road this
week. Think it over. If you find yourself rationalizing about moving your bombrelease altitude up a thousand feet from where your strike leader briefs it, or adding a few hundred pounds fuel to your over-target bingo because “the Navy needs
you for greater things,” or you must save the airplane for some “great war” of the
future, you, you’re in the wrong outfit. You owe it to yourself to have a talk with
your skipper or me. It’s better for both you and your shipmates that you face up
to your fork in the road here at 140 degrees east rather than later, two thousand
miles west of here, on the line.
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Let us all face our prospects squarely. We’ve got to be prepared to obey the
rules and contribute without reservation. If political or religious conviction helps
you do this, so much the better, but you’re still going to be expected to press on,
with or without these comforting thoughts, simply because this uniform commits
us to a military ethic—the ethic of personal pride and excellence that alone has
supported some of the greatest fighting men in history. Don’t require Hollywood
answers to “What are we fighting for?” We’re here to fight because it’s in the interest of the United States that we do so. This may not be the most dramatic way to
explain it, but it has the advantage of being absolutely correct.
I hope I haven’t made this too somber. I merely want to let you all know first
of all where this wing stands on “Duty, Honor, Country.” Secondly, I want to warn
you all of excessive caution. A philosopher has warned us that, of all forms of
caution, caution in love is the most fatal to true happiness. When that Fox flag is
two-blocked in the Gulf, you’ll be an actor in a drama that you’ll replay in your
mind’s eye for the rest of your life. Level with yourself now. Do your duty.
Footnote: No one came forward with reservations. By the time Oriskany returned to San Diego
in December 1965, its pilots had earned a record total of military decorations for Vietnam
carrier deployments. Of the 120 pilots addressed in this talk, thirteen did not return to the ship:
eight were killed in action, one is still unaccounted for, and four—including the speaker—spent
seven and a half years as POWs in Hanoi.
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DIRECT FROM GENDA PRIMARY-SOURCE EVIDENCE FROM GENDA
BEARING ON PARSHALL-BENNETT EXCHANGE REGARDING FUCHIDA AT
PEARL HARBOR

Norman Polmar

In a Research & Debate (R&D) item in the Winter 2013 issue of the Naval War
College Review, Martin Bennett authored a scathing—and correct—attack on Jon
Parshall’s R&D item “Reflecting on Fuchida,” which had appeared in the Spring
2010 issue of the Review. A key point of the original article and the subsequent
commentary was Fuchida’s alleged “demands” that the Japanese carrier task force
that attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, undertake a third strike—
primarily to destroy the fuel tanks.
As Bennett states, there was no such discussion or debate on the flag bridge
of the carrier Akagi. My sources for this contribution are my lengthy correspondence and personal discussions with Minoru Genda, who was on the flag bridge
as the carrier force’s air operations officer and had been one of the two initial
planners of the Pearl Harbor strike. (After the war, with the rank of general, he
commanded the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.)
I recently found a letter from Genda to me from September 1965, at which
time he was assisting me with my book Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier
Aviation and Its Influence on World Events. In the
letter Genda stated:
Norman Polmar has authored or coauthored more
than fifty published books, including extensive writings on carrier aviation. He also writes a column on
historic naval aircraft for Naval History magazine.
Previously, Mr. Polmar wrote a column for the U.S.
Naval Institute’s Proceedings for thirty-eight years.
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There were no hot discussions on board the Akagi.
Commander Fuchida might [have] expressed his
opinion about the further attacks, I do not know.
The only thing I know is “If they come out [of Pearl
Harbor], we will strike again,” Commander Fuchida
said just after he landed on the deck.
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Anyhow, Adm. Nagumo [the task force commander] and Rear Admiral Kusaka (chief
of staff, 1st Air Fleet) made up their minds, “No Second Attack,” long before we
started the attack.

Genda later confirmed these recollections in personal discussions with me
in Annapolis in May 1969. A specific concern he mentioned to me was the
unknown locations of the three U.S. aircraft carriers in the Pacific. With search
planes from Oahu seeking the Japanese carriers and the U.S. carriers possibly in
the area, Admiral Nagumo (1) was concerned about being surprised by the U.S.
carriers, and (2) feared that the surviving aircraft on Oahu could mount strikes
against his ships if they remained in the area.
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BOOK REVIEWS

PLUS ÇA CHANGE, PLUS C’EST LA MÊME CHOSE
TORCH: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory, by Vincent P. O’Hara. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2015. 384 pages. $49.95.

In the literary mountain of scholarship,
research, and writing devoted to World
War II, the story of Operation TORCH,
the Allied landings in North Africa in
November of 1942, is presented often as
something of an overture to the massive
amphibious symphonies that followed.
Accounts may include some discussion
of Eisenhower’s growing facility for
strategic leadership, the byzantine nature
of Vichy and Free French politics, and
the gradual emergence of Charles de
Gaulle as the leader of Free France. The
landings themselves all too often have
been presented as hinting of a Kabuki
production, if not of opéra bouffe, with
a few desultory shots fired to assuage
Gallic honor, followed by capitulation.
Then, it seems, the real war begins,
moving down dusty roads to Kasserine,
the initial blooding of the U.S. Army,
the rise of Patton and Bradley, and the
inexorable sweep of operations to Sicily,
the Italian mainland, and eventually the
beaches and hedgerows of Normandy.
Vincent O’Hara has done much to
correct this impression and to give
TORCH the attention it deserves.
Readers will come away with a much
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better understanding of the difficulties
faced by both the French defenders and
the Allied invaders and the political
currents that swirled about the operation
from the very beginning—and with
an appreciation for how the results
could have been very different.
As O’Hara points out, 1942 was a
parlous time for the Allies. Axis
armies were cutting deep into the
Soviet Union, and fear that it would
drop out of the war was palpable. U.S.
leaders, particularly George Marshall,
eschewed what might be considered
military sideshows and argued for a
rapid buildup of force in Great Britain,
followed by a cross-channel invasion
at the earliest opportunity. The British,
led by Churchill and scarred by their
experience in World War I, preferred
less direct approaches, avoiding the U.S.favored direct attack until victory was
assured. TORCH represented a victory
for British planners and a setback for
Marshall. This is among the betterknown elements of the North African
campaign, and O’Hara does it justice
without dwelling overlong on the topic.
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In contrast, French politics usually
are, for the most part, underexamined,
and O’Hara provides a valuable
understanding of French actors and
motives. His examination of Marshal
Pétain’s efforts to end the German
occupation and restore France to
something approaching its former status
is both convincing and useful. So too
is O’Hara’s meticulous description of
French forces, plans, and readiness in
North Africa on the eve of invasion.
O’Hara’s discussion of invasion
planning and preparation and the
movement to the various landing
beaches is excellent. Although dwarfed
by later invasions, TORCH required
a major effort at a time when Allied
amphibious resources were extremely
limited. Scheduling convoys, arranging
for carrier-based air support, and
coping with potentially lethal surf
conditions all foreshadowed difficulties
that would have to be overcome in later
amphibious operations. The plan was
audacious. Allied forces were to carry
out five simultaneous and geographically separated landings on the Atlantic
and Mediterranean shores of North
Africa, then race to Tunis to trap
German forces in Africa and deny those
forces additional support from Europe.
Accomplishing this would bring the
Mediterranean under much greater Allied control, and the Axis might have to
take some pressure off the Soviet Union
to deal with the new threat to the south.
As O’Hara makes clear, French
resistance, while affected by conflicting orders on whether to take Allied
troops under fire, was not a token
effort, although the loss of only 1,700
Allied wounded and killed may have
contributed to this impression. Although
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ill equipped and often outnumbered,
French forces, including colonial auxiliaries and units of the Foreign Legion,
fought well. While some French units
offered no resistance, they did so in obedience to orders from their commanders. O’Hara details the action on each
of the five invasion beaches in detail.
The naval battle of Casablanca was, as
O’Hara describes it, “the largest surface,
air, and subsurface naval action fought
in the Atlantic Ocean during World War
II.” The battle, which lasted six hours,
featured naval gunfire duels between
USS Massachusetts and the disabled
French battleship Jean Bart. French
shore batteries engaged U.S. warships
and French combatants shelled Allied
landing craft en route to the invasion
beaches. French officers handled their
ships with courage and daring, and they
came close to engaging the Allied troop
transports. Maps are provided, greatly
aiding the reader’s understanding of
how the battle was conducted. There
was also a naval engagement off Oran,
and Italian and German aircraft and
submarines conducted significant
antishipping actions as the campaign
wore on. O’Hara illustrates that, far
from being an Allied walkover, the
possibility of TORCH resulting in a
disaster at sea was much more likely
than is normally acknowledged.
A greater appreciation of TORCH by
students of amphibious warfare is warranted. Many of the problems associated
with projecting power from the sea were
identified during this campaign. The
role of beachmasters, the timing and
coordination of shore bombardment,
and the logistical difficulties associated with landing supplies on an open
beach in high surf all were factors. At
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times the lessons learned were small,
such as the discovery that landing net
rungs spaced too far apart posed a
significant danger to debarking troops.
Some elements of the TORCH landings
touch on current questions. For example,
although the Saint-Nazaire and Dieppe
raids had demonstrated previously the
inherent difficulty in conducting an
amphibious assault on built-up areas,
TORCH would feature several efforts
along these lines. The most dramatic of
these was an attempt to land U.S. troops
from HMS Walney and HMS Hartland
(the former U.S. Coast Guard cutters
Sebago and Pontchartrain, respectively)
directly onto the moles of Oran Harbor.
Both vessels quickly were identified as
hostile and ran an intense gauntlet of
French fire until sunk. In contrast, an
attempt was made to sail USS Dallas, a
vintage destroyer carrying seventy-five
specially trained assault troops, six miles
up Port Lyautey’s Wadi Sebou waterway
to carry out an attack on a critically important all-weather airfield. The effort,
despite experiencing significant delays,
succeeded. In an ever-urbanizing world,
the viability of direct amphibious assaults may be open to debate once again.
O’Hara rightfully points out that TORCH,
in the main, failed to deliver hoped-for
results. It would take five months to
achieve victory in North Africa, not the
three weeks anticipated. The operation
did nothing to ease the plight of the
Soviet Union and the Mediterranean
remained contested waters. The African
campaign drew men, matériel, and
shipping away from efforts to support
a direct invasion of Europe. TORCH
resulted in the total occupation of
France by Germany and the intentional
scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon.
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None of these results, according to
O’Hara, inflicted real loss on Italy and
Germany. However, in the opportunity
to identify and resolve amphibious
challenges and as a beginning to the
development of a truly combined
strategic command, TORCH was of
value. If, as O’Hara claims, TORCH also
ensured that France would not become
a true ally of Germany, the strategic
benefit may have been significant.
TORCH sheds some welcome light on
a campaign that too often is passed
over. Scholars and lay readers alike will
find the book useful. While O’Hara
has performed yeoman service in
providing this detailed account of the
amphibious portion of the campaign,
perhaps his greatest contribution
is to restore the reputation of naval
forces that, far from offering token
resistance, fought with courage and
tenacity, often against superior odds.
RICHARD J. NORTON

How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II, by Phillips Payson
O’Brien. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2015. 640 pages. $35.

This book provides a detailed reexamination of the main contributory factors
leading to Allied victory in World War
II. In many ways the book’s argument
is not so much new as it is a revision
of the revisionists. During the Cold
War the narrative was largely that the
Western Allies had triumphed over
Germany and Japan with some help
from the Soviet Union. That narrative
was challenged at the time, and with
more success after the end of the Cold
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War by revisionist historians who
placed an increased emphasis on the
role of Soviet ground and air forces in
the defeat of Germany. The Russian
front, it was argued, was where the
bulk of Germany’s forces was engaged
and, as far as the revisionist narrative
went, defeated by the Soviet Union. Dr.
O’Brien, a reader at the University of
Glasgow, challenges that argument with
a wealth of data and looks at the war in
more global terms. He argues that the air
and sea forces of the United States and
the British Empire played the decisive
role by preventing “the Germans and
Japanese from moving” (p. 16).
How the War Was Won provides a broad
array of detailed information discussing
the enormous industrial contribution
of all sides. Indeed, the author’s analysis
of all this information makes a compelling case for his argument. Yet there is
something missing: it is difficult to see
the link between cause and effect. One
can see such a link better regarding the
war against Japan, but in the case of the
war in Europe the author does not show
clearly the link he claims between air
and sea power causing immense damage
to Germany’s war economy and Soviet
troops wandering around Berlin in 1945.
I suspect that the Soviet forces’ killing
and wounding of millions of German
combat troops might have something to
do with this, for without the physical removal of German soldiers from the Soviet Union’s route to Berlin Hitler might
not have felt the need to commit suicide.
Now, there is no denying that Allied
air and sea power contributed to Allied
victory in Europe; the argument seems
to be to what extent they did so. Thus,
this book is welcome for the depth of
detail it provides as fodder for such a
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debate. That this reviewer is not entirely
convinced of the author’s arguments
does not make this a bad book; it is in
fact a very good book, and an extremely
welcome addition to the literature on
World War II. It provides an enormous
amount of information and analysis
about the role of air and sea power,
which furthers our understanding of
the reasons for Allied success. That it
causes the questioning of the current
orthodoxy is to be applauded, as
greater understanding often results
from challenges to the status quo.
This book should prove of great benefit
to advanced students of World War
II, and it is particularly pertinent for
specialists interested in current U.S.
national security needs. Given the
friction that exists among the United
States, China, and Russia, the book
provides an opportunity to think about
how the U.S. armed services should
structure their forces for any future
conflict with these potential adversaries.
Dr. O’Brien’s book should be read by
any sailor, marine, or airman invested
in a budget fight, because “the only way
to ‘win’ a war is to stop your enemy
from moving” (p. 488). That argument
seems a particularly pertinent one when
looking at the problems of Southeast
Asia or the Baltic or Black Sea regions.
NICHOLAS MURRAY

A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the
Samurai to the 21st Century, by John T. Kuehn.
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014. 299 pages. $75.

Japan is at an inflection point. Depending on how particular peoples and
nations view this enigmatic country, it
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now either is turning away from rightly
enforced demilitarization and back
toward the more martial and expansionist policies of its past, or is working to
become a security provider concomitant
with its economic power. A Military
History of Japan is therefore a timely
work that will add studied moderation
and critical analysis to the argument
regarding the path on which the country
is located now and down which it
is likely to progress in the future.
This book goes well beyond a traditional
historical narrative. The author follows Japan from its origin myths up
to the present time, adding elements
of geographic determinism and
cultural anthropology as well as his own
experiences. The military and warfare
aspects obviously receive the most
focus, but they are not, and perhaps
cannot be, separated from the overall
history of the country and culture.
In the first chapter, “From Sun Goddess
to Samurai,” the author helps explain
Japan’s nature by telling its creation story
and examining how landscape, climate,
outside influences, and internal competition shaped Japanese development and
societal worldview. Around the eighth
century CE, when that first chapter concludes, the seminal samurai culture, and
an overall Japanese culture distinct from
those of neighboring Korea and China,
is in place, one the author argues still
manifests itself in Japanese society.
The following chapters chronicle the
subsequent maturation of Japan’s
political and military power structure.
The many accounts of royal machinations and specific battles may confuse
or lose those not well versed in Japanese
geography or language, but those the
author includes do add to the story of
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how and why Japan’s military evolved as
it did. These middle chapters also shed
light on the Japanese military’s actions
during the first half of the twentieth century, and on the still-tense relationship
between Japan and its neighbors, much
of that distrust predating World War II.
The Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese
Wars get ample attention and analysis,
as does the very calculated, top-down
manner in which Japan’s post-samurai
military attempted to imitate the best
militaries of contemporary Europe.
The “Great East Asian War” chapter
may not cover much new ground for
those readers with more-than-standard
knowledge of World War II. But in
“After the Samurai,” the book’s final
pages tie in themes present in Japan
for at least 1,200 years. They provide
an excellent argument that Japan’s
future will be determined by the same
geographic, cultural, and geostrategic
influences that have shaped its past.
The author is a retired naval aviator and
a professor at the Army Command and
General Staff College. He spent time
living in Japan both as a dependent
child in the mid-twentieth century and
later as a Navy officer. These experiences give him insights different from
those expected from either a pure
academic analyst or a strategist viewing
the country simply as an unsinkable
aircraft carrier. He effectively intersperses personal and family recollections
with more-standard history to give
better descriptions of cultural norms
and practices, as when he writes about
Japanese rioters sending teams ahead
to warn citizens, including his parents,
to stay indoors for their own safety.
For the casual reader, A Military History
of Japan functions as a needed update
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to Ruth Benedict’s much-maligned
yet still-influential 1946 work The
Chrysanthemum and the Sword, a
general primer on the seemingly
contradictory forces driving this global
power. For those with a professional
interest in the country and its region,
this book is a must-read, an enlightening
facilitator in the current debate over
Japan’s place in Asia and the world.
J. OVERTON

Flash Points: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, by
George Friedman. New York: Doubleday, 2015.
288 pages. $28.95.

Flash Points is both an elegant and a
disturbing book. Not simply elegant
in its writing style, which is direct and
clear, but also in its initial discussion of
the age of discovery and enlightenment
that propelled the European nations
into becoming world powers—you
rarely find a more cogent and concise
explanation of the roots of European
social, cultural, political, and economic
development. Yet the book is also very
disturbing because it details how the
factors that allowed Europe to transform
the world—faith, individualism, scientific inquiry, ideas of self-determination
and legal rights, and nationalism—also
contributed to the almost unfathomable
destruction of the two world wars that
tore it apart. George Friedman details
the region’s history, current events, and
potential future in a way that makes
an admonishment from his father, a
Hungarian Jewish survivor of both the
Nazis and the Soviets, seem very true:
“Europe will never change. It will just
act as if nothing happened” (p. 23).
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Freidman, the well-known founder of
Stratfor.com, one of the first private
intelligence firms to be a major presence on the web, and an author of
prescient books on the future security
environment, begins with the personal
history of how and why his family escaped Hungary in 1949. Having
survived the horrors of World War
II and the Communist takeover in a
weak, dependent, and occupied nation,
Friedman’s father wanted his family
to go to America and “live in a strong
country with weak neighbors and, if
possible, no Nazis, communists, or
anyone else who believed in anything
deeply enough to want to kill him
and his family over it” (p. 17). His
view—that a humane peace in Europe
always would be a mere interlude—sets
the scenario for the rest of the book.
This fear is, of course, what spurred the
creation of the European Union (EU).
Friedman analyzes the weaknesses
of the EU and the sources of conflict
throughout Europe, particularly in a
situation in which NATO’s perceived
importance has diminished, and
concludes that the centripetal forces of
geopolitics are just too strong. It is not
just the potential collapse of the euro; it
is the fact that national identities cannot
be supplanted by a European identity
without destroying a cultural diversity
established over millennia. The fact that
the EU appeared to achieve some small
success in cultivating a cosmopolitan
Europeanness is, in Friedman’s view,
merely a veneer that a U.S. commitment
to defending a cold peace under unique
historical circumstances made possible.
Those circumstances have devolved.
With the controlling pressures
removed, Yugoslavia—perhaps the
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greatest attempt at fusing otherwise
hostile nationalities—exploded into
violence until all sides were exhausted
by fighting or concluded that opposing
NATO’s wishes was too costly. But that
was before a resurgent Russia could
intervene on behalf of the Serbs. Friedman’s book tours the other potential
flash points of Europe within a background where Russia is back, and the
geopolitical question of who will be the
hegemonic leader of Europe—France,
Germany, or Russia—has returned. It
is not ambition that drives; it is fear of
the power of the others (as Thucydides
described so many centuries ago). By
all measures, Germany would remain
the dominant power in economics, as
it is the economic engine of the EU
today. But it also is the power most
easily invaded from both east and west.
And it is growing impatient with the
seeming impossibility of creating an EU
that conforms to its view of necessary
order. The Germans, according to
Friedman, view themselves as the
victims of the EU/euro economic
crisis. What would it mean to the EU,
NATO, and specifically eastern Europe
if Germany were to cut a deal with
Russia to secure its own “permanent”
peace—secure to be the export
power it already is beyond Europe?
In Friedman’s view, the question of
Germany, Russia, and European peace
is one of national culture as well as
geopolitics: “For the Germans, success
and disaster are intimately linked, so
they are simultaneously afraid of what
they have achieved and tremendously
proud of it. . . . They do not aspire
to lead a new Europe. They fear that
they cannot escape the role. The rest
of Europe harbors suspicions that
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Germany’s public fears and modesty are
feigned, that in the end the old Germany
has never died but has merely been
asleep” (p. 153). Add in Russian pressure
and the fact that post–Cold War
Germany is united, and the European
foundation seems a lot less stable.
Even if the European powers never
are moved to conflict with each other,
Friedman’s conclusion is that the situation can make the continent safe for
ethnic breakups, with all the resulting
potential for wars—or perhaps hybrid
wars and gray-zone conflicts—to
occur. Russia will be the first to take
advantage of that, prompting others to
do the same. He predicts that “Europe’s
history of conflict is far from over. . . .
[I]n many places Europe’s anger against
other Europeans is still there” (p. 251).
Ultimately, Friedman sees the future still
controlled by Europe’s “Faustian spirit”
that “haunted its greatest moment, the
Enlightenment,” defined as “the desire
to possess everything even at the cost of
their souls,” and today “everything at no
cost” (p. 257). By “everything,” he means
national sovereignty without the exercise
of national sovereignty; wealth distribution without work distribution; a world
in which they can feel like the hegemon
but not have to be it; a world in which
wars would stop without intervention; and, perhaps worst of all, ethnic
nationalism without its implications.
What can be done to prevent growing
conflicts? Friedman flirts with the fact
that America today is still as powerful
as it was when it put out “the European
fire in 1918 and 1945” and contained
it during the Cold War. But can it do
so in the future? Should it do so in the
future, or do the fires need to burn
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themselves out? Friedman is not sure,
but he does give us a disturbing prospect
about which we need to think deeply.
SAM J. TANGREDI

The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation,
and the Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region,
by Michael R. Auslin. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ.
Press, 2017. 304 pages. $30.

The signature foreign policy move,
and greatest strategic insight, of Barack
Obama’s presidency was “the pivot”—
later renamed “the rebalance”—to the
Asia-Pacific region. President Obama’s
initiative grew out of his conviction that
Asia had become the most important
region in terms of economic dynamism,
explosive demographic growth, and
growing military tensions. And if one
broadens the geography and semantics
to include India—yielding the “IndoPacific”—this makes utter sense, since
the region claims 60 percent of the
world’s population, nearly 40 percent of
total global economic output, some of
the fastest-growing and most capable
militaries, and three nuclear states. No
surprise, then, that the Obama White
House argued in a November 2015 fact
sheet that this region “is increasingly the
world’s political and economic center of
gravity.” Or, as top Asia expert and diplomat Kurt M. Campbell astutely wrote
in The Pivot: The Future of American
Statecraft in Asia, “[T]he lion’s share of
the history of the twenty-first century
will be written in Asia” (pp. 1, 344).
While the Obama administration
made a compelling case for the logic
of pivoting to Asia—that is, elevating
the time, attention, and resources
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given to the region relative to other
parts of the world—the results were
uneven. Washington reinvigorated its
diplomacy in the region, strengthened
commitments with U.S. treaty allies,
forged relationships with new partners
such as Burma, began shifting military
assets to the region, and negotiated
a far-reaching trade deal intended to
deepen economic integration. But it also
failed to ratify that trade deal, suffered
significant political setbacks with treaty
allies Thailand and the Philippines,
was unable to counter Pyongyang’s
rush toward acquiring nuclear weapons
capable of reaching the United States,
and did little to restrain Chinese
maritime assertiveness and economic
and political coercion in the region.
How then should one understand and
evaluate the myriad factors contributing
to Asia’s future? And are the risks to
the continued growth and stability of
the region now eclipsing the region’s
promise? These are the questions that
Michael Auslin, scholar in residence
at the American Enterprise Institute,
asks in his judicious, sobering, and
compelling new book The End of the
Asian Century. Auslin argues that Asia’s
future is significantly less assured than
is commonly held. As a longtime scholar
of, frequent traveler to, and trenchant
observer on the geopolitics of Asia, he
is positioned well to make such a case.
This book is far from a polemic; in
fact, Auslin approaches these questions
as a skeptic, describing how he in fact
originally held the opposite belief—that
the twenty-first century inevitably
looked to be an Asian century. Yet
through repeated trips to the region and
multiple meetings with senior policy
makers, businessmen, and military
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officers, he became convinced that risk
rather than opportunity was the most
salient feature of the Asian political,
economic, and military landscape. He
argues that U.S. policy makers have been
overly optimistic about opportunities in
the region and insufficiently attentive to
risks, thereby warping U.S. perception of
regional trends and causing the United
States to pursue misguided policies.
This book is Auslin’s attempt to introduce a framework to assess risks in Asia
properly, across five major categories.
These include threats to Asia’s growth
from the end of its economic miracle
and the failure to implement structural
macroeconomic reforms; demographic
pressures that will place increasing strain
on rapidly modernizing and urbanizing political and economic systems;
unfinished political revolutions that will
address these large-scale economic and
social dislocations; long-term historical
antagonism among various Asian states,
the lack of effective regional political
community among them, and the dearth
of effective institutions to mitigate crises;
and, most alarming, the growth of power
politics and the increasing potential for
war. The book’s organization follows
these categories, with chapters mapping
risk in each thematic domain. A final
chapter both summarizes and concludes
with a series of policy recommendations.
Auslin posits that as risk increases,
prudent investors take out more insurance. This advice is as relevant to nations
as to individual investors, and applies
across all the categories of risk contained
in the earlier sections of the book. In the
security realm, he argues for a concentric triangular approach, with an inner
core of states—Malaysia, the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Singapore—working
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closely with an outer core of the region’s
liberal-democratic heavyweights,
Australia, India, and Japan, to counter
an increasingly aggressive China.
Economically, he advocates for structural reforms within Asian nations and
trade liberalization among them. To
alleviate political instability, he pushes a
realistic democracy-promotion program.
To avoid isolating China, he promotes
an agenda for enhancing contact with
ordinary Chinese citizens. Linking all
these recommendations is a belief that
long-term stability in Asia is most likely
to flow from increased liberalization and
democratization, and that the United
States should have an indispensable
role as partner and catalyst in that
process. Absent American involvement,
investment, and leadership, short- and
long-term instability are likely to rise.
Auslin issues the caveat that his book is
not intended as a comprehensive guide
to all the countries in the region or all
the issues affecting them. And yet in just
222 pages his book manages to serve
not only as an excellent introduction
to the region but as an incisive guide to
understanding the contemporary risks
roiling the most consequential region of
the world. Extremely useful for national
security professionals, investors, and
interested observers alike, this book
moves beyond headline news to analysis
and advice in navigating the region’s
shifting geopolitical, demographic, and
economic landscape. Some will find
his recommendations too aggressive,
although his policy prescriptions explore
both costs and benefits. Others perhaps
will allege that Auslin is too bearish, too
gloomy on what many are expecting to
be the dawn of the Asian century. But,
given the acceleration of tensions in
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Asia, the demise of trade liberalization,
the erosion of democracy and advance
of autocratic rulers, and the doubts
the Trump administration has cast on
its commitment to alliances, we may
find that he was in fact too sanguine.
CHARLES EDEL

Warring Navies: India-Pakistan; Indian Navy’s
Role in the Indo-Pak Wars, by Ranji Rai and Joseph Chacko. Dombivli West, India: Frontier India Technology, 2014. 320 pages. $20.

Ranji Rai and Joseph Chacko’s book,
Warring Navies, is a welcome addition
to the scant coverage of the naval
history of South Asia. The authors are
a retired Indian navy commodore and
a defense journalist, respectively, and
the book draws heavily on Commodore
Rai’s experiences in the navy. The book
itself crosses the boundaries between
memoirs and popular history, covering
the history of the Indian navy’s operations from independence through the
end of the Cold War. It also includes
several stand-alone essays on various
topics related to maritime and regional
security by prominent retired Indian
military leaders, such as former army
chief Ved P. Malik, former navy chief
Vishnu Bhagwat, and Lieutenant
General C. Satish Nambiar. One of
the major strengths of the book is its
coverage of the many lesser-known uses
of the Indian navy (e.g., the liberation
of Goa in 1961 and the interventions
in the Maldives, Seychelles, and Sri
Lanka in the 1980s). It is particularly
useful for both Indian and non-Indian
readers to be aware of these past actions
today, as both India and its international
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partners debate India’s role as a security
provider in the Indian Ocean region.
The book is pitched toward a general
audience interested in military and
naval affairs in South Asia. The prose is
engaging and humorous, which makes
the book a quick read. For example,
the title for the chapter on the 1965
war—in which the Indian navy was not
particularly active—is “The Navy Does
Sweet Fanny Adams in 1965.” One of the
more interesting aspects of this book is
its use of various Indian, Pakistani, and
American autobiographies and memoirs
to interject vignettes from people
involved in the conflicts, ranging from
Indian naval officers to Pakistani leaders
and even to Henry Kissinger. These
provide insight into the perspectives of
participants in the events. The book’s
main strength is that it gives an insider’s
view on the challenges of joint operations for the Indian military. There are
some excellent examples, ranging from
air force and naval aviation in the 1965
war to amphibious operations in 1971
and smaller operations in the 1980s.
A couple of minor points detract from
the book. Given that it is a popular
history based on personal observations
and the memoirs of participants, some
of the general history of the conflicts
does reflect older interpretations and
narratives that are now debatable. The
book is not academically sourced and
does not have citations, so the reader is
left wondering whether the book would
have been improved if the authors had
engaged more with the work of recent
historians, such as Srinath Raghavan’s
excellent work on the 1971 war, or
even the classic histories of the Indian
navy done by Admirals Singh and
Hiranandani. Similarly, the book could
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have given greater attention to formatting and editing to improve its structure
and eliminate typographical errors that
distract the reader. In particular, the
intersection of long quotations from
other authors sometimes confuses the
narrative; perhaps some of these longer
passages could have been placed in an
appendix so the authors’ narrative would
not be interrupted. Last, some of the
additional essays by other authors do not
seem to fit within the theme of the book.
However, these shortcomings need to be
taken in context, given the nature of the
book and its intended audience. Readers
should keep in mind that the work
is intended to be neither a definitive
history nor an academic book, so they
should not expect it to engage with the
academic literature or offer extensive
footnoting. But for its intended audience
and modest ambitions, it does succeed
in bringing a valuable perspective with a
great deal of personal experience to the
reader in an approachable and readable
format. It will be of use to readers who
want more anecdotal details of the
history of naval operations and the naval
cultures of India and Pakistan, and those
who want a short overview of the naval
aspects of the conflicts in question.
PATRICK BRATTON

Vietnam Narratives and the Collective Memory
of the Vietnam War, by John A. Wood, War and
Society in North America series. Athens: Ohio
Univ. Press, 2016. 200 pages. $69.95.

More than forty years after the last U.S.
combat troops departed Vietnam in
1973, the conflict looms large in American popular culture and memory. Vivid
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depictions of guerrilla warfare, antiwar
protests, and psychologically troubled
veterans proliferate in print and film.
This was not always the case, however.
Silence followed in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War as veterans
and civilians alike grappled to forge
meaning from the long, costly intervention and ultimate American defeat. The
arrival of veteran-authored memoirs in
the late 1970s and the 1980s reignited
popular interest in the war and inspired
numerous others to follow suit. In subsequent decades, the gritty authenticity
of these best-selling narratives, written
by “those who were there,” profoundly
shaped American collective memory
and historical discourses about the war.
John A. Wood’s Vietnam Narratives and
the Collective Memory of the Vietnam
War aims to expose myriad misconceptions that have developed as a result.
Undertaking a comprehensive analysis
of the best-known Vietnam veteran
memoirs, Wood delineates the accuracies, omissions, and miscues inherent
in the genre to ascertain its overall
influence on American understanding of
the war. His methodology centers on the
collective analysis of fifty-eight Vietnam
veteran memoirs and oral histories
published between 1967 and 2005. He
supplements this primary set of texts
with films, newspapers, U.S. government
studies, historical scholarship, and
personal accounts from Vietnamese
civilians, African Americans, women
veterans, and other less prominent
authors. Wood’s primary argument
is that veteran narratives are subject
to the properties and limitations of
memory. Based on personal recollection
usually written long after the events in
question, memoirs necessarily provide
a fragmentary and biased perspective.
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Seven chapters ranging in topic from
author demographics to race, sex,
and postwar life illustrate this point.
Examining the backgrounds of the most
prominent authors, chapter 1 generates
a demographic profile for the typical
Vietnam-veteran memoirist: a collegeeducated, white, male officer. Although
enlisted personnel tended to be younger
and more-diverse working-class men,
Wood astutely notes that most veteranwriters were low-ranking officers whose
combat experiences were not only similar to but representative of those of the
men they commanded. Chapter 2 delves
into the authorial ambivalence common
to many veteran narratives, which
simultaneously disparage the military
mission and condemn Vietnamese civilians as duplicitous enemy collaborators
and greedy opportunists. Wood attempts
to rehabilitate popular perception of the
Vietnamese by justifying their behaviors
as the desperate actions of the inhabi
tants of a war-ravaged nation. Observing
a conspicuous absence of racial tensions
in the best-known Vietnam memoirs,
chapter 3 foregrounds the narratives
of nonwhite veterans as a race-centric
“countermemory” of the Vietnam War.
Wood’s analysis reveals two competing
paradigms: authors either highlight racial cooperation and pride in the combat
performance of their particular ethnic
groups or they underscore incidents of
white racism and express a separatist
racial ideology derived from the Black
Power movement. Women and sexuality are the focus of chapter 4, which
concedes that male soldiers generally
behaved in a sexist manner in their
interactions with Asian and American
women in Vietnam. Wood attributes the
prevailing misogynist attitude of American servicemen to mainstream and
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military cultures that emphasized sex
and promoted a general hostility toward
women. Chapter 5 debunks prevailing
myths about veterans’ homecomings
and postwar lives: first, that Vietnam
veterans suffered from post-traumatic
stress disorder at a greater rate than
soldiers who survived earlier wars;
second, that Vietnam veterans literally
were spat on by an ungrateful American
public on their return home. Chapter
6 underscores the ambivalent political
sentiment common to Vietnam veteran memoirs and concludes that such
characterizations accurately reflected
the views expressed in U.S. government
opinion polls. The final chapter tracks
numerous similarities between Vietnam
memoirs and narratives produced
by veterans of other American wars,
arguing that cross narrative parallels
reflect a consistent demographic among
authors as well as the fact that “combat
soldiers’ wartime experiences have not
changed in many fundamental ways
since at least the 1940s” (p. 109).
Wood’s desire to present a comprehensive analysis of the genre has produced a
volume that is both more superficial and
more repetitive than necessary. Wood
also overlooks the ways that memoirs
as a genre guide veterans’ selection of
stories to include. Memories are at once
distilled to a carefully curated collection,
embellished with expository detail and
context, and stitched together to form
a compelling narrative arc. Vietnam
veteran narratives not only inspired
and made acceptable “uncensored”
accounts but provided a model and
template for the types of stories that
should be featured. Noncombatant
veteran memoirs, for example, represent
a potentially rich, untapped vein of
information for scholars but almost
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certainly lack the high-intensity combat
usually considered “worthy” of retelling.
Although Wood’s research is voluminous, it relies heavily on published
materials. Archival records and
Vietnamese-language sources would
strengthen an already insightful analysis
of American veteran narratives and
their imprint on popular perception
of the war. Moreover, Wood’s reliance
on previous scholars’ works undercuts
his oft-repeated claim that the book
offers an overdue corrective to existing scholarship. Indeed, this slender
volume is directed not only to the casual
reader but to the professional historian.
According to Wood, Vietnam veteran
memoirs have received “inadequate
treatment” by literary scholars and
historians, who generally consider only a
small sample of texts and fail to distinguish fiction from nonfiction narratives.
He further charges that few military
historians scrutinize veteran-authored
texts. Yet Wood’s fundamental premise
that this book “is a work of history, but
it does not treat veteran memoirs as
sources that can be straightforwardly
mined for information” belies a naive
understanding of professional historical
practice (p. 5). Any responsible scholar
approaches her sources—archival and
secondary—with a professionally
critical eye.
Even so, this book would be an excellent
addition to an undergraduate military
history curriculum. Wood’s clear and
impressive synthesis of historical and
literary scholarship provides a useful
introduction to the critical study of
Vietnam veteran memoirs. Interested
readers will want to supplement Wood’s
book with fine-grain examinations such
as David Kieran’s Forever Vietnam: How
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a Divisive War Changed American Public
Memory, Thomas Myers’s Walking Point:
American Narratives of Vietnam, and
Jerry Lembcke’s The Spitting Image:
Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of
Vietnam.
BREANNE ROBERTSON

The Role of the Royal Navy in South America,
1920–1970, by Jon Wise. London: Bloomsbury,
2014. 288 pages. $122.

Although arguably not a very enticing
title for American naval professionals,
this small, hardback book is nonetheless
well worth their time. The author’s aim
is to illustrate the contribution that the
maritime service can make to a nation’s
foreign policy in peacetime, and in
particular to the health of its shipbuilding and defense exports. While the
book obviously showcases the fortunes
of twentieth-century Great Britain, the
points it makes are broadly transferable
and increasingly relevant in this era of
growing emphasis on seamless intergovernmental cooperation. Besides, the
subject matter is refreshing: How often
among naval monographs do you find
a top-notch scholarly investigation into
that most mundane and yet ubiquitous
naval mission of “presence” or “showing the flag”? Naval officers are quick
to extol the virtues of these activities
in conversation, but few actually can
substantiate their claims. This book
goes some way toward filling that gap.
The book has its origins in a PhD dissertation on the history of the relationship
between the Royal Navy and its Chilean
counterpart. As such it limits the focus
to a manageable analysis of the presence

164

4/21/17 8:35 AM

War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue

mission in a particular theater at a given
time, while at the same time allowing a
useful extension into the broader topic
of naval diplomacy throughout the
Americas as a backdrop. The work begins with a survey of the extant scholarship on showing the flag—a term that the
author explains is really too broad to be
useful—before moving chronologically
through the decades of the last century.
By and large the chapters flow logically
into one another, although the comparative chapter on U.S. postwar defense
plans (chapter 6) seems something of an
outlier, particularly in view of the title.
The research is excellent and uses a wide
variety of contemporary official sources
and established scholarly works. The
author is an academic researcher and
does not appear to have had any naval
experience, although he has done his
homework in gathering the appropriate
naval opinions. The work forms a
concise and usable package. (However,
from a publishing point of view, the
physical ink used in the printing leaves
a lot to be desired. In the reviewer’s
copy, even the action of fingering a page
lifted the print right off the paper!)
The book’s overall message is that, while
the Royal Navy was suffering through a
stretch of undeniable decline throughout
the period, even in its heyday the
service never really enjoyed a position
of complete, influential dominance
on the South American continent.
Furthermore, by being proactive and
focusing its efforts on areas where
success was more likely, it managed to
maintain a surprising level of influence
for far longer than one might have
imagined in what was, after all, very
much a secondary theater for the
United Kingdom. To this end, the book
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showcases the importance of the attaché
in linking naval and diplomatic efforts,
as well as the enormous value of offering
educational experiences and exchanges
to foreign officers, thereby sowing the
seed corn for future cooperation.
Interestingly, it also demonstrates that
even in the absence of such schemes,
the Royal Navy leadership could and
did lead the impetus for change, with
surprising success—as evidenced by the
impact of the 1970s “Group Operating”
concept, which enhanced the prestige
value of the navy’s visits ashore while at
the same time sustaining its skills and
capabilities at sea. The navy benefited in
that its “blue-water” skills were preserved far longer than would have
been possible otherwise, and defense
sales benefited from the showcasing
of those skills. It truly was a “win-win”
development. In conclusion, this is a
worthwhile read for anyone interested
in the broad topic of naval diplomacy
overseas or defense sales in particular.
ANGUS ROSS

The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary
Warfare: Achilles Goes Asymmetrical, by Pauline
M. Kaurin. Surrey, U.K.: Ashgate, 2014. 154 pages.
$149.95.

Pauline Kaurin is associate professor
of philosophy at Pacific Lutheran
University, specializing in the just war
tradition and military ethics. For this
volume, Kaurin developed her research
during time at the U.S. Naval Academy
and U.S. Military Academy and in
dialogue with academic colleagues in
the International Society for Military
Ethics. This volume examines the ethical
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complexities facing the modern warrior
engaged in asymmetrical warfare (AW).
In the introduction, Kaurin begins
with a thorough discussion of the term
warrior, giving it a meaning distinct
from soldier, sailor, airman, or any other
military operator. To give meaning to
the warrior concept, Kaurin reaches
back to ancient Greek mythology: she
finds Achilles, of Homer’s Iliad, to be
the “touchstone” for the ethical warrior.
Kaurin does not see Achilles as the perfect example of a warrior; instead, Achilles exemplifies the military professional’s
existential essence in war and personifies
warrior virtues, resilience, and prowess.
Even though Achilles fought his wars
in antiquity, Kaurin sees Achilles as
relevant to the AW of the current era.
Examined through the lens of jus in
bello, how do we fight like Achilles and
how do we fight against Achilles? The
volume addresses the moral education
of the warrior to engage and interpret
better the unconventional conflicts
that present ethical challenges, as
well as ethical impediments that are
contrary to jus in bello. How do we
equip the warrior to engage ethically complex weapons technology and
changing asymmetrical conflict?
Kaurin argues for a systematic examination of the ethical challenges posed by
autonomous weapons and AW. What are
the ethics of the strategies and tactics
of each of the two sides in AW? One
side may use torture against captives,
whether combatants or noncombatants,
while the other side chooses not to
reciprocate owing to countervailing
moral norms, contrary public opinion,
and lack of political will. How does
the warrior question, think, and
respond to such moral dichotomies
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faced in AW? Kaurin’s premise is that
moral education must address AW
within the scope of jus in bello.
The focus on AW stems from two
points. The first is a mind-set fixed
on a conventional-war theory that
understands asymmetrical conflict as
part of conventional warfare. A second
point is that AW requires new challenges
to ethical thinking that are counter
to that associated with conventional
war. When will serious ethical thought
be given to the changing nature of
war, which confronts the norms of
traditional war between nations?
Kaurin’s thoughts and observations
go beyond AW. She identifies the
deeper nuances of moral asymmetry,
as defined by Michael Gross and Rob
Thorton. The adversary’s failure to
practice reciprocity undermines the
moral norms, strategy, and tactics of
the generally stronger opponent. With
disproportional impact, the effect
represents a symbolic and ideological
stance against the stronger opponent.
Of the ethical questions Kaurin
poses throughout the book, some are
being contemplated already, while
others are harder to engage because
the moral scope involved cannot be
brought into focus yet. She contends
that understanding the full scope of the
ethical issues requires getting into the
hearts and minds of the adversary; yet
often it is the adversary who artfully
gets into the hearts and minds, and
the social fabric, of the opponent.
Kaurin contends that if warriors are to
engage in asymmetrical moral conflict,
they must have courage. Yet the technological development of weapons means
that the physical distance between
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opponents is growing, so it takes less
courage to go to war. Achilles had the
courage to fight face-to-face, taking
risks and facing danger directly.
For many, distancing oneself from
danger—even the risk of danger—by
using technology imposes a fundamental
weakness on the modern warrior amid
the challenges he faces. Kaurin presents
a detailed analysis of courage in an
asymmetrical context, with a prescription for developing courageous warriors.
Another moral attribute that Kaurin
sees as essential to the warrior ethos is
loyalty. This loyalty is built on leadership and trust and is a foundation of
the profession of arms. Referencing
the Illiad, she compares the loyalty of
Achilles, the traditional warrior, with
that of Hector, the contemporary,
professional warrior. A strategy for
training warriors for loyalty is laid
out. In addition to excellent military
ethics literature references, Kaurin uses
film to illustrate key ethical points.
The combatant/noncombatant
distinction must be made clear for the
soldier considering jus in bello. Kaurin
proposes a five-level gradation of power
and threat, from highest to lowest:
• uniformed combat personnel
• unconventional belligerents
• those provisionally hostile
• neutral or nonhostile noncombatants
• vulnerable noncombatants
Discerning the appropriate category
of combatant/noncombatant would
determine the appropriate level of force.
Such a moral model of ascertaining
the threat level would equip the soldier
better in the ethics of jus in bello.
Kaurin’s thoughts are a contribution
to the literature on the higher level of
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moral thinking for military leaders. She
does not shy away from the conundrums
the warrior faces. To maintain an
ethical edge in asymmetrical warfare,
military ethics must be embedded into
the culture of the profession of arms.
THOMAS E. CREELY

The General vs. the President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War, by H. W. Brands.
New York: Doubleday, 2016. 448 pages. $30.

The relief of General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur by President Harry
S. Truman remains one of the most
controversial and debated wartime
command decisions made in the
military history of the United States.
By April 1951, Douglas MacArthur was
at the peak of his game as a military
leader. His public pressing to widen the
war in Korea, in direct contradiction
to the intent of his president, and his
public statements to that end that led
to his dismissal still fuel debate today.
H. W. Brands gives depth to the tale of
MacArthur versus Truman by including the complexities that existed in
the Korean conflict and its Cold War
context, when a U.S.-led “free world”
was engaged in a global struggle against
Soviet-led Communism (and especially
Soviet interest in Central Europe). As
the fighting in Korea continued, official
Washington, and the Pentagon in
particular, worried that the war effort
was tying down more and more U.S.
military resources—worries that
fueled further concerns that Moscow
might see the United States stretched
militarily and unable to defend
Central Europe adequately.
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Brands highlights another lesser-known
aspect of the Korean War: MacArthur’s
desire to bring Chinese Nationalist
forces into the fight. Truman and the
Joint Chiefs, knowing how this could
antagonize Mao’s China and possibly
widen the war, did not view the idea
favorably. Truman and the Joint Chiefs
were not convinced that Chiang
Kai-shek’s corrupt and recently defeated
forces would prove more of an advantage
than a burden to the fight in Korea.
MacArthur also clearly chafed at what
he perceived to be Truman’s hesitancy
in fighting Communism. Truman, in
turn, remained focused on the Communist threat to Central Europe and
U.S. commitments to its European allies,
all the while trying to balance resisting
Communist aggression in Korea against
preventing the conflict from widening.

presidential nomination. Yet, not
desiring to campaign and growing ever
more shrill in his speeches, MacArthur
quickly doomed his potential candidacy
to oblivion. His seeming advocacy for
the use of nuclear weapons in Korea
gave civilian and military leaders further
pause, particularly when he suggested
“sowing of fields of suitable radio-active
material” in theater. Interestingly, it
was President-elect Eisenhower who
later broke the peace talk deadlock
by intimating his openness to using
nuclear weapons against the Chinese.

Yet the conflict in Korea did widen
when Chinese forces entered the fray
in November 1950—an escalation
that caught MacArthur off guard.
Only a month earlier, in his famous
meeting with Truman at Wake
Island, he categorically had dismissed
Chinese intervention as a concern.

Perhaps the most damning part of
the MacArthur story is the general’s
testimony before the Senate Armed
Services and Foreign Relations Committees upon his relief of command
and forced return from Japan. The
testimony, which Brands recounts in
great detail, makes for some of the best
reading. MacArthur tries to live up to
his reputation, yet appears to be out of
his league before inquisitive senators.
He ultimately loses what support he
had from Republicans, who, while no
fans of Truman, in the end opted not
to cast their lots with MacArthur.

The central element of the MacArthurTruman controversy proved to be the
persona of Douglas MacArthur himself.
Having lived and fought in the Pacific
since 1937 (and not having returned to
the United States until his relief in 1951),
MacArthur had a self-described faith in
his understanding of the “Asian mind.”
By 1951 MacArthur, then seventy-one,
had lost touch with his country, which
had changed considerably in the thirteen
years since he had been there last. Believing he could speak for the American
people, MacArthur allowed a draft effort
to go forward for the 1952 Republican

A few aspects of the book did prove
distracting. Detailed maps of the
Korean Peninsula showing the many
stages of the Korean War would have
added to the reader’s understanding of
the conflict but are absent. Further, a
glitch in binding resulted in the Korean
Peninsula map that was included on the
inside cover being upside down. The
reviewer contacted the publisher via
e-mail and, although acknowledged,
was not responded to. And on page
329 the author’s passage “MacArthur’s
prediction that by January 1950 the
victory would be so complete” is clearly
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a misprint, because North Korea did not
invade South Korea until June 1950.
These items are minor and easily
corrected in a future edition. What
remains still is a powerful book that
goes into great detail, benefiting
from the storytelling ability of H. W.
Brands. We hope that a civil-military
conflict between a towering figure like
MacArthur and a sitting U.S. president
is unlikely to reoccur. Yet the story
remains a valid one today, with its lessons on the reach of military power in
a democracy, the role of the president
in setting national policy, and the role
of civilian oversight of military power.
DAVID L. TESKA

The Pacific War and Contingent Victory: Why
Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable, by Michael
W. Myers. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2015.
208 pages. $34.95.

The Pacific War and Contingent Victory
is “an exercise in the elucidation of
terms”—an exercise necessary to
determine whether the Empire of
Japan could have avoided defeat at the
hands of the United States and its allies.
The focus on “terms” is important,
as precision and clarity are vital to
Professor Michael Myers’s effort to
challenge the near-universal acceptance
of the idea that Japanese defeat was
inevitable. On the contrary, Myers
argues that there were several points
in the war where the arc of history was
subject to change, given a different mix
of luck, skill, will, or strategy. Myers’s
book takes aim at British historian H.
P. Willmott—a leading proponent of
the inevitability school—and Willmott’s
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assertion that since “the defeat of
Japan was assured” no single battle or
campaign can be considered “decisive.”
The Pacific War and Contingent
Victory challenges this conventional
view that inherent industrial, financial,
and demographic shortcomings all
but guaranteed Japanese defeat.
Myers is also careful to argue that,
while the Japanese could have avoided
defeat, this does not mean necessarily
that they ultimately could have gained
victory. Rather, Japan might have
realized outcomes short of actual defeat,
such as an armistice preserving some
of the gains made early in the war, a
return to the status quo ante bellum, or
even a negotiated surrender that left
Japan more intact than it would be when
it ultimately did surrender in 1945.
Myers’s challenge to Willmott and the
rest of the proponents of inevitable
Japanese defeat is built on an insistence
on precise terms: as he explains, all that
is required is to show that there was the
slightest chance of a Japanese victory,
however long the odds or improbable
the required chain of events. If, even
under the most remote of conditions,
a different outcome could have occurred, then the inevitability argument
is defeated. Myers then argues that if
defeat was not a certainty, then one
or more events—be they battles or
campaigns or just a moment of good
or ill fortune—had to be decisive. It is
difficult, perhaps even impossible, to
argue with Myers’s logic. His position
is somewhat similar to that of a lawyer
defending the owners of a carnival who
offer a commonly found midway game
involving tossing softballs into milk cans
for prizes. All the lawyer has to do is
show that it is possible for the softball to
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go into the can, even if the likelihood of
that happening is as close to zero as one
can get, and no one ever wins a prize.
Myers produces ample evidence to prove
his point. He notes that even Willmott
himself acknowledges that a German
victory in Europe could have enabled
Japan to achieve something other than
defeat in the Pacific. If the avatar of
inevitability admits the possibility of
an alternative outcome, what else is
needed to carry the argument? However,
the clarification that Japanese defeat
was nearly inevitable versus simply
inevitable is a distinction without a
difference. If this were all there was to
Myers’s book, it would be scant reward
for the cost of purchase or the time
spent reading it. Luckily there is more.

Japan might have avoided defeat.
These include a United States willing
to settle for a negotiated conclusion
in the face of mounting casualties
and war weariness. Greater success
against Australia, which Myers argues
could have been achieved, perhaps
combined with a successful invasion
and occupation of Hawaii, might have
been another means to a different end.
In sum, Myers’s book—which has
been used in the Naval War College’s
curricular case on the Pacific theater
in the Second World War—by focusing
on war’s contingent nature, illustrates
well the oft-noted maxim that in war
the enemy truly does “get a vote.”
RICHARD J. NORTON

The Pacific War and Contingent Victory
identifies a number of ways by which
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the western Pacific region in the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning. He received a BA in
classics from Yale College and holds a PhD in history from Yale University. An intelligence officer
in the Navy Reserve, he is the author of Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy
of the Republic (Harvard Univ. Press, 2014).
Nicholas Murray teaches in the Strategy and Policy Department of the Naval War College. He
received his doctorate in modern history from the University of Oxford. He is the author of The
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Rocky Road to the Great War (Potomac Books, 2013), and he advises the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on professional military education.
Richard J. Norton is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College. He is a retired
naval officer and holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. His most recent
publications include articles in the Naval War College Review and the Marine Corps University
Journal.
J. Overton is the writer/editor for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Division Keyport. He was
previously an adjunct instructor in the Naval War College Fleet Seminar Program and the Marine
Corps Command and Staff College Distance Education Program. He served in the U.S. Coast
Guard, and has worked in other public affairs and historian positions for the Navy and Army.
Breanne Robertson is a historian with the Marine Corps History Division at Marine Corps University. She has published articles on Marine Corps activities in the Dominican Republic between
1916 and 1924 and on U.S. efforts to cultivate Pan-Americanism through the visual arts during
World War II. She is currently editing a volume on the history and meaning of the Iwo Jima flag
raisings, entitled Investigating Iwo: The Flag Raisings in Myth, Memory and Esprit de Corps.
Angus Ross is a retired Royal Navy officer and professor of joint military operations at the Naval
War College. He is a graduate of the College, received a second MA from Providence College,
and is working on PhD studies, looking at naval transformation prior to the First World War. His
recent published works include articles in this journal and others on the dilemma facing both the
Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy in the wake of the dreadnought revolution.
Sam J. Tangredi is a professor of national, naval, and maritime strategy at the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies, Naval War College. He is the author of Anti-access Warfare: Countering A2/AD
Strategies (Naval Institute Press, 2013) and two earlier books on the future security environment.
David L. Teska is a retired captain in the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. He is a graduate of Texas Tech
and Kansas Universities. He works for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Homeland Security Department.
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-

I

ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

n late February 2017, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) launched his more
comprehensive and digitally focused CNO Professional Reading Program (CNOPRP). The revised program comprises over 140 books, which are arranged in
categories that align with the “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.”
CNO Admiral John Richardson, USN, launched the website with these words:
Warfare is a violent, intellectual contest between thinking and adapting adversaries.
The team that can think better and adapt faster will win. As we prepare for operations
and war with an increasingly complex set of potential adversaries, we must do more
to sharpen our thinking, learn the lessons from history, and expand our minds. The
books on this list are those that have influenced my leadership development. It is our
responsibility as leaders to continue to grow and to always question the status quo.
These books have helped me do just that. If you find just one book on this list that
challenges you as a leader, then it has been a success. I encourage you to discuss what
has challenged you as a leader in our new forum. Remember to never stop striving to
expand your mind.

The site provides book summaries aligned with the lines of effort and attributes identified in the Design. They include the following:
Naval Power. These books provide a strong foundation of knowledge on classic
and modern maritime strategy, emerging issues, and new threats and opportunities. Historical works in this category span from the age of sail to the many naval
battles of World War II and beyond; studying the history of naval power deepens
the context and offers precedent for the challenges of the present.
Fast Learning. Books in this category address the challenges of creating a flexible
and adaptive learning environment, from the deck plates to the Pentagon, which
is critical to the success of our fleet. Applying the best concepts, techniques,
and technologies accelerates learning for individuals, teams, and organizations.
Clearly knowing the objective and the theoretical limits of performance comes
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through practice and education. We must adapt processes and thinking to be
inherently receptive to innovation and creativity.
Navy Team. These books recognize that we are one Navy team comprising a diverse mix of active-duty and reserve sailors, civilians, and families, with a history
of service, sacrifice, and success. Mariners who read these titles will be better
prepared to build on this history to create a climate of operational excellence that
will keep us ready to prevail against all future challenges.
Partnerships. Books in this category speak to the need for our Navy to deepen
operational relationships with the other services, agencies, industry, allies, and
partners who operate with us to support our shared interests. Partnerships include those with joint service and interagency partners, with international partners, and with research-and-development labs and academic institutions.
The Canon. These books provide core knowledge that is fundamental to the naval profession. Understanding the causes of conflict, the dynamics of power, and
the intersections of politics, diplomacy, economics, and military power is part of
the core knowledge each sailor should have.
Core Attributes. Books in this category address the four core attributes of our
professional identity—integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness—that
help to serve as guiding criteria for our decisions and actions. By embracing these
attributes, our core values of honor, courage, and commitment should be clearly
evident in our actions.
In addition to the books and documents that comprise the CNO-PRP, several
movies and documentaries have been identified to support the learning objectives of the program.
To be more responsive to changes and to reduce procurement and distribution costs, the CNO-PRP is now limited to electronic/digital versions of books
(e-books); hard copies no longer will be distributed automatically to Navy commands afloat and ashore. Many of these e-books are available as downloadable
files that can be borrowed (for limited periods but at no cost) from the MWR
digital library. Most titles in the reading program also are available for free at My
Navy Portal or directly through a log-in from the Navy General Library Program.
Security restrictions at your work site may preclude downloading these books
via Navy-owned computers, so downloading them to personally owned devices
may be necessary. More-detailed instructions on how to access the available
books can be found on the program website at www.navy.mil/ah_online/cno
-readingprogram/.
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Reading books of consequence can be an interesting and effective way to become more professional sailors and informed citizens. This tradition goes back
nearly two hundred years, to Secretary of the Navy Samuel Southard’s order that
every Navy ship be outfitted with a professional library of thirty-seven books on
topics that included mathematics, history, and philosophy. Two centuries later,
we should follow in the footsteps of our predecessors and “Read, Write, and
Win!”

JOHN E. JACKSON
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